Bennett v. PRC Public Sector, Inc.

931 F. Supp. 484, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13202, 1996 WL 408604
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 26, 1996
DocketCivil Action H-93-0810
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 931 F. Supp. 484 (Bennett v. PRC Public Sector, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bennett v. PRC Public Sector, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 484, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13202, 1996 WL 408604 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING EXPERT TESTIMONY

ATLAS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant PRC Public Sector, Inc. a/k/a PRC Pubic Management Services, Inc. (“PRC”) has filed a Motion in Limine [Doe. # 182] (“Motion”) seeking exclusion of certain evidence to be presented by Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Lawrence Schulze, on the grounds that the testimony fails to meet the standards of Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (“Daubert’’), as well as because the testimony allegedly contains medical opinions that the witness is unqualified to present. Plaintiffs strenuously oppose the motion. 1

The Court held a preliminary hearing on November 8, 1995, pursuant to Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 104. During the hearing, the Court received Plaintiffs’ ten exhibits, some of which are scientific or medi *488 cal articles to which Defendant now has objected because they are not peer-reviewed. The Court notes that peer review is not a requirement for admissibility, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. at 2797, and declines to change its evidentiary rulings. This is in no way a comment as to whether or not the articles are peer-reviewed.

Plaintiffs are ten employees who worked in the Computer-Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) System of the City of Houston Police Department (“HPD”). The CAD system was designed to enable the Houston Police Department to respond quickly to its “911” calls. Plaintiffs were among the HPD “911” call takers and dispatchers. 2

Plaintiffs contend that Defendant PRC designed, promoted, marketed, distributed, sold, and installed the CAD system. See Joint Pretrial Order [Doc. # 201], at 3. PRC denies these contentions and asserts that it provided the system according to detailed specifications that were supplied by the HPD. Id. at 5.

Plaintiffs assert against PRC 3 claims of strict liability arising from the allegedly defective design and unreasonably dangerous condition of the CAD system. 4 Dr. Schulze’s opinions largely relate to the design of what he calls the “console” or the “workstation” and the effects it allegedly caused to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that the system was designed with inherent risks and dangers to users arising from extended use, and such use- was foreseeable and was contemplated by PRC. Plaintiffs also assert that PRC “failed to warn and/or adequately warn users and consumers ... of the risks of the defects in the machines and workstations,” that PRC failed to instruct users concerning the proper and safe use of the machines and work stations, that PRC was negligent in consulting and designing the work stations, and that PRC breached implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for their intended use. First Amended Complaint [Doc. # 74], ¶ 13; Joint Pretrial Order, at 3-4.

Plaintiffs allege that as a result of these wrongs by PRC they have sustained severe bodily injuries to the “muscles, tendons, vessels and soft tissue of their upper extremities,” which include “carpal tunnel syndrome [‘CTS’], thoracic outlet syndrome, reflect sympathic dystrophy, tendinitis, tenosynovi-tis, nerve ganglia, ulnar and median nerve compression and entrapment, fibrositis and causalgia.” Joint Pretrial Order, at 4. Plaintiffs further state that most of them have undergone “extensive surgery and medical treatment” for their injuries, and that “no Plaintiff has successfully completed the treatment.” Id. They also allege mental anguish, physical pain, disfigurement, impairment, medical expenses, and loss of earning capacity. Id.

Defendant PRC, in sum, denies that the workstations (or consoles) are defectively designed or unreasonably dangerous, deny that they caused Plaintiffs’ injuries, and deny that there is any breach of implied warranties.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

The parties largely agree on the applicable legal standards. They merely dispute those standards’ application to Dr. Schulze’s testimony. More specifically, it appears that the disagreement centers on whether Dr. Schul-ze’s opinions on causation, unreasonably dangerous equipment and defective equipment *489 are grounded in valid and appropriate scientific methodology.

Under Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court has made it clear that the “trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. 5 The reliability inquiry is grounded in Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires that the expert testimony be admitted if it consists of “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge,” and that such knowledge is relevant in the sense that it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 6 Id.; U.S. v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir.1995).

The first inquiry for this Court under Rule 702, therefore, is whether Dr. Schulze is qualified as an expert. See F.R.E. 702, 104(a). Next, the Court must assess whether or not the testimony Plaintiffs seek to offer qualifies as “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.”

The Supreme Court noted in Daubert that the “scientific knowledge” requirement establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. The Court stated that the “adjective ‘scientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science,” and that the “word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Id. While there is no requirement that the subject of scientific testimony be “known” to a certainty, “in order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.” Id. All proposed testimony therefore must be supported by appropriate validation; in other words, there must be “ ‘good grounds’, based upon what is known” supporting it. Id. 7

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Bluebook (online)
931 F. Supp. 484, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13202, 1996 WL 408604, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bennett-v-prc-public-sector-inc-txsd-1996.