Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Smallwood

608 A.2d 1222, 327 Md. 220, 1992 Md. LEXIS 124

• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
• Decided: July 17, 1992
• Docket: 71 & 72, September Term, 1990
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

These cases involve the validity of charter amendments proposed, pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, Art. XIA, § 5,¹ by petitions of the voters of Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties respectively. This opinion sets forth the reasons underlying the Court’s order requiring each county’s Board of Election Supervisors to place proposed “Property Tax Limitation” charter amendments on the ballots for the 1990 general election. Also addressed is this Court’s order prohibiting the Anne Arundel County Board of Supervisors of Elections from placing a “Ballot Initiative Amendment” on the ballot.

I.

As this opinion encompasses two distinct appeals, the facts and procedural history of each case will be addressed separately.

A.

On July 5, 1990, the Baltimore County Citizens for Representative Government (BCCRG) submitted a petition to place a Property Tax Limitation charter amendment on the 1990 general election ballot.² The Board of Election Supervisors reviewed the petition and found that it contained the requisite number of signatures.³ The proposed charter amendment would have altered § 710 of the Baltimore County charter. Section 710 of the charter provides that when the county budget has been finally adopted, the county council shall levy and raise the amount of taxes required by the budget. The proposed amendment would have required the property tax revenues for the tax year 1991-1992 to be limited to the amount of property tax revenues realized for the tax year 1989-1990; it would not have allowed the tax revenues to be raised by more than 2% per year, beginning with tax year 1992-1993. An “escape clause” would have permitted the county council to increase property taxes by more than the 2% maximum when at least two-thirds of the qualified registered voters in the county approved the increase by referendum. The proposed amendment to § 710 of the Baltimore County charter also contained a severability provision in the event that any portion of the proposed amendment were found to be invalid.

On August 16,1990, Baltimore County and nine individual taxpayers filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the proposed amendment to the charter of Baltimore County was void because it violated Art. XI-A of the Maryland Constitution and/or because it conflicted with Maryland Code (1986), § 6-302(a) and § 6-308 of the Tax-Property Article. The plaintiffs also requested an injunction prohibiting the placement of the amendment on the general election ballot.

On August 31, 1990, the circuit court declared that the proposed amendment violated both the Maryland Constitution and the Tax-Property Article of the Maryland Code and therefore could not be on the ballot. Nevertheless, the court directed the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore County not to remove the proposed tax limitation amendment from the ballot until the earlier of October 5, 1990,⁴ or a decision as to the validity of the amendment by this Court. On the same day, the BCCRG noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, Baltimore County filed in this Court a petition for writ of certiorari which we granted on September 6, 1990.

B.

The facts and procedural history surrounding the Anne Arundel County case are similar. On July 20, 1990, the Anne Arundel Taxpayers for Responsive Government (AATRG) submitted petitions to place a Property Tax Limitation charter amendment⁵ and a Ballot Initiative charter amendment on the 1990 general election ballot.

Section 710 of the Anne Arundel County charter requires the County Council to maintain a balanced budget. The section also exempts from executive veto any ordinance that levies taxes required to balance the budget. The proposed amendment to § 710 of the Anne Arundel County charter would have limited property tax revenues for the tax year 1991-1992 to the amount of property revenues raised during the 1988-1989 tax year. The proposal would have placed the tax cap provision of the amendment in the context of the constant yield tax rate provided for in the Tax-Property Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Specifically, beginning with tax year 1992-1993, the Anne Arundel County Council could not have allowed property tax revenues to exceed the constant yield rate by a value greater than the increase in the Consumer Price Index from the preceding January, or by 4.5%, whichever would be less. The proposed Anne Arundel County amendment also contained an “escape clause” that would have allowed the county council to exceed the cap upon approval by the qualified voters of the county in a referendum.

The second Anne Arundel County proposed charter amendment would have amended § 308 of the county charter. Section 308 reserves to the voters of Anne Arundel County the right of referendum regarding legislation passed by the county council. The proposed amendment would have given the voters of Anne Arundel County the power to initiate legislation which would not be subject to the veto power of the County Executive, and which could only be amended or repealed by an affirmative vote of all seven members of the county council.⁶

On August 6, 1990, four individual taxpayers and Anne Arundel County filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County a complaint and motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that both of the proposed amendments were invalid because they violated the Maryland Constitution. The plaintiffs further contended that the Property Tax Limitation amendment was in conflict with §§ 6-302(a) and 6-308 of the Tax-Property Article of the Maryland Code.

