Opinion of the Court by
Justice MINTON.
Thomas Berryman filed this appeal as a matter of right1 from his convictions for wanton murder and assault in the first degree for which he was sentenced to a total of forty-five years’ imprisonment. Berryman raises two issues. First, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict. Second, he contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to exclude evidence regarding illicit pills. We reject both arguments and, consequently, affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
Berryman and a friend, Michael Dunn, retrieved a package from a UPS hub in Stanton, Kentucky. That package contained Lortab pills, which Dunn admitted purchasing on the internet without a prescription. After retrieving the package, Berryman, accompanied by Dunn, was traveling on the Mountain Parkway in Clark County when their vehicle struck the vehicle occupied by Charles and Angela Deaton. Angela Deaton suffered serious injuries in the collision. Charles Dea-ton died.
Berryman was indicted for wanton murder, assault in the first degree, one count of possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, and one count of possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The trial court granted Ber-ryman’s motion to sever the controlled substance charges. The assault and murder charges proceeded to trial.
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced testimony that Berryman was driving his vehicle at approximately ninety-eight miles per hour at the time of the collision. Furthermore, two witnesses observed that Berryman appeared to be preoccupied with something in the center or passenger [177]*177area of the car shortly before the accident. Dunn testified that at the time of the collision, he was counting Lortab pills in the front seat of the vehicle while simultaneously conversing with Berryman about a future package. Dunn further testified that he saw the Deatons’ vehicle ahead on the parkway while Berryman’s vehicle was passing a third vehicle but that Berryman made no effort to apply the brakes before colliding with the Deatons’ vehicle. Dunn also testified that Berryman asked him to tell the police that he, not Berryman, was driving the vehicle and that he initially complied with Berryman’s request but, ultimately, told the police that Berryman was the driver.
The jury found Berryman guilty of wanton murder and of assault in the first degree. Consistent with the jury’s recommendations, the trial court sentenced Ber-ryman to thirty years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction and fifteen years’ imprisonment for the assault conviction, with those convictions ordered to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of forty-five years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS.
A. The Trial Couri Properly Denied Berryman’s Motion for a Directed Verdict.
Berryman contends that his conduct cannot constitute wantonness. Thus, according to Berryman, since wanton conduct is an essential element of wanton murder and first-degree assault, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. But because we find that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find Berryman guilty of engaging in wanton conduct, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Berryman’s motion for a directed verdict.
The familiar standard for ruling on a motion for directed verdict is as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.2
In order to convict Berryman of wanton murder, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Berryman “operated] ... a motor vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, [and] ... wantonly engagefd] in conduct which create[d] a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causefd] the death of another person.”3 Similarly, in order to convict Berryman of assault in the first degree, the Commonwealth was required to show that “[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life [Berryman] wantonly engage[d] in conduct which create[d] a grave risk of death to another and thereby cause[d] serious physical injury to another [178]*178person.”4 So each charge required the Commonwealth to prove that Berryman acted wantonly.
The General Assembly has provided that “[a] person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”5 We must examine the evidence to determine if the Commonwealth adduced sufficient evidence to meet the requisite level of wantonness necessary to convict a defendant of murder and first-degree assault.
When all of the evidence in the case at hand is considered in its totality and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the Commonwealth, it is clear that the trial court properly denied Berryman’s motion for a directed verdict. The evidence in this case showed that Berryman (1) drove at an alarmingly high rate of speed; (2) ignored the conditions of the road and other vehicles ahead; (3) made no effort to brake or swerve before overtaking and ramming the Deatons’ vehicle, even though the Deatons’ vehicle was visible; and (4) had traces of Xanax in his system.6 Berryman’s egregious misconduct is obviously evidence of more than just a driver who had an accident while speeding and not paying close attention to the road. Instead, Berryman’s tragic misconduct clearly manifests an extreme indifference to human life.
