Bonilla v. Meza

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedOctober 25, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-01931
StatusUnknown

This text of Bonilla v. Meza (Bonilla v. Meza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bonilla v. Meza, (S.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA Case No.: 24-cv-01931-RBM-KSC CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY vs. FILING FEES REQUIRED BY 14 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) AND AS AMALIA M. MEZA, et al., 15 FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT Defendants. TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2) 16 17 18 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, currently incarcerated at the California Medical 19 Facility in Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint 20 (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff is a serial litigant, and in this 21 action he complains that his Alameda County criminal judgment and death sentence was 22 procured unlawfully. (See Compl. at 2–7.) Bonilla has neither paid the $405 civil filing 23 fee nor submitted a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(a). 25 I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status 26 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 27 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 1 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55, 2 although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 4 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 5 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(a). Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 7 While “[t]he previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive 8 fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ . . . [t]he PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] 9 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of 10 the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the 11 prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of 12 the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1915(b)(1)). To proceed IFP, prisoners must submit an affidavit of all assets they possess 14 and a certified copy of a trust fund account statement or institutional equivalent for the 6- 15 month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)– 16 (2). Using this financial information, “[t]he court shall assess and, when funds exist, 17 collect,” an initial partial filing fee based on the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s 18 account or the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account over the 6-month term, 19 with the remainder of the fee to be paid in monthly payments. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2). 20 Plaintiff has failed to submit an IFP motion or any of the required financial information. 21 While the Court would typically grant a prisoner leave to file an IFP motion, Bonilla 22 has abused that privilege many times in the past and is precluded from doing so now unless 23 he “is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Harris v. 24 Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A negative consequence that may impact 25 a prisoner who files a frivolous complaint is a restriction on his ability to file future cases 26 without prepaying filing fees.”) Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three “strikes,” i.e., 27 prior civil cases or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim, 1 cannot proceed IFP absent a showing of imminent danger. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 2 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). Bonilla is one of those prisoners, and he makes no plausible 3 allegations of imminent danger here. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of 5 California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se § 1983 civil rights actions between June 1 6 and October 31, 2011, alone, which were dismissed “because the allegations in the 7 complaints do not state a claim for relief under § 1983.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently 8 informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to 9 proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.”). 10 II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 11 Even if Bonilla paid the full filing fee or was eligible to proceed IFP, 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1915A, also enacted as part of the PLRA, requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner 13 complaints like his, or any portions of them, which are frivolous, malicious or fail to state 14 a claim upon which relief may be granted, and those that seek monetary relief from a 15 defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2); Coleman v. 16 Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 538-39 (2015). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the 17 targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom 18 v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quote marks omitted). 19 Bonilla’s challenge to the validity of his conviction and sentence fails to state a claim 20 in this action because a habeas corpus action is his sole federal remedy, and a lawsuit under 21 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inappropriate. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 479 (1973) 22 (“Release from penal custody is not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act”);

23 Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[H]abeas corpus is the 24 exclusive remedy to attack the legality of [a] conviction or sentence … .”) 25 III.

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Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Andrews v. Cervantes
493 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Scott Nordstrom v. Charles Ryan
762 F.3d 903 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Coleman v. Tollefson
575 U.S. 532 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Damous Nettles v. Randy Grounds
830 F.3d 922 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Jason Lee Harris v. J. Kenneth Mangum
863 F.3d 1133 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Rosselló-González v. Calderón-Serra
398 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2005)
Jay Hymas v. Usdoi
73 F.4th 763 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)

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Bluebook (online)
Bonilla v. Meza, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bonilla-v-meza-casd-2024.