1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 24-cv-1002-WQH-LR CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY v. FILING FEES REQUIRED BY 14 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) AND AS
15 FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT SAN DIEGO COUNTY SUPERIOR TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2) 16 COURT, ITS JUDGES AND COURT CLERK’S OFFICE, 17 Defendants. 18 19 HAYES, Judge: 20 Plaintiff Steve Wayne Bonilla, currently incarcerated at the California Medical 21 Facility in Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint 22 (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is a serial litigant, and in 23 this action he complains that the San Diego County Superior Court, its judges and Clerk’s 24 Office, have erred in refusing to invalidate his Alameda County criminal judgment and 25 death sentence in Case No. H-12210-A. (See Compl. at 2–7.) He seeks a declaration that 26 his conviction is “void,” an order releasing him from custody, and compensatory damages. 27 Id. at 7. Bonilla has neither paid the $405 civil filing fee nor submitted a motion to proceed 28 1 in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 2 I. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS 3 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 4 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 5 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55, 6 although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. 7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 8 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 9 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1915(a). Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 11 While “the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive 12 fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ … the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] 13 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of 14 the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the 15 prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of 16 the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). To proceed 17 IFP, prisoners must submit an affidavit of all assets they possess and a certified copy of a 18 trust fund account statement or institutional equivalent for the 6-month period immediately 19 preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)–(2). Using this financial 20 information, the court “shall assess and when funds exist, collect,” an initial partial filing 21 fee based on the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account or the average monthly 22 balance in the prisoner’s account over the 6-month term, with the remainder of the fee to 23 be paid in monthly payments. Id. § 1915(b)(1)–(2). Plaintiff has failed to submit an IFP 24 motion or any of the required financial information. 25 Although the Court would typically grant a prisoner leave to file an IFP motion, 26 Bonilla has abused that privilege many times in the past and is precluded from doing so 27 now unless he faced “imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time of filing. 28 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A negative 1 consequence that may impact a prisoner who files [] frivolous complaint[s] is a restriction 2 on his ability to file future cases without prepaying filing fees.”). Pursuant to § 1915(g), a 3 prisoner with three “strikes,” i.e., prior civil cases or appeals dismissed as frivolous, 4 malicious, or for failing to state a claim, “cannot proceed IFP” absent allegations of 5 imminent danger. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). Bonilla is one 6 of those prisoners, and he makes no plausible allegations of imminent danger here. See In 7 re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s 8 litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se 9 civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011, alone, which were dismissed 10 “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief under 11 § 1983.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 12 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights 13 action.”) (citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal 14 at 6:23-7:19)). 15 II. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(B) 16 Even if Bonilla paid the full filing fee or is eligible to proceed IFP, 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1915A, also enacted as part of the PLRA, requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner 18 complaints like his, or any portions of them, which are “frivolous, malicious,” those that 19 “fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or those that “seek[] monetary 20 relief from a defendant who is immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2); Coleman v. 21 Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 538‒39 (2015). The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the 22 targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom 23 v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 24 As noted above, Bonilla seeks both to vacate his state criminal judgment and 25 sentence and to sue the San Diego County Superior Court, its judges and Clerk’s Office 26 for compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to declare his Alameda 27 County Superior Court conviction “void.” (See Compl. at 7.) He may do neither in this 28 action. 1 First, to the extent Bonilla challenges the validity of his conviction and sentence, a 2 habeas corpus action is his sole federal remedy, and a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 3 inappropriate.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 24-cv-1002-WQH-LR CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY v. FILING FEES REQUIRED BY 14 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) AND AS
15 FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT SAN DIEGO COUNTY SUPERIOR TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2) 16 COURT, ITS JUDGES AND COURT CLERK’S OFFICE, 17 Defendants. 18 19 HAYES, Judge: 20 Plaintiff Steve Wayne Bonilla, currently incarcerated at the California Medical 21 Facility in Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint 22 (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is a serial litigant, and in 23 this action he complains that the San Diego County Superior Court, its judges and Clerk’s 24 Office, have erred in refusing to invalidate his Alameda County criminal judgment and 25 death sentence in Case No. H-12210-A. (See Compl. at 2–7.) He seeks a declaration that 26 his conviction is “void,” an order releasing him from custody, and compensatory damages. 27 Id. at 7. Bonilla has neither paid the $405 civil filing fee nor submitted a motion to proceed 28 1 in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 2 I. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS 3 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 4 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 5 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55, 6 although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. 7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 8 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 9 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1915(a). Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 11 While “the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive 12 fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ … the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] 13 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of 14 the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the 15 prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of 16 the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). To proceed 17 IFP, prisoners must submit an affidavit of all assets they possess and a certified copy of a 18 trust fund account statement or institutional equivalent for the 6-month period immediately 19 preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)–(2). Using this financial 20 information, the court “shall assess and when funds exist, collect,” an initial partial filing 21 fee based on the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account or the average monthly 22 balance in the prisoner’s account over the 6-month term, with the remainder of the fee to 23 be paid in monthly payments. Id. § 1915(b)(1)–(2). Plaintiff has failed to submit an IFP 24 motion or any of the required financial information. 25 Although the Court would typically grant a prisoner leave to file an IFP motion, 26 Bonilla has abused that privilege many times in the past and is precluded from doing so 27 now unless he faced “imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time of filing. 28 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A negative 1 consequence that may impact a prisoner who files [] frivolous complaint[s] is a restriction 2 on his ability to file future cases without prepaying filing fees.”). Pursuant to § 1915(g), a 3 prisoner with three “strikes,” i.e., prior civil cases or appeals dismissed as frivolous, 4 malicious, or for failing to state a claim, “cannot proceed IFP” absent allegations of 5 imminent danger. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). Bonilla is one 6 of those prisoners, and he makes no plausible allegations of imminent danger here. See In 7 re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s 8 litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se 9 civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011, alone, which were dismissed 10 “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief under 11 § 1983.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 12 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights 13 action.”) (citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal 14 at 6:23-7:19)). 15 II. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(B) 16 Even if Bonilla paid the full filing fee or is eligible to proceed IFP, 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1915A, also enacted as part of the PLRA, requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner 18 complaints like his, or any portions of them, which are “frivolous, malicious,” those that 19 “fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or those that “seek[] monetary 20 relief from a defendant who is immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2); Coleman v. 21 Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 538‒39 (2015). The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the 22 targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom 23 v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 24 As noted above, Bonilla seeks both to vacate his state criminal judgment and 25 sentence and to sue the San Diego County Superior Court, its judges and Clerk’s Office 26 for compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to declare his Alameda 27 County Superior Court conviction “void.” (See Compl. at 7.) He may do neither in this 28 action. 1 First, to the extent Bonilla challenges the validity of his conviction and sentence, a 2 habeas corpus action is his sole federal remedy, and a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 3 inappropriate. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 479 (1973) (“Release from penal 4 custody is not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act.”); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 5 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to attack 6 the legality of [a] conviction or sentence.”); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) 7 (“[Section] 1983 remains available for procedural challenges where success in the action 8 would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner … habeas 9 remedies do not displace § 1983 actions where success in the civil rights suit would not 10 necessarily vitiate the legality of (not previously invalidated) state confinement.”) 11 Second, Bonilla seeks damages against San Diego County Superior Court Judges for 12 making excuses to avoid their statutory duty to exercise their jurisdiction and vacate his 13 conviction, contending that a void conviction such as his “is subject to collateral attack 14 ANYWHERE, at any time and in any place.” (Compl. at 3.) Judges are absolutely immune 15 from damages liability for acts which are judicial in nature. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 16 219, 227–29 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355‒57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 17 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967). Judicial immunity applies to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983 for acts committed within the scope of judicial duties, “even when such acts are in 19 excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” 20 Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. “[A] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he 21 took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will 22 be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 23 356–57; see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227 (stating that a judicial act “does not become 24 less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive”). Therefore, 25 Bonilla’s claims for money damages against the Superior Court judges must be dismissed 26 sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) based on absolute immunity. See Mainez 27 v. Gore, No. 17cv1359-JAH (JLB), 2017 WL 4005269, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2017) 28 (finding § 1983 claims for monetary damages against Superior Court Judge subject to sua 1 ||sponte dismissal as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)Gii) & 1915A(b)). 2 || When absolute immunity applies, claims for damages are frivolous. See Baker v. King 3 || Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 981 F.2d 1257, at *1 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished). □□□□□□□□□□□ 4 claims against the Superior Court itself and its Clerk’s Office for their role in their judges’ 5 || failure to declare his conviction invalid is likewise frivolous. /d. If an action is frivolous, 6 || “there is by definition no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to 7 ||amend.” See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons set forth above, the Court: (1) DISMISSES this civil action based 10 Plaintiff's failure to pay the $405 civil filing and administrative fee required by 28 11 ||}U.S.C. § 1914(a); (2) DISMISSES the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 12 || § 1915A(b)(1)(2); (3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal in this case would not be taken in 13 || good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and (4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court 14 || to close the file. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: June 24, 2024 BE: eg Ze. A a 17 Hon, William Q. Hayes 18 United States District Court 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28