We reject Berryman’s contention that his conduct is less egregious than that in the similar case of Brown v. Commonwealth,7 a case in which we found that the trial court properly denied a directed verdict on wanton murder. In Brown, a driver was convicted of wanton murder under facts showing that the driver was speeding, may have been watching a television while driving, consciously ran through a red light, and failed to apply his brakes before colliding with another vehicle.8 Among the issues on appeal was Brown’s contention that his conduct could not be found to have been wanton.
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Opinion of the Court by
Justice MINTON.
Thomas Berryman filed this appeal as a matter of right1 from his convictions for wanton murder and assault in the first degree for which he was sentenced to a total of forty-five years’ imprisonment. Berryman raises two issues. First, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict. Second, he contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to exclude evidence regarding illicit pills. We reject both arguments and, consequently, affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
Berryman and a friend, Michael Dunn, retrieved a package from a UPS hub in Stanton, Kentucky. That package contained Lortab pills, which Dunn admitted purchasing on the internet without a prescription. After retrieving the package, Berryman, accompanied by Dunn, was traveling on the Mountain Parkway in Clark County when their vehicle struck the vehicle occupied by Charles and Angela Deaton. Angela Deaton suffered serious injuries in the collision. Charles Dea-ton died.
Berryman was indicted for wanton murder, assault in the first degree, one count of possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, and one count of possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The trial court granted Ber-ryman’s motion to sever the controlled substance charges. The assault and murder charges proceeded to trial.
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced testimony that Berryman was driving his vehicle at approximately ninety-eight miles per hour at the time of the collision. Furthermore, two witnesses observed that Berryman appeared to be preoccupied with something in the center or passenger [177]*177area of the car shortly before the accident. Dunn testified that at the time of the collision, he was counting Lortab pills in the front seat of the vehicle while simultaneously conversing with Berryman about a future package. Dunn further testified that he saw the Deatons’ vehicle ahead on the parkway while Berryman’s vehicle was passing a third vehicle but that Berryman made no effort to apply the brakes before colliding with the Deatons’ vehicle. Dunn also testified that Berryman asked him to tell the police that he, not Berryman, was driving the vehicle and that he initially complied with Berryman’s request but, ultimately, told the police that Berryman was the driver.
The jury found Berryman guilty of wanton murder and of assault in the first degree. Consistent with the jury’s recommendations, the trial court sentenced Ber-ryman to thirty years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction and fifteen years’ imprisonment for the assault conviction, with those convictions ordered to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of forty-five years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS.
A. The Trial Couri Properly Denied Berryman’s Motion for a Directed Verdict.
Berryman contends that his conduct cannot constitute wantonness. Thus, according to Berryman, since wanton conduct is an essential element of wanton murder and first-degree assault, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. But because we find that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find Berryman guilty of engaging in wanton conduct, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Berryman’s motion for a directed verdict.
The familiar standard for ruling on a motion for directed verdict is as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.2
In order to convict Berryman of wanton murder, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Berryman “operated] ... a motor vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, [and] ... wantonly engagefd] in conduct which create[d] a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causefd] the death of another person.”3 Similarly, in order to convict Berryman of assault in the first degree, the Commonwealth was required to show that “[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life [Berryman] wantonly engage[d] in conduct which create[d] a grave risk of death to another and thereby cause[d] serious physical injury to another [178]*178person.”4 So each charge required the Commonwealth to prove that Berryman acted wantonly.
The General Assembly has provided that “[a] person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”5 We must examine the evidence to determine if the Commonwealth adduced sufficient evidence to meet the requisite level of wantonness necessary to convict a defendant of murder and first-degree assault.
When all of the evidence in the case at hand is considered in its totality and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the Commonwealth, it is clear that the trial court properly denied Berryman’s motion for a directed verdict. The evidence in this case showed that Berryman (1) drove at an alarmingly high rate of speed; (2) ignored the conditions of the road and other vehicles ahead; (3) made no effort to brake or swerve before overtaking and ramming the Deatons’ vehicle, even though the Deatons’ vehicle was visible; and (4) had traces of Xanax in his system.6 Berryman’s egregious misconduct is obviously evidence of more than just a driver who had an accident while speeding and not paying close attention to the road. Instead, Berryman’s tragic misconduct clearly manifests an extreme indifference to human life.