On August 30, 1990, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County declared that both proposed amendments were unconstitutional. The court entered an injunction prohibiting the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County from placing either proposed amendment on the 1990 general election ballot. The same day, AATRG filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Before any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, Anne Arundel County and the individual taxpayers filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which was granted by this Court on September 6, 1990.

C.

The oral arguments for the Baltimore County and Anne Arundel County appeals were advanced to September 19, 1990. On appeal, the parties addressed the standing of the plaintiffs, the constitutionality of the charter amendments, the potential conflict of the charter amendments with public general law, and the possibility of severing any portions found to be invalid.⁷

At the conclusion of oral arguments, we affirmed the portion of the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County which prohibited the Board of Election Supervisors of Anne Arundel County from placing the proposed Ballot Initiative amendment on the ballot. Otherwise, we reversed the judgments of the circuit courts and required the Boards of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore County and Anne Arundel County to place the respective proposed Property Tax Limitation charter amendments, with certain invalid portions severed, on the 1990 general election ballot.⁸

II.

The proposed Anne Arundel County Ballot Initiative charter amendment attempted to reserve to the voters of that county “the power to propose public local laws in the same manner as provided for the County Council ... and to adopt or reject the same, at the [next county-wide election].” The effect of the proposed amendment would have been to allow voter-initiated legislation in Anne Arundel County. Anne Arundel County and the individual plaintiffs argued that the amendment violated Art. XI-A, § 3, of the Maryland Constitution, and thus was invalid.⁹

In Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot County, 316 Md. 332, 348-350, 558 A.2d 724, 732-733 (1989), this Court flatly held that § 216 of the Talbot County charter, authorizing voter-initiated legislation, was “manifestly repugnant” to Art. XI-A, § 3, of the Maryland Constitution. Quoting from the opinion in Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 613, 415 A.2d 255, 264 (1980), we stated (316 Md. at 349, 558 A.2d at 732):

“ ‘The powers of referendum and initiative, though each may affect the form or structure of local government, are otherwise distinctly different. Under the referendum power, the elective legislative body, consistent with § 3, continues to be the primary legislative organ, for it has formulated and approved the legislative enactment referred to the people. The exercise of the legislative initiative power, however, completely circumvents the legislative body, thereby totally undermining its status as the primary legislative organ.’ Thus, we held that ‘the power to initiate legislation, unlike the referendum power, cannot be reconciled with § 3.’ ”

Talbot County is precisely on point, and is determinative of the ballot initiative issue here. See also Griffith v. Wakefield, 298 Md. 381, 470 A.2d 345 (1984); Ritchmount Partnership v. Board, 283 Md. 48, 388 A.2d 523 (1978); Rowe v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 56 Md.App. 23, 466 A.2d 538 (1983).

We reiterate that the voters of a charter county cannot reserve to themselves the power to initiate legislation because such initiative conflicts with the terms of Art. XI-A, § 3, of the Maryland Constitution. Therefore, the proposed Ballot Initiative amendment was unconstitutional, and the injunction prohibiting the Board of Election Supervisors of Anne Arundel County from placing it on the general election ballot was proper.

III.

The proposed Property Tax Limitation charter amendments in Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties would have placed a percentage cap on the amount of local property tax revenues to be raised each year. The plaintiffs in both cases attacked the proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments on two grounds. First, they asserted that a limitation on the taxing power of the county councils is not proper charter material, and thus is repugnant to Art. XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. Relying on Griffith v. Wakefield, supra, 298 Md. at 385, 388, 470 A.2d at 348-349, and Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., supra, 287 Md. at 606-607, 415 A.2d at 261, the plaintiffs argued that a charter is intended to establish “the form and structure of government” and that the proposed amendments would not have changed “the form and structure” of the counties’ governments. Second, the plaintiffs claimed that the proposed tax limitation amendments conflicted with public general law, namely §§ 6-302(a) and 6-308 of the Tax-Property Article of the Maryland Code.

