Bolden v. PrimeCare

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided December 2, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-07232·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK HIRAM BOLDEN, Plaintiff, 24-CV-7232 (LTS) -against- PRIMECARE, SULLIVAN COUNTY JAIL; ORDER OF DISMISSAL DANIEL WHITMORE, SULLIVAN COUNTY WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD PRIMECARE STAFF, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is held at Sullivan County Jail, brings this action, pro se, alleging that Defendants violated his rights with respect to their handling of Plaintiff’s confidential medical information. By order dated October 30, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff states that the events giving rise to his claims occurred at Sullivan County Jail. He alleges that Defendants “violated the Hippa [sic] law and patient confidentiality clause [when] it was said over a recorded line in which [I] filed a [New York Freedom of Information Law] request and grievances on the matter.” (ECF 1, at 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that, on July 29, 2024, he “filed a claim against said defendants with [A]lbany and it was dismissed [d]ue to [l]ack of [j]urisdiction.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $500,000 and a “hand written apology.” (Id. at 2.) DISCUSSION A. Claims under HIPAA Plaintiff invokes the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).

HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records without a patient’s consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to 1320d-7. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained, however, that “the statute does not expressly create a private cause of action for individuals to enforce this prohibition. Instead, HIPAA provides for penalties to be imposed by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.” Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing § 1320d-5(a)(1). Because “HIPAA confers no private cause of action, express or implied,” id., this federal statute does not provide a viable basis for Plaintiff’s claims for relief based on his allegations that Defendants violated the confidentiality of his medical information. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s HIPAA claims for failure to state a claim

on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Because Plaintiff names as defendants medical staff at Sullivan County Jail that may be considered state actors, the Court construes the complaint as also attempting to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The Due Process Clause protects a “right to privacy [that] can be

2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 characterized as a right to ‘confidentiality,’” which “includes the right to protection regarding information about the state of one’s health.” Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Hancock v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, 882 F.3d 58, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[S]ubstantive due process categorically protects privacy in certain types of personal

information[, including] medical information.”); Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he right to confidentiality includes the right to protection regarding information about the state of one’s health.”). Incarcerated people “retain[ ] those [constitutional] rights that are not inconsistent with [their] status as . . .

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Bolden v. PrimeCare, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

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