Bonilla v. Court Clerk's Office

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 10, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00096
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 25-cv-0096-BAS-DEB CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY vs. FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 14 28 U.S.C. 1914(a) COURT CLERK’S OFFICE, 15 DOES 1–1000, and COURT CLERKS, 16 Defendants. 17

18 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at 19 California Medical Facility, has filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 20 1.)1 Plaintiff seeks to “void” his Alameda County criminal conviction and judgment and 21

22 1 Plaintiff has since also filed an additional document entitled “Disqualification of Judge For Committing 23 Fraud Upon the Court,” in which he states that both the undersigned and United States Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Butcher “are disqualified due to committing fraud upon the Court,” contending “the judge 24 failed/refused to pronounce the judgment void or prove subject matter jurisdiction was acquired” despite 25 the asserted lack of an existing federal grand jury subpoena in his criminal case. (ECF No. 2 at 1.) The Court liberally construes this document to be a motion for recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. 26 Yet, the standard for recusal is “‘whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 27 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986). A judge’s previous adverse ruling alone is not 28 1 seeks punishment of those whom he claims violated the federal Constitution and violated 2 his due process rights by failing to declare that judgment void. (Id. at 3–4.) Plaintiff has 3 not filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) in this matter, nor has he paid the 4 initial civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). For the reasons explained below, 5 the Court dismisses the case. 6 I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status 7 Any person filing a civil case such as this one must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28 8 U.S.C. § 1914(a).2 The case may go forward without the plaintiff paying the entire filing 9 fee, though, if the court grants him permission to proceed in forma pauperis—which means 10 as a person without the money or resources to pay the filing fee. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 11 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 12 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, 13 Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 14 The statute that sets out the rules for this is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a)(2) 15 requires all persons who want to pursue a case without paying the filing fee to file a 16 document called an affidavit. That affidavit must include a statement of all assets, or things 17 of value, the plaintiff possesses and must demonstrate the plaintiff’s inability to pay the 18 filing fee. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). This helps the 19 court to evaluate the plaintiff’s ability to pay the filing fee. 20 Plaintiffs who are imprisoned at the time they file their civil case must submit 21 another document as well, called a “trust fund account statement.” The Prison Litigation 22

23 must take all facts provided as true for the purpose of ruling on their legal sufficiency, the court need not 24 accept conclusory speculations that lack any factual support.” United States v. Bell, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 25 1173 (E.D. Cal. 1999). Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of judicial bias other than his conclusory statement which lacks any factual support whatsoever. The Court therefore finds recusal is not warranted. 26 2 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil plaintiffs must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 28 1 Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires imprisoned plaintiffs to submit this “certified copy of the 2 trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period 3 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 4 King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). While “[t]he previous version of the IFP statute 5 granted courts the authority to waive fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ . . . . [t]he PLRA 6 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of 7 the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the 8 prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 9 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured timeline for 10 collecting this fee.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). 11 Plaintiff has not paid the $405 filing and administrative fee required to begin this 12 civil action. He also has not submitted a properly supported Motion to Proceed IFP. See 13 Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Thus, his case cannot go forward. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 14 II. Leave to Proceed IFP 15 Even if Plaintiff had filed a Motion to Proceed IFP, the Court finds he is not entitled 16 to do so in this action for the reasons set forth below. 17 A. Standard of Review 18 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 19 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, “face 20 an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 21 filing fee” in installments for the suits or appeals they launch, see Bruce v. Samuels, 577 22 U.S. 82, 85 (2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)); see also Williams v. Paramo, 775 23 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the PLRA also amended Section 1915 to preclude the 24 privilege to proceed IFP: 25 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 26 States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 27 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 1 2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This subdivision is commonly known as the “PLRA’s ‘three strikes’ 3 rule.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 4 2016). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 5 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. The PLRA furthers “the congressional goal of reducing 6 frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th 7 Cir. 1997). 8 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 9 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a 10 claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles 11 such dismissal as [a] denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 12 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 13 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 14 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 15 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- 16 Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 17 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 18 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 19 from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing 20 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 21 F.3d at 1051‒52 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 22 plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at 23 the time of filing.”). In addition to being “imminent,” that danger must also be “both fairly 24 traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in [the] complaint and redressable by the court.” Ray 25 v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 701 (9th Cir. 2022). 26 B. Discussion 27 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds that it does not contain any 28 “plausible allegations” to suggest that he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical 1 injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 2 Instead, Plaintiff asserts that his Alameda County judgment was obtained by fraud on the 3 court due to the lack of a “federal grand jury subpoena to support the evidence” and that 4 his civil rights were violated due to a “false arrest warrant affidavit.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) He 5 seeks both relief “from a void judgment and malicious prosecution” and punishment for 6 those that assertedly violated his due process rights by failing to declare his judgment void. 7 (Id. at 3–4.) 8 Plaintiff has not moved to proceed IFP in this case; nevertheless, the Court finds it 9 would be futile for him to do so. While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to 10 produce evidence demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 11 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court docket records may be sufficient to show 12 that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore 13 counts as a strike,” id. at 1120. That is true here. 14 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER,3 this Court 15 finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 16 incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 17 that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 18 granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting 19 Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal 20 of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011, alone, which were 21 dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief 22 23 24 3 A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 25 2009 WL 160937, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Servs., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 26 2015), and “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 27 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 28 1 under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without prejudice 2 and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: 3 Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda County 4 District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0026; 5 Bonilla v. Cullen, C 12-0027; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at *3 6 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 7 he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” (citing In re 8 Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23–7:19)). 9 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than 10 the three “strikes” permitted by Section 1915(g), and he fails to make any plausible 11 allegation that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this 12 case, he is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 13 Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 14 “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with 15 a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP 16 status”). When a prisoner-litigant “has accumulated three prior dismissals on statutorily 17 enumerated grounds[,] . . . . a court may not afford him in forma pauperis status with 18 respect to his additional civil actions.” Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534 (2015). 19 This is because “court permission to proceed [IFP] is itself a matter of privilege and not 20 right.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984). 21 III. Conclusion and Orders 22 For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 23 1. DISMISSES this civil action based on Plaintiff’s failure to pay the civil filing 24 fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); and 25 26 27 28 1 2. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the case and accept no further 2 documents for filing in this matter, except a timely-filed Notice of Appeal, 3 which this Court CERTIFIES would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 4 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 ~ 7 || Dated: February 10, 2025 (pallu Bahar g H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28