1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RENATA BIENIEK, Case No.: 3:21-cv-00018-AJB-MSB Plaintiff, 12 ORDER: v. 13 ALVARADO HOSPITAL MEDICAL (1) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 14 CENTER; SCRIPPS HEALTH, COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO 15 Defendants. AMEND, (Doc. No. 1); AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT 16 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR IN 17 FORMA PAUPERIS, (Doc. No. 2) 18 Plaintiff Renata Bieniek (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this action against 19 Alvarado Hospital Medical Center and Scripps Health La Jolla. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff also 20 filed a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Plaintiff seeks to 21 “appeal” her medical bills from September 23, 2020, to November 10, 2020. (Id. at 1.) 22 Plaintiff’s Complaint is currently before the Court for screening. 23 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD 24 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 25 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 26 $402. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Complaint requires 27 a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 28 1 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) screening 2 applies to non-prisoners proceeding IFP); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126– 3 27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). Under this statute, the 4 Court must sua sponte dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, 5 fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez, 203 6 F.3d at 1126–27. “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 7 malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 8 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 9 “When a court does not have jurisdiction to hear an action, the claim is considered 10 frivolous.” Johnson v. E. Band Cherokee Nation, 718 F. Supp. 6, 6 (N.D.N.Y. 1989). 11 Moreover, “[t]he Court has an independent obligation to determine whether it has subject- 12 matter jurisdiction.” Cox v. Lee, No. CV-20-0275-PHX-DMF, 2020 WL 1904625, at *2 13 (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2020) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 14 (1999)); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011) 15 (“[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the 16 scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions 17 that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.”) (citation omitted). Pursuant to Federal 18 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject- 19 matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action” (emphasis added). As the plain 20 language of Rule 12(h)(3) suggests, this requirement is mandatory. See Arbaugh v. Y&H 21 Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (noting that “‘subject-matter jurisdiction, because it 22 involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived’”; therefore, 23 “when a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 24 dismiss the complaint in its entirety”) (citation omitted). 25 Courts have a duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. See Karim- 26 Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The district court should 27 grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect,” 28 unless the court determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation 1 of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing 2 Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 3 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990)). 4 A. Discussion 5 Plaintiff brings this suit against Alvarado Hospital Medical Center and Scripps 6 Health La Jolla. In the Complaint, Plaintiff requests an “appeal” of “medical bills” from 7 September 23, 2020, to November 10, 2020. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff asserts that she 8 was in admitted to Scripps Health La Jolla on September 23, 2020 and was then transported 9 to Alvarado Hospital Medical Center. She remained at Alvarado Hospital until November 10 10, 2020. (Id.) In addition to filing a Complaint, Plaintiff attached several medical records 11 and medical bills from both Alvarado Hospital and Scripps Health La Jolla. Also, Plaintiff 12 offers her past employment history, in addition to documents reflecting her past 13 employment as a music instructor. 14 1. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted 15 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 16 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 17 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 18 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual 19 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 20 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Detailed factual 21 allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 22 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 23 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context- 24 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 25 common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant- 26 unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 27 see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 28 Here, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief may be 1 granted. In the Complaint, Plaintiff requests to “appeal” her medical bills but provides no 2 further facts to support any cause of action. Unclear to the Court is how Plaintiff would 3 like her medical bills “appealed,” and what relief she precisely seeks. Specifically, she 4 offers no factual allegations as to why she would like to “appeal” her medical bills, the 5 amount of her medical bills, if she is seeking to proceed in bankruptcy court, the 6 circumstances giving rise to the debt, or any other details concerning Defendants’ handling 7 of the debt. She additionally provides no rule, regulation, statute, or theory as to how she 8 would be entitled to have her medical bills discharged. Based on this failure to allege 9 sufficient facts, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint. 10 2.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RENATA BIENIEK, Case No.: 3:21-cv-00018-AJB-MSB Plaintiff, 12 ORDER: v. 13 ALVARADO HOSPITAL MEDICAL (1) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 14 CENTER; SCRIPPS HEALTH, COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO 15 Defendants. AMEND, (Doc. No. 1); AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT 16 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR IN 17 FORMA PAUPERIS, (Doc. No. 2) 18 Plaintiff Renata Bieniek (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this action against 19 Alvarado Hospital Medical Center and Scripps Health La Jolla. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff also 20 filed a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Plaintiff seeks to 21 “appeal” her medical bills from September 23, 2020, to November 10, 2020. (Id. at 1.) 22 Plaintiff’s Complaint is currently before the Court for screening. 23 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD 24 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 25 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 26 $402. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Complaint requires 27 a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 28 1 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) screening 2 applies to non-prisoners proceeding IFP); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126– 3 27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). Under this statute, the 4 Court must sua sponte dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, 5 fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez, 203 6 F.3d at 1126–27. “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 7 malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 8 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 9 “When a court does not have jurisdiction to hear an action, the claim is considered 10 frivolous.” Johnson v. E. Band Cherokee Nation, 718 F. Supp. 6, 6 (N.D.N.Y. 1989). 11 Moreover, “[t]he Court has an independent obligation to determine whether it has subject- 12 matter jurisdiction.” Cox v. Lee, No. CV-20-0275-PHX-DMF, 2020 WL 1904625, at *2 13 (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2020) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 14 (1999)); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011) 15 (“[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the 16 scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions 17 that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.”) (citation omitted). Pursuant to Federal 18 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject- 19 matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action” (emphasis added). As the plain 20 language of Rule 12(h)(3) suggests, this requirement is mandatory. See Arbaugh v. Y&H 21 Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (noting that “‘subject-matter jurisdiction, because it 22 involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived’”; therefore, 23 “when a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 24 dismiss the complaint in its entirety”) (citation omitted). 