Boggs v. Citywide Mobile Response

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 28, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-10238
StatusUnknown

This text of Boggs v. Citywide Mobile Response (Boggs v. Citywide Mobile Response) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boggs v. Citywide Mobile Response, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JARED BOGGS, Plaintiff, 22-CV-10238 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND CITYWIDE MOBILE RESPONSE, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action against his employer, Citywide Mobile Response. By order dated December 7, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Jared Boggs filed this complaint using the Court’s general complaint form. He invokes the court’s federal question jurisdiction, and in the section of the form that asks Plaintiff

which of his federal constitutional or federal statutory right have been violated, he writes, “Fair labor law, Libel, Harassment with intent to cause duress and emotional distress.”1 (ECF No. 2 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claim occurred at “1624 Stillwell Ave,” and that the events occurred from “4/13/22 – current.” (Id. at 5.) He alleges the following, Citywide Mobile Response did tell Jared Boggs, over a recorded line that he would be abandoning a patient in the care of a physician if he did not transport that patient.

1 The Court quotes the complaint verbatim. All spelling, punctuation, and grammar are as in the original. Citywide did violate Jared Boggs right to privacy by confronting him about a sensitive matter in front of coworkers to make him feel ashamed of what he had felt. Citywide did attempt to deny Jared’s union rights for a hearing w/ his union rep while deducting union dues from his check. Citywide did fabricate a story to make Jared look bad or otherwise intimidate Jared from seeking counsel or bringing Litigation. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff asserts that he has suffered “Emotional distress, aggravation, court costs, therapy, occupational rehabilitation” as a result of Defendants’ actions, and he seeks “$120,000 total for all charges.” (Id. at 6.) DISCUSSION A. Hybrid § 301/Duty of Fair Representation Claim Because Plaintiff sues his employer, claiming that it attempted to deny him the right to a hearing with his union representative, his complaint may be construed as asserting a “hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation (“DFR”)” claim. This type of claim arises under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, which governs the employer’s duty to comply with the collective bargaining agreement, and under the National Labor Relations Act, which implies the union’s duty of fair representation. DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983); see also Price v. Int’l Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 795 F.2d 1128, 1134 (2d Cir. 1986) (union’s duty of fair representation is implied from § 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), specifically). To state a hybrid Section 301/DFR claim, a plaintiff must allege “both (1) that the employer breached a collective bargaining agreement and (2) that the union breached its duty of fair representation vis-a-vis the union members.” White v. White Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164- 65). The employee may sue the union or the employer, or both, but must allege violations on the part of both regardless of which entities he chooses to sue. Id. at 179. The limitations period on a hybrid Section 301/DFR action is six months, see DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169, which begins to run when the employee knew or should have known of the breach of the duty of fair representation, see Cohen v. Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 68 F.3d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1995); King v. New York Tel. Co., 785 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1986).

A union has a duty to fairly represent employees subject to the collective bargaining agreement. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991). A court’s review of a union’s representation of its members is highly deferential, and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of a union. Id. at 78. Instead, the duty of fair representation is limited to avoiding conduct that is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Id. at 67.

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Boggs v. Citywide Mobile Response, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boggs-v-citywide-mobile-response-nysd-2023.