The tax cap portion of the proposed tax limitation amendments constituted proper charter material. We have repeatedly explained that a county charter is equivalent to a constitution. Bd. of Elections Laws v. Talbot County, supra, 316 Md. at 341, 558 A.2d at 728; County Exec., Prince Geo’s Co. v. Doe, 291 Md. 676, 680, 436 A.2d 459, 461 (1981); Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., supra, 287 Md. at 606, 415 A.2d at 261; Ritchmount Partnership v. Board, supra, 283 Md. at 58, 388 A.2d at 530; Harford County v. Schultz, 280 Md. 77, 85, 371 A.2d 428, 432 (1977); Anne Arundel County v. Moushabek, 269 Md. 419, 422, 306 A.2d 517, 519 (1973). The basic function of a constitution or a charter is to distribute power among the various agencies of government, and between the government and the people who have delegated that power to their government. As Chief Judge Murphy stated for the Court in Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., supra, 287 Md. at 607, 415 A.2d at 261:

“A charter ... is the organic, the fundamental law, establishing basic principles governing relationships between the government and the people.”

The proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments directly involved the relationship between the people and the government by limiting the power of the government to tax.

Limitations imposed by the people on their government are fundamental elements of a constitution. See, e.g., Marburg v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176-177, 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 (1803); The Federalist, Nos. 78, 81, 84 (1788) (Alexander Hamilton).¹⁰ The Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution largely represent limitations on governmental power. In fact, the desire of the people to limit the government’s ability to tax was a major cause of the American Revolution. “There was no colony of English America, in which the claim of the inhabitants, to exemption from all taxation not sanctioned by their assent, was more familiar than in Maryland.”¹¹ The Constitution of the United States,¹² the Constitution of Maryland,¹³ and the charters of Anne Arundel and Baltimore counties,¹⁴ are replete with provisions limiting the power of governments to raise and appropriate revenue. Thus, a limitation on the power of a legislative body to raise revenue is at the heart of the form and structure of our government and thus is proper charter material. See Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot County, supra, 316 Md. at 347-348, 558 A.2d at 731-732; Griffith v. Wakefield, supra, 298 Md. at 389, 470 A.2d at 350; Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., supra, 287 Md. at 606-608, 415 A.2d at 261-262; Ritchmount Partnership v. Board, supra, 283 Md. at 58, 388 A.2d at 530.

Neither Griffith v. Wakefield, supra, nor Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., supra, upon which the plaintiffs rely, are to the contrary. As Judge Rodowsky noted in his dissent in Griffith v. Wakefield, supra, 298 Md. at 390-391, 470 A.2d at 350-351, “the majority opinion does not conflict” with the conclusion that taking fiscal power away from the county council is “bedrock charter material” that “alters the form and structure of government ... in a most fundamental way.” Instead both Griffith v. Wakefield and Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp. were concerned with attempts by the voters to initiate detailed legislation through the guise of charter amendments.

In Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., this Court invalidated a proposed amendment to the Baltimore City charter which would have created a tenant-landlord commission and would have imposed a comprehensive system of rent control. We held that the proposed amendment was an attempt to “divest the [City] Council of its acknowledged ... power to legislate on the subject of rent control.” 287 Md. at 609, 415 A.2d at 262. Thus, the proposed amendment was essentially legislative in nature and not valid charter material.

The proposed charter amendment in Griffith v. Wake-field sought to create a system of binding arbitration for Baltimore County and the fire fighters’ union. The proposal set forth in detail the entire system of arbitration and left “nothing for the determination of the County Executive or the County Council.” 298 Md. at 386, 470 A.2d at 348. The Court held that the amendment was invalid because it was “ ‘essentially legislative in character;’ [and] it [was] a complete and specifically detailed legislative scheme.” 298 Md. at 388, 470 A.2d at 349. In distinguishing Maryland Cl. Emp. Ass’n v. Anderson, 281 Md. 496, 380 A.2d 1032 (1977), the Court stated (298 Md. at 389, 470 A.2d at 350):

“It is common for constitutions or charters to authorize, or preclude, specified types of enactments by legislative bodies. This is quite different from a charter itself containing all of the detailed provisions concerning the subject.”

See also Harford County v. Board, 272 Md. 33, 39, 321 A.2d 151, 154 (1974) (“It is not uncommon for people to write into their basic charter a restriction upon the powers of their legislative body”); Bell v. Arel, 123 N.H. 311, 316, 461 A.2d 108, 110-111 (1983) (citizens may require limits on taxation as long as no impairment of the city’s ability to carry out its mandatory obligations will occur); E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 44.26 (3rd ed. 1984) (“A common express restriction upon the municipal power to tax is one limiting the amount or the rate that may be imposed in any one year. The validity of such a provision generally is sustained”).

The proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments at issue here did not suffer from the same weakness as was presented by the proposed amendments in Cheeks and Griffith. These proposed tax limitation amendments were not back-door attempts by the voters of Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties to enact detailed legislation. Nor did they divest the county councils of the ability to set the property tax rates. Rather, each would have merely precluded a particular type of enactment by the legislative body, namely the power to collect property taxes above the specified cap.

There are also practical difficulties with the plaintiffs’ position that the proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments would have impermissibly infringed on the legislative power conferred on the county councils by Art. XI-A and thus were not proper charter material. Acceptance of the plaintiffs’ arguments that limits cannot be placed on the budgetary and fiscal authority of county councils would result in the invalidation of many existing provisions in county charters which, as previously noted, limit the power of the county councils in these areas. For example, the executive budget system, in effect in several counties, places a greater restriction on the fiscal power of the county councils than these proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments would have. Under the executive budget system, the county executive prepares and submits a budget for each fiscal year. See Baltimore County Charter, § 706; Anne Arundel County Charter, § 706. The county council has “no power to change the form of the budget as submitted by the county executive, to alter the revenue estimates except to correct mathematical errors, or to increase any expenditure recommended by the county executive for current or capital purposes.” Baltimore County Charter, § 709; Anne Arundel County Charter, § 709. Various other limitations on the fiscal powers of the two county councils are contained in their charters. See note 14, supra.

Consequently, we hold that a provision in a county charter placing restrictions upon the county council’s revenue raising authority is a fundamental aspect of the form and structure of government and thus is proper charter material.

The proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments also were challenged on the ground that they conflicted with public general law, Code, §§ 6-302(a) and 6-308 of the Tax-Property Article.¹⁵

We have on numerous occasions pointed out that “[w]hen a provision in a county charter conflicts with a public general law, the public general law prevails under Art. XIA, § 1.” Rosecroft Trotting & Pacing v. P.G. County, 298 Md. 580, 599, 471 A.2d 719, 729 (1984). See also Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, 311 Md. 512, 514, 536 A.2d 641, 642 (1988); East v. Gilchrist, 296 Md. 368, 374, 463 A.2d 285, 288 (1983); Wilson v. Bd. of Sup. of Elections, 273 Md. 296, 301, 328 A.2d 305, 308 (1974); Schneider v. Lansdale, 191 Md. 317, 61 A.2d 671 (1948). Nevertheless, “[wjherever reasonably possible, courts will construe enactments so that there is no conflict. This principle avoids the need to invalidate one law or the other.” Town of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331, 337, 435 A.2d 425, 428 (1981); Wilson v. Bd. of Sup. of Elections, supra, 273 Md. at 301, 328 A.2d at 308.

Section 6-302(a) of the Tax-Property Article provides that the government body of a county shall set the tax rate on property for the next taxable year. The proposed tax limitation amendments would not have conflicted with this provision. If the proposed amendments had been adopted, the county councils of Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties could still have exercised discretion to determine the tax rates on property for the next taxable year. A limitation would simply have been placed on this power, so that the increase in property tax revenue for the next tax year could not have exceeded 2% in Baltimore County or 4.5% in Anne Arundel County. The proposed tax limitations would not have had the effect of allowing the electorate of the two counties to set the tax rates. As required by § 6-302(a), the legislative body in each county would continue to set the tax rate on property. There is no language in the statute indicating that reasonable limits cannot be placed on the legislative power to set the tax rate.

Nor do we agree with the plaintiffs’ argument that the proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments conflicted with § 6-308 of the Tax-Property Article. Both Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties contended that § 6-308(g) constitutes an affirmative grant of power authorizing the county councils to adopt an increase in the property tax rate which exceeds the constant yield rate. We have previously held, however, that § 6-308(g) represents a limitation on the taxing power of a county. Garrett County v. Bolden, 287 Md. 440, 446-447, 413 A.2d 190, 193 (1980). We stated that the purpose of § 6-308 “is to focus public attention from one year to the next on the interrelationship between the rate of property tax and the assessable basis in a period of rising property values.” Ibid. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ interpretation, § 6-308 specifies detailed procedural requirements with which a county governing body must comply before it will be permitted to increase the tax rate above the constant yield rate. The proposed tax limitation amendments would have also limited the power of the county councils to raise the tax rate above the constant yield rate. Since § 6-308 is a procedural provision limiting a county’s authority, rather than an affirmative grant of power, it does not conflict with the proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments.

