Boaz v. Buford

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJuly 11, 2023
Docket2:21-cv-11386
StatusUnknown

This text of Boaz v. Buford (Boaz v. Buford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boaz v. Buford, (E.D. Mich. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

PEYTON BOAZ, Plaintiff, Case Number 21-11386 v. Honorable David M. Lawson

VITATOE AVIATION, LLC, Defendant. _______________________________________/

and

RACHEL TREVINO MCCAMY, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of JULIE MARIE CASTANO BOAZ, Deceased, Plaintiff, Case Number 21-11602 v. Honorable David M. Lawson

VITATOE AVIATION, LLC, Defendants. ________________________________________/

TYLER G. BOAZ, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of GREGORY D. BOAZ, Deceased, Plaintiff, Case Number 21-11682 v. Honorable David M. Lawson

VITATOE AVIATION, LLC, Defendants. _________________________________________/

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE EXPERT AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE EXPERT AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT On June 24, 2018, a single-engine Cessna crashed while on approach to the Coleman A. Young International Airport (Detroit City Airport) in Detroit, Michigan, killing the pilot and all but one passenger, who was seriously injured. The representatives of the deceased passengers and pilot and the surviving passenger each filed separate lawsuits against a variety of parties who handled the flight or maintained the aircraft. Those cases were consolidated for discovery. The respective plaintiffs have resolved their cases against all defendants except Vitatoe Aviation, LLC. Vitatoe now moves to exclude the respective plaintiffs’ common liability expert and asks for summary judgment in all three cases. The Court heard oral argument on June 26, 2023. The record contains sufficient information to support the expert’s opinions on fuel flow and landing gear

maintenance to allow those opinions to be considered by a jury. There also is evidence in the record to create a fact question on whether Vitatoe’s conduct was at least “a” proximate cause of the accident, despite its contention that a non-party’s conduct broke the chain of causation. The Court will deny the motions to exclude Donald Sommer’s opinion evidence and for summary judgment. I. Facts and Proceedings Most of the circumstances of the fatal aircraft accident, aside from questions of causation, are undisputed for the purposes of the present motions, except as noted below. A. The Accident On June 24, 2018, Gregory Boaz (deceased), with his wife, Julie Boaz (deceased), and 17-

year-old son, plaintiff Peyton Boaz, departed Baytown Airport in Baytown, Texas in a Cessna P210N aircraft, registration number N3896P, flown by Gregory. Their destination was Detroit, Michigan, where Peyton’s sister was playing in a volleyball tournament. After a fuel stop at West Memphis Municipal Airport in West Memphis, Arkansas, the aircraft continued en route to Michigan on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan. As the aircraft approached Detroit, Gregory contacted the local tower controller at the Detroit City Airport seeking a landing clearance. That controller was former defendant Steven Buford, who was employed by former defendant Midwest Air Traffic Control, Inc. (MATC). MATC provides air traffic control services from the local

airport tower under a contract with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). At 7:48 p.m. local time, Buford cleared the Cessna to land on Runway 33. Runway 33/15 runs generally northwest to southeast, with the designation “33” (corresponding to compass heading 330 degrees) indicating an approach from the southeast on a northwesterly heading. When Boaz made his initial contact, the aircraft was flying at an altitude of 2,000 feet above Mean Sea Level (MSL). The elevation of the airport is 626 feet MSL. At 7:49 p.m., Boaz reported that the landing gear light in the aircraft was not illuminated, indicating a problem with the aircraft’s retractable landing gear. By then, the airplane was at 1,500 feet MSL on a downwind leg for Runway 33, about to make a left-hand turn to the base leg and then to the final approach to the

runway. At 7:50, Buford directed Boaz to overfly Runway 33 so that Buford could visually check the landing gear condition. After the flyover, Buford told Boaz that one of the main landing gear legs was not extended. Buford allegedly never dispatched emergency response resources and never asked Boaz about the aircraft’s remaining fuel reserve. While still in communication, Boaz tried cycling the landing gear in an attempt to extend the malfunctioning gear leg. The aircraft climbed back to 2,000 feet and re-entered the traffic pattern, reversing direction to come around for a second approach to Runway 33. Boaz’s attempt to lower the gear was unsuccessful, and he then asked for permission to land on the grass infield area to the west of Runway 33, or alternatively the grass infield east of the opposite heading Runway 15. Buford advised Boaz that he could not give clearance for a landing on the grass infield due to concerns about damaging the aircraft or runway lights and other airport fixtures in the grassy area. At 7:55 p.m., as the aircraft continued to circle with the gear still not deployed, it came into position for an approach to Runway 7 (a crossing runway on a roughly easterly heading that

intersected at the approach end of Runway 33). However, at that time Buford asked Boaz if he could continue to circle while emergency vehicles were mobilized. Boaz never declared an emergency or reported minimum fuel. But at 7:56 p.m. Boaz informed the controller that the aircraft had just run out of fuel. Buford immediately cleared the Cessna to land on Runway 7, but by the time that clearance was given, Boaz’s aircraft had circled back around to northeast of the Runway 15 threshold at an altitude of 1,900 feet MSL. The plaintiffs allege that from that position the airplane could have safely turned left and made a gliding approach without power to land on Runway 15 on a southeasterly heading. Buford did not change the landing clearance or clear the Cessna for a landing on any runway. The threshold of Runway 7 was at that point more than 1.6

miles west of the aircraft’s position, whereas the threshold of Runway 15 was just off the aircraft’s left wing and less than half as distant. Boaz attempted to circle around for an approach on Runway 7, but the aircraft was unable to make the airport. The last radar return showed the Cessna at 800 feet MSL (less than 180 feet above ground level), and more than 4,400 feet from the threshold of Runway 7. The airplane crashed in a residential lot outside the airport area. After it came to rest, the airplane caught fire. Gregory Boaz and his wife Julie died in the fire. Plaintiff Peyton Boaz was severely burned but survived after a bystander used an axe to breach the aircraft fuselage, allowing him to escape. B. NTSB Investigation The National Transportation Safety Board conducted an investigation and issued a report of factual findings. See Aviation Accident Factual Report, ECF No. 61-2. The report noted that the Cessna P210N is a fixed-wing aircraft with retractable tricycle landing gear, a six-seat pressurized cabin, and a 90-gallon fuel capacity (89 gallons useable). Boaz’s airplane had been

modified under Vitatoe Aviation Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA02918CH, which involved replacement of the standard engine and propeller with a higher performing Continental IO-550P engine using a turbo-normalized intake system and a Hartzell constant-speed propeller. Ibid. The NTSB report noted that the Vitatoe STC specified that the pilot should adjust the engine fuel flow to a “lean of peak” setting for cruise flight, then monitor the cylinder head temperature (CHT) readings to ensure no cylinder exceeded 380 degrees. At the specified settings, the expected fuel flow was 17.6 gallons per hour (GPH).

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