Bethea v. NYCHA Law Department

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 6, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00803
StatusUnknown

This text of Bethea v. NYCHA Law Department (Bethea v. NYCHA Law Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bethea v. NYCHA Law Department, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELAINE WILLIAMS BETHEA, Plaintiff, 23-CV-0803 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL NYCHA LAW DEPARTMENT, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, invokes the court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendant “NYCHA Law Department” violated her rights. By order dated February 15, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead her claims in an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In

reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings her claims using the court’s general complaint form. She checks the box to invoke the court’s federal question jurisdiction and, in response to the question asking which of her federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated, writes “Discrimination under the Fair Housing policy. Intimidation, Racism[.]”1 (ECF 2, at 2.) She alleges that the

events giving rise to her claims occurred at an address in New York, New York, from “June 2001 to Present.” (Id. at 5.) The following allegations are taken from the complaint. In 2001, Plaintiff was selected for a two-bedroom apartment at the Robert Fulton Houses. (Id.) She was selected for the

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, punctuation, and grammar are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. apartment under a “Class Action suit.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff “was not given that selection at all.” (Id.) She instead was placed in a one-bedroom apartment in which she continues to reside with her grandson. “Another material issue of fact” is that the “tenant selection and assignment plan” (TSAP) “is designed to ‘ensure’ the housing Authority processes applications and transfer requests in a ‘fair’ and ‘objective’ manner in accordance with applicable Federal Law and regulations,” which Plaintiff maintains she was “never afforded . . . twenty-one years ago!” (Id.)

(quotation marks and emphasis in original). She asks the Court to “please explain to [her] why a waiting List Annual canvass case #62756, after twent[y]-one years is being offered to [her] now[.]” (Id. at 6) (emphasis in original). She further asks, if the TSAP is designed to “Ensure” the housing authority processes applications in a fair and objective manner in accordance with applicable Federal Law and regulations[,] why didn’t they do so, and if they had done so, would I have sustained a devastating slip and fall, which ended me up in the hospital having emergency spine surgery and paralized during the pandemic?? (Id.) Plaintiff describes her injuries as the following: Hospitalized five days, Mold and Mildew, awful odor for months, leaking water from radiator in living room Quality of air in apartment unsafe as per health inspector taking grandson back and forth to emergency and Pediatrician or asthma. Sleeping with front door to apartment open to remove the awful odor for months. The Brown water from all areas in apartment faucets. (Id.) Plaintiff does not specify the relief she is seeking. DISCUSSION A. Fair Housing Act Because Plaintiff states that she experienced discrimination, intimidation, and racism, (see ECF 2, at 2), the Court construes the complaint as attempting to assert claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3604.2 The FHA “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing.” Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979). Specifically, it prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status . . . national origin,” or disability. 42 U.S.C.§ 3604(b), (f). The

FHA also prohibits retaliation against persons who have asserted their rights under the FHA. See id. § 3617 (unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by [among others, §§ 3604 and 3605] of this title”). Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting a violation of the FHA.

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Bluebook (online)
Bethea v. NYCHA Law Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bethea-v-nycha-law-department-nysd-2023.