We hold that the tax cap portions of the proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments were facially valid because they constituted proper charter material and did not conflict with public general law. Nevertheless, we render no opinion as to the validity of the tax caps as they might have been applied in practice. County governments are required by state law to provide many public services such as public education, police and fire protection services, water and sewage services, etc. If it is subsequently demonstrated in a particular case that a local limitation on property tax revenues so hampers a county government that it cannot perform the duties required under state law, a tax limitation charter provision may well be found to be invalid as applied. See E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, supra, at § 44.26.

IY.

While the tax cap portion of the proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments were valid, there were two aspects of the amendments that were inconsistent with public general law and thus were invalid. Those portions of the amendments, however, were severable.

The “roll back” provisions of the proposed amendments would have limited the amount of property tax revenues for the tax year 1991-1992 to no more than the amount collected in the tax year 1989-1990 for Baltimore County, and no more than that collected in the tax year 1988-1989 for Anne Arundel County. These provisions violated § 6-302(a) of the Tax-Property Article which mandates that the governing body of each county is to set the property tax rate for the next tax year. Unlike the tax cap provisions that would have simply placed a limit on the taxing power of each county council, the roll back provisions would have transferred the county councils’ § 6-302(a) powers to the voters. Instead of the councils setting the tax rates, the roll back provisions would have allowed the voters of Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties to set the property tax rates for the tax year 1991-1992.

In addition, each county’s proposed amendment included an escape clause that would have allowed the county councils to increase the property tax rates in any given tax year above the rate specified in the tax cap by referring the proposed increase to the voters for approval. The escape clause provisions were invalid for the same reason that the roll back provisions were invalid. Section 6-302(a) of the Tax-Property Article requires that a county’s tax rate be set by the governing body of the county. The effect of the escape clause provisions would have been that, even if a county council would determine in any given year that it is necessary to raise the tax rate above the limit specified by the cap, the voters of the county would have decided whether the rate would be raised to particular levels above the caps or would remain at cap levels. Thus, in essence, the voters would be setting the tax rate for that year.

In light of our conclusion that the escape clause provisions violated public general law, we need not deal with other issues that were raised concerning the validity of the escape clauses.

Both the invalid roll back and the invalid escape clause provisions were severable from the valid portions of the proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments. There is a strong presumption that if a portion of an enactment is found to be invalid, the intent is that such portion be severed. Sugarloaf Citizens Assoc. v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 574, 573 A.2d 1325, 1333 (1990); Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 410, 568 A.2d 1111, 1122 (1990); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 297, 554 A.2d 366, 387 (1989); O.C. Taxpayers v. Ocean City, 280 Md. 585, 600, 375 A.2d 541, 550 (1977). This presumption has never been limited solely to bills enacted by the General Assembly, but has been applied to local ordinances, Anne Arundel County v. Moushabek, supra, 269 Md. at 430, 306 A.2d at 523, charter amendments, O.C. Taxpayers v. Ocean City, supra, 280 Md. at 601-603, 375 A.2d at 550-551, and provisions of the state constitution invalidated under the federal constitution, Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 83, 344 A.2d 422, 439 (1975). This presumption applies even in the absence of an express clause declaring the drafters’ intent that the enactment be severed if a portion is found to be invalid. Cities Service Co. v. Governor, 290 Md. 553, 575, 431 A.2d 663, 676 (1981); O.C. Taxpayers v. Ocean City, supra, 280 Md. at 600, 375 A.2d at 550. Inclusion of a severability clause, like the clause inserted in the proposed charter amendment in Baltimore County, reinforces the presumption. Cities Service Co. v. Governor, supra, 290 Md. at 576, 431 A.2d at 676; O.C. Taxpayers v. Ocean City, supra, 280 Md. at 601, 375 A.2d at 550.

In addition to this general presumption, it is a settled principle that “[w]hen the dominant purpose of an enactment may largely be carried out notwithstanding the [enactment’s] partial invalidity, courts will generally hold the valid portions severable and enforce them.” O.C. Taxpayers v. Ocean City, supra, 280 Md. at 601, 375 A.2d at 550. See also State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., supra, 315 Md. at 297, 554 A.2d at 387-388; Cities Service Co. v. Governor, supra, 290 Md. at 576, 431 A.2d at 676.

