Bondi v. Bank of America Corp.

383 F. Supp. 2d 587
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 5, 2005·No. No. 05 Civ. 4015(LAK)·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KAPLAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Enrico Bondi has served since December 2003 as the Extraordinary Commissioner of Parmalat Finanziaria S.p.A., Parmalat S.p.A., and 21 affiliated entities (the “Parmalat Debtors”) in the Italian reorganization proceedings known as Extraordinary Administration.1 His position is roughly equivalent to that of a chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee in the United States. This action, which was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina and transferred here by the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation, alleges in substance that Bank of America Corporation and affiliates 2 (collectively “BoA” or the “Bank”) structured transactions that operated to defraud the Parmalat Debtors and their [590]*590investors. The defendants move to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim and to join indispensable parties.3

I. The Complaint

The thrust of the complaint, the well-pleaded factual allegations of which are presumed true for purposes of this motion, is that BoA assisted the Parmalat Debtors, their affiliates (collectively “Parmalat” or the “Company”) and these companies’ managers in “structuring and executing a series of complex, mostly off-balance sheet, financial transactions that were deliberately designed to conceal Parmalat’s insolvency.” 4 The Bank’s “knowing assistance ensured that Parmalat’s financial statements were false and misleading.... The eventual result of this deception was Parmalat’s bankruptcy[.]”5 According to the complaint:

“[kjeeping Parmalat’s actual financial condition secret was crucial to the ability of certain Parmalat insiders ... to maintain an investment grade credit rating for Parmalat. This allowed them to continue to raise additional financing for (a) their massive acquisition campaign, (b) their equally massive looting of the company and (c) their effort to keep the company afloat amid a mounting wave of losses, debts and disappearing funds.”6

A. Specific Transactions

1. December 1997 Credit Agreement with Venezuelan Subsidiary

On December 16, 1997, BoA entered into an $80 million five-year credit agreement with one of Parmalat’s Venezuelan subsidiaries. The parties did not disclose a side letter that gave BoA additional guarantees, a $120,000 “Arrangement Fee,” and interest beyond the publicly-disclosed rate. In other words, the transaction made Par-malat appear healthier and more creditworthy than BoA knew that it was.7

2. September 1998 Loans Secured by Cash Raised Through Private Placements of Debt8

On September 29, 1998, BoA entered into an $80 million eight-year credit agreement with two of Parmalat’s Venezuelan subsidiaries and a $100 million credit agreement with a Brazilian subsidiary. The loans were secured by cash deposits made by Eurofood IFSC Limited (“Euro-food”), an Irish Parmalat subsidiary, in the entire amounts of the respective loans. Eurofoods obtained the funds through issuance of eight-year notes to institutional investors in the United States in private placements arranged by BoA. In other words, the flow of funds in substance was from the investors to the South American subsidiaries. BoA had no risk, but when Parmalat’s troubles came to light in December of 2003, BoA foreclosed on the collateral for the loan to the Venezuelan subsidiaries.

The fact that the loans were secured by cash put up by Parmalat was not disclosed publicly. Consequently, the purchasers of [591]*591the eight-year notes did not know that they were contributing collateral for BoA loans. Nor did the purchasers of Parma-lat’s publicly-traded securities know that Parmalat had approximately $180 million less available cash than its financial statements indicated. Side letters that increased the fees and interest payable to BoA also were not disclosed, thus further distorting Parmalat’s financial picture.9 In addition, the actual purpose of the Venezuela loans was to extinguish debt under the December 16, 1997 agreement—-not, as the public disclosure suggested, “to fund import/export activities by the Venezuelan companies.”10

Finally, the complaint alleges that Par-malat, starting in September 2001, made premium payments on a new credit risk insurance policy. The payments, which totaled $20 million, were deposited to an account controlled by BoA officers, rather than paid to the underwriter of the policy.11

3. October 1999 Credit Agreement with Mexican Subsidiary

On October 12, 1999, BoA signed a $25 million credit agreement with a Mexican subsidiary of Parmalat. Again, the loan was collateralized with approximately $25.5 million in cash deposited by a Parmalat entity. The complaint alleges a complicated series of transfers, but the end result was that the money moved from one Par-malat entity to another. BoA had no exposure but received an annual interest spread and fees. In December of 2003, the Bank foreclosed on the collateral.12

A $300 Million Equity Investment in Administracao13

BoA allegedly structured a set of transactions pursuant to which $300 million of privately placed debt issued by a Brazilian Parmalat subsidiary was disguised as an equity investment. In particular, BoA created two special purpose entities (SPEs) that purchased $300 million worth of stock, equivalent to an 18 percent stake, in Par-malat Administracao S.A. (“Administra-cao”). The SPEs in turn issued four-year notes that were purchased by BoA, institutional investors in the United States, and another Parmalat subsidiary.14 Adminis-tracao booked $130 million of the $300 million as equity. The remaining $170 million was booked as goodwill “and then funneled to Wishaw Trading, a Uruguayan shell entity controlled by the Tanzi family, for the benefit of unknown parties.”15 (Calisto Tanzi was Parmalat’s founder and former chief executive officer,16 and certain members of his family served as officers, directors, or advisors of the Company.17) Furthermore, Parmalat never accounted for $150 million repaid to BoA in connection with these transactions.18

Luca Sala, a BoA employee, advised Parmalat in December 1999 how to describe the transaction in a press release so that it would appear to be equity rather than debt. The appraisal value of Admin-[592]

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Bondi v. Bank of America Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

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