We reject Berryman’s contention that his conduct is less egregious than that in the similar case of Brown v. Commonwealth,7 a case in which we found that the trial court properly denied a directed verdict on wanton murder. In Brown, a driver was convicted of wanton murder under facts showing that the driver was speeding, may have been watching a television while driving, consciously ran through a red light, and failed to apply his brakes before colliding with another vehicle.8 Among the issues on appeal was Brown’s contention that his conduct could not be found to have been wanton. We disagreed, holding that it was not unreasonable as a matter of law for a jury to find that Brown’s misconduct rose to the level necessary to constitute wanton murder.9
Contrary to Berryman’s arguments, this case is similar to Brown. In many important ways, Berryman’s misconduct is more egregious than Brown’s. Both cases involve a driver who was inattentive to the road. Brown’s inattention involved watching television; Berryman’s involved monitoring the counting of his illegal drug shipment. Both cases involve defendants who were speeding. But Ber-[179]*179ryman was exceeding the speed limit by over thirty miles per hour; Brown was exceeding the speed limit by only between five and fifteen miles per hour. And there is no indication that Brown was impaired to any degree by alcohol or other intoxicants. A reasonable inference could be drawn that Berryman was impaired, at least somewhat, by the Xanax in his system.10 Thus, in many important respects, the facts in this case contain even stronger evidence of wanton conduct than that found in Brown.
Likewise, we reject Berryman’s alternate contention that Brown was incorrectly decided. To the contrary, we find that Brown, properly analyzed and applied both our precedent and the relevant statutory provisions enacted by the General Assembly. Thus, because Brown was correctly decided and the facts in this case demonstrate even stronger evidence of wanton conduct, we decline Berryman’s invitation to overrule Brown.
Accordingly, we reject Berryman’s contention that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the murder and assault charges.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err When it Permitted the Commonwealth to Introduce Evidence Regarding the Lortab Pills.
Berryman repeatedly requested that the trial court exclude evidence of the contents of the package that he and Dunn picked up at the UPS hub in Stanton. On appeal, he contends that the trial court’s failure to exclude that evidence constituted reversible error because the evidence was irrelevant. We disagree.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” 11 All relevant evidence is admissible; 12 however, relevant evidence may, nonetheless, be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice....” 13 Because “determinations as to the relevance and admissibility of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial court[,]” we may reverse a trial court’s decision to exclude or admit evidence only “after a finding that the decision amounted to an abuse of discretion.” 14
Although the drug-related charges against Berryman had been severed, the evidence about the drugs was still relevant to prove that Berryman’s conduct rose to the level of wantonness necessaiy for murder and assault in the first-degree convictions. A reasonable juror could have found that Berryman’s conduct was more culpable because he was watching Dunn divvy up illicit pills than if Berryman had been distracted by something more benign, such as briefly taking his eyes off the road to change the station on the radio. Although the fact that Berryman, apparently, was engrossed by Dunn’s counting of illicit pills surely was prejudicial, the jury was entitled to be aware of the full spectrum of Berryman’s misconduct so that it could make the difficult determination of whether Berryman’s misconduct constituted wanton murder and/or first-degree assault or whether that misconduct constituted a lesser-included offense, such [180]*180as reckless homicide or fourth-degree assault.15 Only a juror possessed with full knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the tragic collision could have made the requisite determinations as to the proper degree of culpability for Berry-man’s misconduct.
The trial court mitigated any undue prejudice Berryman may have suffered by granting his request for an admonition to the jury. The trial court admonished the jury that the evidence involving drugs was only to be considered to the extent it reflected upon Berryman’s operation of the vehicle. A jury is presumed to follow an admonition;16 and Berryman has pointed to nothing to show that the jury in the case at hand could not, or did not, follow the trial court’s limiting admonition.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the Lortab-related evidence was admissible.
III. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, Thomas Ber-ryman’s murder and assault convictions are affirmed.
All sitting. LAMBERT, CJ.; ABRAMSON, CUNNINGHAM, NOBLE, and SCOTT, JJ., concur.