The dominant purpose of the proposed Property Tax Limitation amendments was to place a cap on property tax revenues. We have upheld the facial validity of these tax cap provisions. The purpose of the tax cap could have been carried out without the invalid roll back or escape clause provisions. Thus, under the principles set forth in the above-cited cases, we had a duty to sever the invalid provisions and allow the tax cap provisions to be submitted to the electorate at the November 1990 general election.¹⁶

Despite these well established principles of sever-ability, the plaintiffs argued that any invalid provisions should not be severed and that if any portion of the proposed amendment was invalid, the entire amendment should not be submitted to the electorate. In essence their argument was that severability principles did not apply to a proposed charter amendment. The severability principles discussed above are a fundamental part of the determination of validity. This court has “consistently taken the position that the submission to the voters of a proposed charter amendment, in conflict with public general law, should be enjoined.” Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, supra, 311 Md. at 518, 536 A.2d at 644; Wilson v. Bd. of Sup. of Elections, supra, 273 Md. at 300, 328 A.2d at 308; Planning Commission v. Randall, 209 Md. 18, 23-24, 120 A.2d 195, 198 (1956); Schneider v. Lansdale, supra, 191 Md. at 322, 61 A.2d at 673. Similarly, if a portion of a proposed charter amendment is invalid and severable, this Court has a duty to sever those portions when they are challenged. See O.C. Taxpayers v. Ocean City, supra, 280 Md. at 600, 375 A.2d at 550; Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 48, 343 A.2d 521, 528 (1975); Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 351, 335 A.2d 670, 678 (1975).

This Court in Schneider v. Lansdale, supra, was confronted with the issue of whether portions of the proposed Montgomery County Charter conflicted with the Maryland Constitution. The Court held that the challenged portions of the Charter under consideration were valid and, therefore, did not need to reach the issue of whether and when to sever portions found to be invalid. The Court, however, did infer that this determination would be based upon whether any invalid portion was “so inseparable from the remainder that its invalidity makes the whole invalid.” Schneider v. Lansdale, supra, 191 Md. at 323, 61 A.2d at 673.

Other language in Schneider arguably supports the idea that even if portions of a proposed charter amendment are invalid and capable of being severed, they should not be severed until after the election. Such language in Schneider was dicta. Moreover, to the extent that it could be interpreted to allow voters to vote on invalid portions of a charter amendment, it is inconsistent with subsequent decisions of this Court and is erroneous. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, supra, 311 Md. at 520, 536 A.2d at 645 (“Allowing a vote on proposed charter amendments which, if approved by the electorate, cannot go into effect because they conflict with higher law, would be to sanction ‘straw votes’ on a multitude of public issues or potential issues”). Furthermore, submission of an amendment with invalid and severable portions intact would mislead the public during the election by asking them to vote on an amendment which, in its present form, was incapable of becoming part of their charter. We do not believe that it is appropriate to deceive the voters in this fashion.

We have determined in this case that severance of the invalid portions does not destroy the dominant purpose of the amendments and that they were not “so inseparable from the remainder that [their] invalidity makes the whole invalid.” Schneider, 191 Md. at 323, 61 A.2d at 673. Thus, the invalid roll back provisions and the invalid escape clause provisions of the Property Tax Limitation amendments were severed. The tax cap provisions were properly submitted to the voters of Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties at the November 6, 1990, general election.

1 . Section 5 of Art. XI-A provides in relevant part as follows:

"Section 5. Amendments to charters.

Amendments to any charter adopted by the City of Baltimore or by any County of this State under the provisions of this Article may be proposed by a resolution of the Mayor of Baltimore and the City Council of the City of Baltimore, or the Council of the County, or by a petition signed by not less than 20% of the registered voters of the City or County, provided, however, that in any case 10,000 signatures shall be sufficient to complete a petition. * * *.”

2 . The petition proposed that the following language be added to § 710 of the Baltimore County Charter:

“(d) Property Tax. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Charter, commencing on July 1, 1991, and for the tax year 1991— 1992, the County property tax may not exceed the property tax realized by the County for the tax year 1989-1990, except as provided in subparagraph (1) and (2) herein:

(1) For the tax year 1992-1993, and for succeeding years the County property tax may be increased, but by no more than 2 percent per year.

(2) In any tax year subsequent to tax year 1991-1992, the county may increase the property taxes by no more than 2 percent provided such increase is put to referendum by the County and is approved by not less than two thirds of the qualified registered voters in the County.

(3) The limitation provided for in subparagraph (d) above shall not apply to property taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on any indebtedness approved by the voters prior to the time this section becomes effective.

