Board of Trustees of the Employee Painters' Trust v. D & R Glazing Inc

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided August 8, 2024·No. 2:22-cv-01831·Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CASE NO. 2:22-cv-01831-LK 11 EMPLOYEE PAINTERS’ TRUST et al., ORDER GRANTING IN PART 12 Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION AND v. ISSUING ORDER TO SHOW 13 CAUSE D & R GLAZING, INC. et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: 17 Contempt and for Sanctions. Dkt. No. 29. The Court has considered the motion, the relevant 18 portions of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised, the Court grants in part the 19 motion as described below. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiffs Board of Trustees of the Employee Painters’ Trust, Board of Trustees of the 22 Western Glaziers Retirement Fund, Board of Trustees of the District Council No. 5 Apprenticeship 23 and Training Trust Fund, Board of Trustees of the Washington Construction Industry Substance 24 1 Abuse Program, and Board of Trustees of the Painters and Allied Trades Labor Management 2 Cooperation Initiative (collectively, “the Trusts”), are trusts created pursuant to written trust 3 agreements between various unions, including the International Union of Painters and Allied 4 Trades District Council No. 5 (the “Union”). Dkt. No. 1 at 3. They initiated this action in December

5 2022, seeking to audit the payroll records of Defendant D & R Glazing, Inc., doing business as 6 Don’s A-1 Glass Service (“D&R”), and to recover damages based on delinquent employee benefit 7 contributions from the company and its corporate governor, Peggy Owens. See id. at 4–5, 11. After 8 neither Defendant appeared or defended in the action, the Clerk of Court entered default and the 9 Court subsequently granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 6–7, 12– 10 13, 22. The Court declined to reach Plaintiffs’ request for monetary relief and attorney’s fees but 11 ordered Defendants to submit D&R’s relevant payroll and related records to the Trusts and their 12 auditors within 30 days. See Dkt. No. 22 at 6–10, 15. 13 On May 1, 2023, Ms. Owens mailed a three-page document entitled “OBJECTION TO 14 DEFAULT JUDGMENT,” Dkt. No. 23, which the Court construed as a request pursuant to Federal

15 Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default and the Court’s order granting 16 in part Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, Dkt. No. 24. On July 2, 2024, the Court denied Ms. 17 Owens’ request and reiterated that “unless and until the Court grants relief pursuant to a proper 18 motion, Defendants remain bound by the Court’s order granting in part Plaintiffs’ motion for 19 default judgment.” Dkt. No. 27 at 8. Plaintiffs aver that they sent the Court’s July 2, 2024 Order 20 to D&R and Ms. Owens and “have requested Defendants’ voluntary compliance,” but that 21 Defendants “failed to respond to these requests and have failed to comply with the Court’s Order 22 to produce records for an audit.” Dkt. No. 29 at 3; see Dkt. No. 30 at 2–3; Dkt. No. 30-1 at 2–12. 23 As a result, Plaintiffs now move for an order directing Defendants to show cause why they should

24 not be held in contempt and subject to sanctions, including paying Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and 1 costs incurred by bringing the instant motion. See Dkt. No. 29 at 5–6; Dkt. No. 30 at 3. Plaintiffs 2 certify that they served their motion on Defendants on July 23, 2024. Dkt. No. 29 at 8. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 “A court’s contempt powers are broadly divided into two categories: civil contempt and

5 criminal contempt.” Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 815 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2016); 6 accord Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 81 F.4th 843, 858 (9th Cir. 2023). And while the 7 distinction between the two categories is not always clear—particularly given that the same 8 conduct may result in sanctions for both—courts differentiate between civil and criminal contempt 9 based on the resulting sanction’s “character and purpose.” Shell Offshore, 815 F.3d at 628–29 10 (quoting Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. V. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994)); see also 11 Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631–32 (1988). Criminal contempt sanctions are “punitive” in the 12 sense that they are intended to “punish prior offenses,” whereas civil sanctions are meant to “coerce 13 compliance with a court order or to compensate the aggrieved party for sustained losses.” Oracle 14 USA, 81 F.4th at 858 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827

15 (“[C]ivil contempt sanctions . . . may be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and 16 an opportunity to be heard.”). 17 Plaintiffs contend that Defendants “have qualified themselves as prime candidates for both 18 [civil] and criminal contempt” and “request that both sanctions and punishment be [o]rdered in 19 this matter.” Dkt. No. 29 at 5. However, in light of the complained-of conduct (Defendants’ failing 20 to comply with the Court’s order), and the character of the sanctions requested (Defendants’ 21 compliance with the Court’s order and Plaintiffs’ compensation in the form of attorney’s fees and 22 costs incurred), the Court finds that civil contempt is the proper prism through which to view 23 Plaintiffs’ motion. See, e.g., Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827; Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631–32; Shell Offshore,

24 815 F.3d at 629. 1 A party moving for civil contempt must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 2 nonmoving party violated a court order. Ahearn ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse 3 Union, Locals 21 & 4, 721 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013). “The contempt need not be willful, 4 and there is no good faith exception to the requirement of obedience to a court order.” In re Dual-

5 Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks 6 and citation omitted). Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the alleged 7 contemnor to demonstrate why it was unable to comply. Stone v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 968 F.2d 8 850, 856 n.9 (9th Cir. 1992). 9 Here, plaintiffs have established by clear and convincing evidence a prima facie case that, 10 despite being given notice and sufficient time to comply, Defendants have failed to comply with 11 this Court’s March 29, 2024 Order to submit D&R’s payroll and related records to Plaintiffs and 12 their auditors. See Dkt. No. 22 at 15; Dkt. No. 30 at 2–3. In addition, the Court notes that Ms. 13 Owens’ motion to set aside default indicates that she had notice of the order directing her to submit 14 D&R’s records. See Dkt. No. 23 at 1. Because the record establishes by clear and convincing

15 evidence that Defendants have failed to comply with this Court’s order, the burden now shifts to 16 Defendants to “show ‘categorically and in detail’ why [they are] unable to comply with the court’s 17 previous order.” Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1240 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States 18 v. Rylander, 656 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 460 U.S.

Board of Trustees of the Employee Painters' Trust v. D & R Glazing Inc, (W.D. Wash. 2024).

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