Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry. Co.

300 F. 173, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1421
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedJune 6, 1924
DocketNos. 156, 187, 188
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 300 F. 173 (Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry. Co., 300 F. 173, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1421 (N.D. Ga. 1924).

Opinion

SIBEEY, District Judge.

The Atlanta, Birmingham & Atlantic Railway Company grew out of a consolidation of other railroads and a reorganization perfected in 1915. The reorganization left an im[175]*175portant part of the system known as the Atlantic & Birmingham Railroad under a precedent mortgage in which Old Colony Trust Company, a corporation of Massachusetts, is trustee, and left the whole system under a mortgage, subject to the former one, in which Equitable Trust Company, a corporation of New York, is trustee, and under a third mortgage, subject to both the preceding, in which Columbia Trust Company, a corporation of New York, is trustee. Each mortgage covers physical properties and rents, issues, and profits, has a provision for' accelerated maturity in case of defaults as to interest or taxes, or' failure to discharge other liens, and for the trustees thereupon taking possession or securing a receivership. The interest on the bonds issued under the last-named mortgage, however, was due only from net income earned each fiscal year ending June 30th.

The system was operated under federal control until March 1, 1920, the corporation being paid -for its "use a compensation of $480,000 per year. Thereafter, until September 1, 1920, it was operated under the guaranty of section 209 of the Transportation Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10071J4dd), in effect that the net railway operating income for the six months should not be less than $240,000. Operations were at a continuous loss throughout the guaranty period, the company claiming a deficit of $793,402 in addition to the guaranteed profits of $240,000. Of this claim the United States paid from time to time, between September 10, 1920, and February 25, 1921, $764,000, and has paid since $90,000, leaving a balance of $179,402 still claimed by the company to be due. Operations continued to be at a large and steady loss until, on February 25, 1921, a note creditor, holding bonds under the second mortgage as collateral security, obtained a receivership, the company consenting, for the benefit of all creditors, including the mortgagees, on the grounds of the company’s insolvency, the increasing burden of taxes, labor and supply liens, the pendency of suits, and the likelihood of a dismemberment of the property and the destruction of its value as a going concern. An ascertainment of the mortgage debt and all others was prayed, and a complete administration of the property sought. Process, however, was asked only against the railway company.

The receiver was ordered to take over all of its assets and to “continue the operation of the railroad and to conduct systematically, in the same manner as at present, the business and occupation of carrying passengers and freight.” On February 28, 1921, he was “authorized, in his discretion, from time to time to pay out of the moneys that shall come into his hands operating expenses, taxes, traffic and car mileage balances, and also unpaid pay rolls and supply accounts incurred in operation since August 25, 1920.” The receiver’s operations were at a loss also. In December, 1921, the trustees of the mortgages not having intervened, they were, by amendment of the bill, sought to be brought in by substituted service, not being found within the court’s jurisdiction. They, however, each filed an independent bill, making each other and the receiver and the railway company parties, and each prayed a receiver and foreclosure. By consent these bills were consolidated on March 11, 1922, with the original bill, and the receiver[176]*176ship extended to the consolidated case, without prejudice to any question'of priorities. Rosses in operation have continued until very recently, and there is yet no net income in the receiver’s hands.

■Many interventions have been filed by persons having claims against the corporation and the receiver. Those relating to coal furnished before and since the receivership and not paid for have been heard. A very comprehensive and intelligent report made by the special master, fixing their several amounts and priorities, is excepted to as respects some conclusions of law only. The questions raised are: What dignity, as against the mortgages, have these claims found to be' for supplies necessary to operate the railroad and preserve it as a ’going concern, against income in the receiver’s hands or against the proceeds of sale of the corpus of the property for the periods (a) prior to the receivership; (b) during the receivership, before the entry into the case of the trustees; and (c) since their entry ? And collateral to these is an important inquiry as to whether funds that should have been applied to current debts have been diverted to the benefit of the mortgages under such circumstances as that they must be accounted for and restored.

1. The mortgagees in their bill assert, as did the original complaint, the necessity of an operation of the railroads by a receiver to prevent dismemberment and sacrifice until a sale can be made. Though parties now for two years, they have not yet pressed for a sale. The coal bills and other expenses incurred since their bills were filed, in this effort to operate and preserve the property, must by all principles of administration be paid before anything can be paid to the litigants who have sought and authorized the effort. Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust Co., 136 U. S. 89, 10 Sup. Ct. 950, 34 L. Ed. 379.

2. The coal bills made by the receiver prior to the entry into the case of the mortgagees must be awarded the same priority. They were incurred under the identical order to operate, which is still of force, granted for the same reasons that were later repeated by the mortgagees. While original authorization or consent by them was lacking, and express ratification was guarded against in the order enlarging the receivership, still the power of the court extends thus far. The original receivership consented to by the corporation was valid. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Atlanta, Birmingham & Atlantic Railway Co. (D. C.) 271 Fed. 731. It was invoked for the benefit of the mortgagees, though they were alleged to be beyond the process of the court, as well as for the benefit of all others. In this regard the bill of the judgment creditor in the Kneeland Case, supra, was quite different from the present one. The need of preserving the property as a going concern in order to effect any sale thereof was fully set forth. The court and receiver were under duty to make the effort so to preserve it. The credit extended to the receiver, asking it under the court’s order silent as to priorities, was a credit of the full power of the court to do right in the premises. Had the court at the time expressly made this expense a charge on the corpus, as by an issue of receiver’s certificates so providing, the action would have been proper and valid, subject to the right of lienors not then before the court to be heard as to the propriety [177]*177of the expenditures. Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Railway Co., 117 U. S. 434, 464, 6 Sup. Ct. 809, 29 L. Ed. 963. The hearing has now been afforded, and no word has been offered in criticism. The receivership was known to the mortgagees immediately. Its necessity, its purpose, and its fortunes have been a continuing whole.

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Bluebook (online)
300 F. 173, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1421, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/birmingham-trust-savings-co-v-atlanta-b-a-ry-co-gand-1924.