(4) If any paragraph, part, clause or phrase hereof is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining portions of the law shall not be affected but will remain in full force and effect.”

3 . The requisite number of signatures required 20% of the registered voters of the County, or 10,000, whichever is less. See note 1, supra.

4 . October 5, 1990, was the latest date by which the Board of Supervisors of Elections must have been informed of all items which would be placed on the November 6, 1990, election ballot.

5 . The petition proposed that the following language be added to § 710 of the Anne Arundel County Charter:

"[d] Property Tax

"(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, commencing on 1 July 1991 (tax year 1991-1992), the County Council may not establish property tax rates which would provide more property tax revenues than were raised during the 1988-1989 tax year, except as provided in subparagraphs [a] and [b] below:

“[a] The Constant Yield Tax Rate, as currently specified by the Tax-Property Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, shall continue as the method of assurance that revenue derived from the property tax remains at a constant level from one year to the next. The provisions of the Tax-Property Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland which permit local taxing authorities to increase property tax rates above the Constant Yield Tax Rate shall be used by the Anne Arundel County Council in the following manner: Commencing 1 July 1992, and applicable to subsequent tax years, the Council may set an annual tax rate which exceeds the Constant Yield Tax Rate by a value which will permit property tax revenues to increase by (1) a percentage corresponding to the immediately previous January Consumer Price Index, U.S. City Average, percentage of change from the preceding January, as computed by the Department of Labor (or other widely accepted index that measures from time to time the rate of inflation), or (2) by 4.5 percent, whichever is the lesser amount.

“[b] In any tax year subsequent to 1992, the County Council may increase property tax revenues for that year by an amount greater than that stated in paragraph (d) herein by referring a specific revenue increase to a referendum of the qualified voters of the County.”

6 . Initiative refers to the process by which the electorate petitions for and votes on a proposed law. Referendum is the process by which legislation passed by the governing body is submitted to the electorate for approval or disapproval. O.M. Reynolds, Jr., Handbook of Local Government Law, §§ 203, 204 (1982). See also Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 613 n. 9, 415 A.2d 255, 264 n. 9 (1980) (defining initiative); Ritchmount Partnership v. Board, 283 Md. 48, 60, 388 A.2d 523, 531 (1978) (defining referendum). See generally Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot County, 316 Md. 332, 347-351, 558 A.2d 724, 731-733 (1989).

7 . The defendants in both cases contested the standing of Baltimore County and Anne Arundel County to challenge the validity of the proposed charter amendments. As previously stated, however, individual taxpayers in each county also contested the proposed amendments’ validity. Individual taxpayers have standing to sue for an injunction against submitting a proposal to the electorate; otherwise, they would be “put to wrongful expense for the publication of the referendum and the printing of it on the ballots of the next general election.” Sun Cab Company v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419, 422, 159 A. 922, 923 (1932). See also Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot County, supra, 316 Md. at 341-342, 558 A.2d at 728-729; State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 292, 554 A.2d 366, 385, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816, 110 S.Ct. 66, 107 L.Ed.2d 33 (1989); Inlet Associates v. Assateague House, 313 Md. 413, 441, 545 A.2d 1296, 1310 (1988); Citizens P. & H. Ass’n v. County Exec., 273 Md. 333, 338-343, 329 A.2d 681, 684-687 (1974).

It is a long established rule that "[wjhere there exists a party having standing to bring an action or take an appeal, we shall not ordinarily inquire as to whether another party on the same side also has standing." Board v. Haberlin, 320 Md. 399, 404, 578 A.2d 215, 217 (1990). See also Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641, 650 n. 6, 594 A.2d 1115, 1119 n. 6 (1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., supra, 315 Md. at 291, 554 A.2d at 385; Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, 311 Md. 512, 516 n. 3, 536 A.2d 641, 643 n. 3 (1988); State’s Atty v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 602, 337 A.2d 92, 96 (1975), and cases there cited.

8 . We note that both of the proposed Property Tax Limitation charter amendments were rejected by the voters of Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties at the November 1990 general election.

9 . Art. XI-A, § 3, of the Maryland Constitution provides in relevant part as follows:

“Section 3. Legislative bodies; chief executive officers; enactment, publication and interpretation of local laws.