25 Courts have a duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. See Karim- 26 Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The district court should 27 grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect,” 28 unless the court determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation 1 of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing 2 Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 3 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990)). 4 A. Discussion 5 Plaintiff brings this suit against Alvarado Hospital Medical Center and Scripps 6 Health La Jolla. In the Complaint, Plaintiff requests an “appeal” of “medical bills” from 7 September 23, 2020, to November 10, 2020. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff asserts that she 8 was in admitted to Scripps Health La Jolla on September 23, 2020 and was then transported 9 to Alvarado Hospital Medical Center. She remained at Alvarado Hospital until November 10 10, 2020. (Id.) In addition to filing a Complaint, Plaintiff attached several medical records 11 and medical bills from both Alvarado Hospital and Scripps Health La Jolla. Also, Plaintiff 12 offers her past employment history, in addition to documents reflecting her past 13 employment as a music instructor. 14 1. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted 15 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 16 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 17 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 18 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual 19 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 20 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Detailed factual 21 allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 22 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 23 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context- 24 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 25 common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant- 26 unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 27 see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 28 Here, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief may be 1 granted. In the Complaint, Plaintiff requests to “appeal” her medical bills but provides no 2 further facts to support any cause of action. Unclear to the Court is how Plaintiff would 3 like her medical bills “appealed,” and what relief she precisely seeks. Specifically, she 4 offers no factual allegations as to why she would like to “appeal” her medical bills, the 5 amount of her medical bills, if she is seeking to proceed in bankruptcy court, the 6 circumstances giving rise to the debt, or any other details concerning Defendants’ handling 7 of the debt. She additionally provides no rule, regulation, statute, or theory as to how she 8 would be entitled to have her medical bills discharged. Based on this failure to allege 9 sufficient facts, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint. 10 2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 11 A federal court has an independent duty to assess whether federal subject matter 12 jurisdiction exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (federal 13 courts can adjudicate only those cases in which the United States Constitution and 14 Congress authorize them to adjudicate). There are two bases for federal subject matter 15 jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity 16 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A review of the Complaint reveals it should be 17 dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Complaint fails to demonstrate 18 a basis for such jurisdiction. 19 a) Federal Question Jurisdiction 20 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts have jurisdiction over “all civil 21 actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” “A case 22 ‘arises under’ federal law either where federal law creates the cause of action or ‘where the 23 vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal 24 law.’” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) 25 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 26 (1983)). The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the “well- 27 pleaded complaint rule.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under 28 the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question 1 is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Id. 2 The entirety of Plaintiff’s allegations, however, concerns an “appeal” of medical 3 bills. But Plaintiff does not show how her claims arise under federal law, and without more, 4 these claims are not suitable for this Court’s review. Thus, as alleged, the Complaint does 5 not contain any allegation of a violation arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 6 the United States. Accordingly, based on the claims plausibly asserted in the Complaint, 7 the court lacks federal question jurisdiction. 8 b) Diversity Jurisdiction 9 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over 10 civil actions in diversity cases “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 11 of $75,000” and where the matter is between “citizens of different states.” 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1332. Jurisdiction under Section 1332 requires complete diversity, so each plaintiff must 13 be diverse from each defendant. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 14 546, 553 (2005). 15 Here, Plaintiff does not allege the amount in controversy. While her claims surround 16 her medical bills, she does not state the amount at issue. Based on this lack of information, 17 Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing an amount in controversy over the 18 jurisdictional amount required for diversity jurisdiction. 19 Plaintiff has also failed to allege that the parties’ citizenships are completely diverse. 20 The Complaint has no indication of the residencies of Plaintiff or Defendants. See 21 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 67–68 (1996) (“The Supreme Court has interpreted 22 § 1332 to require “complete diversity of citizenship,” meaning each plaintiff must be 23 diverse from each defendant). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing 24 diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 25 II. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 26 Plaintiff also moves to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. An action may proceed 27 despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if she is granted leave to proceed 28 IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th 1 || Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Although the statute 2 || does not specify the qualifications for proceeding IFP, the plaintiff’s affidavit must allege 3 || poverty with some particularity. Granting a plaintiff leave to proceed IFP may be proper, 4 ||for example, when the affidavit demonstrates that paying court costs will result in a 5 || plaintiff’s inability to afford the “necessities of life.” /d. The affidavit, however, need not 6 demonstrate that the plaintiff is destitute. Jd. 7 However, even if a plaintiff meets the income requirement, the Ninth Circuit 8 indicates that leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915(a) is 9 || properly granted only when plaintiff has demonstrated poverty and presented a claim that 10 |/1is not factually or legally frivolous. See Tripati v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 11 }}1370 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s 12 Complaint does not properly state a claim, thus the Court DENIES Plaintiff's IFP motion 13 || AS MOOT. 14 CONCLUSION 15 In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's IFP motion, 16 ||(Doc. No. 2) and DISMISSES Plaintiffs Complaint. (Doc. No. 1). “The court should give 17 leave [to amend] freely when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In the Ninth 18 || Circuit, “Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with 19 || ‘extreme liberality,’ United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981), and “[t]his 20 || policy is applied even more liberally to pro se litigants.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 21 (9th Cir. 1987). As such, the Court provides Plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND to 22 ||address the deficiencies stated herein. Should Plaintiff wish, she may file an Amended 23 || Complaint and renewed IFP motion by September 30, 2021. Failure to do so will result in 24 dismissal of Plaintiff's action. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 || Dated: August 24, 2021 © ¢ 27 Hon, Anthony J.Battaglia 28 United States District Judge
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