“Every charter so formed shall provide for an elective legislative body in which shall be vested the law-making power of said City or County. Such legislative body in the City of Baltimore shall be known as the City Council of the City of Baltimore, and in any county shall be known as the County Council of the County. The chief executive officer, if any such charter shall provide for the election of such executive officer, or the presiding officer of said legislative body, if such charter shall not provide for the election of a chief executive officer, shall be known in the City of Baltimore as Mayor of Baltimore, and in any County as the President or Chairman of the County Council of the County, and all references in the Constitution and laws of this State to the Mayor of Baltimore and City Council of the City of Baltimore or to the County Commissioners of the Counties, shall be construed to refer to the Mayor of Baltimore and City Council of the City of Baltimore and to the President or Chairman and County Council herein provided for whenever such construction would be reasonable. From and after the adoption of a charter by the City of Baltimore, or any County of this State, as hereinbefore provided, the Mayor of Baltimore and City Council of the City of Baltimore or the County Council of said County, subject to the Constitution and Public General Laws of this State, shall have full power to enact local laws of said City or County including the power to repeal or amend local laws of said City or County enacted by the General Assembly, upon all matters covered by the express powers granted as above provided; provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize or empower the County Council of any County in this State to enact laws or regulations for any incorporated town, village, or municipality in said County, on any matter covered by the powers granted to said town, village, or municipality by the Act incorporating it, or any subsequent Act or Acts amendatory thereto. * * * ”

10 . Thus, even those who are particularly known for having favored broad constructions of the federal constitution have recognized that an essential—perhaps the essential—function of a constitution is to limit government power.

In Marbury v. Madison, supra, 1 Cranch at 176, 2 L.Ed. at 73, Chief Justice John Marshall, after pointing out that the government of the United States is one with "certain limits not to be transcended,” went on to say: “that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." Later the Chief Justice emphatically stated that if constitutional limitations on legislative power are not enforceable, “then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable.” 1 Cranch at 177, 2 L.Ed. at 73.

In No. 84 of The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton argued extensively that the federal constitution, by only delegating certain powers to the federal government, represented essentially a limitation upon governmental powers. He stated "that the constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, a bill of rights." (Emphasis in original).

11 . J. McMahon, Historical View of the Government of Maryland, 326 (1831).

12 . Article I, § 7, cl. 1; Article I, § 8, cl. 1; Article I, § 9, els. 1, 4, 5, 6; Article I, § 10, els. 2, 3.

13 . Declaration of Rights: Articles 14, 15; Constitution: Article II, § 17; Article III, §§ 32, 34, 51, 52, 54; Article VIII, § 3; Article XI, § 7; Article XI-E, § 5; Article XI-F, §§ 8, 9.

14 . Anne Arundel County Charter, §§ 608, 704, 709, 710, 718 and 719; Baltimore County Charter, §§ 704, 709, 710, 716 and 717.

15 . Section 6-302(a) provides:

"(a) In general—Except as otherwise provided in this section and after complying with § 6-305 of this subtitle, in each year after the date of finality and before the following July 1, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City or the governing body of each county annually shall set the tax rate for the next taxable year on all assessments of property subject to that county’s property tax."

Section 6-308 provides in relevant part as follows:

"§ 6-308. Constant yield tax rate.

"(b) In general—(1) Unless the requirements of this section are met, a taxing authority may not set a county or municipal corporation property tax rate that exceeds the constant yield tax rate in any taxable year excluding revenue from property appearing for the first time on the assessment roll____

"(c) Notice of rate change.—If a taxing authority intends to set a county or municipal corporation property tax rate that exceeds the constant yield tax rate, it shall advertise to the public____

******

“(e) Contents of notice.—The notice shall state:

(1) that the meeting is being held to hear comments regarding an increase in the county or municipal corporation property tax rate that will make the rate exceed the consent [sic] yield tax rate; and

(2) the day, time, and location of the meeting.

k k k k k k

"(g) Adoption of tax rate.—After the meeting, the taxing authority may adopt by law an increase in the county or municipal corporation property tax rate that exceeds the constant yield tax rate____’’

16 . We wish to point out that the Court did not rewrite, to suit itself, the proposed amendments in our Order of September 20, 1990. Instead, applying the principles set forth in the above-cited cases, we simply deleted the portions of the amendments which we found to be invalid. This necessitated changing some of the dates specified in the proposed amendments in order to eliminate the invalid roll back provisions. But cf. The Sun, October 9, 1990, editorial, p. 6A (“The Court of Appeals ... took the unprecedented step of rewriting the referendum questions to suit the court’s fancy.”)