OPINION
Chabot, Judge-.
Respondent determined deficiencies in Federal individual income tax, and in Federal excisé tax under section 4973,1 against petitioners as follows:
Deficiency Year Income tax Excise tax2
Donald L. Benbow and Patricia J. Benbow 1978 $542.50 $130.20
Daniel W. Cass, Jr., and Barbara L. Cass 1978 $811.00 294.00
Daniel W. Cass, Jr. 1979 294.00
Earl R. Lueckel and Lois B. Lueckel 1978 6,722.11 1979 913.87 913.87
Frederic E. Saunders and Mary Alice Saunders 1978 1,897.00 304.50
William H. Strong and Ella K. Strong 1978 1979 1980 4,558.31 653.10 653.10 653.10
The issues for decision3 are as follows:
(1) Whether any portion of the terminating distributions from a pension plan received by petitioner-husbands in 1978 may be "rolled over” tax free to individual retirement accounts under section 402(a)(5), the plan having lost its tax-qualified status for periods after December 31, 1975.
(2) Whether petitioner-husbands are liable for excise taxes under section 4973 on excess contributions to individual retirement accounts and, if so, in what amounts.
The instant case has been submitted fully stipulated; the stipulations and the stipulated exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.
When the petition in the instant case was filed, petitioners Donald L. Benbow (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Benbow) and Patricia J. Benbow, husband and wife, resided in North Ridgeville, Ohio; petitioners Daniel W. Cass, Jr. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Cass), and Barbara Cass, husband and wife, resided in Wolcottville, Ind.; petitioners Earl R. Lueckel (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Lueckel) and Lois B. Lueckel, husband and wife, resided in Westlake, Ohio; petitioners Frederic E. Saunders (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Saunders) and Mary Alice Saunders, husband and wife, resided in Angola, Ind., and petitioners William H. Strong (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Strong) and Ella K. Strong, husband and wife, resided in Fairview Park, Ohio.
Electric Cord Sets, Inc. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Electric), an Ohio corporation, instituted a pension plan (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the plan) for its employees in 1958. In 1959, the plan became tax qualified under section 401(a) and the plan’s trust (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the trust) became exempt under section 501(a). In 1963, the plan was amended and the Internal Revenue Service recognized the plan’s tax-qualified status under section 401(a) and the trust’s exempt status under section 501(a).
On July 18, 1978, Electric terminated the plan effective for the plan year ended December 31, 1977, and filed a final tax return Form 5500-C for the plan year ended December 31, 1977. In 1978, the trustees of the trust distributed the assets of the trust to the participants in the plan.
Each petitioner-husband was an employee of Electric and a participant in the plan. Each petitioner-husband received a terminating distribution from the trust in 1978 and invested his distribution in an individual retirement account (hereinafter sometimes referred to as an IRA), described in section 408(a).
Throughout the duration of the plan and the trust, none of the petitioners was a trustee of the trust or a shareholder or member of the board of directors of Electric. Throughout the duration of the plan and the trust, none of the petitioners held any decision-making positions with reference to the plan and the trust.
Benbow became president of Electric in April of 1977 and held that position during 1978.
In 1979, the plan and the trust were examined by respondent. Based on this examination, it was determined that the plan discriminated among salaried employees. In September of 1979, a preliminary letter proposing revocation of the plan’s tax-qualified status under section 401(a), and the trust’s exempt status under section 501(a), was issued by respondent. On February 15, 1980, respondent revoked the plan’s tax-qualified status and the trust’s exempt status retroactively, effective as of January 1, 1976.
On January 1, 1976, and thereafter, the plan was not a tax-qualified plan under section 401(a), and the trust was not exempt under section 501(a). In particular, when the terminating distributions from the trust were made to petitioner-husbands in 1978, the plan was not a tax-qualified plan and the trust was not exempt.
The amounts of the total distributions, and the amounts attributable to contributions made for periods after December 31, 1975, are shown in table l.4
TABLE 1
Participant Total distribution Post-1975 portion
Benbow $2,170.00 $2,170.00
Cass 4,900.00 3,488.88
Lueckel 15,231.13 1,938.46
Saunders 5,075.00 1,529.86
Strong 10,885.00 4,036.36
Each petitioner-husband made the maximum allowable contribution to his IRA, for each of the years before the Court for which a deficiency of section 4973 tax has been determined, in addition to the rollover of his 1978 distribution from the trust.
I. Income Tax
Under section 402(a)(5),5 if a participant in a tax-qualified plan receives a lump-sum distribution from the plan’s exempt trust and rolls it over into an IRA, then the participant is not to include in gross income the amount so rolled over.
Section 402(b)6 provides that distributions from a nonexempt trust are to be taxed under section 72, which generally provides for current taxation of distributions as ordinary income.
Respondent contends that, since the plan was not tax qualified and the trust was not exempt when the distributions here involved were made, the distributions are includable in their entirety in petitioner-husbands’ gross incomes under section 402(b) and are taxable as ordinary income. Respondent concedes that each of the rollovers would meet the requirements of current excludability under section 402(a)(5) if the trust were a "qualified trust,” within the meaning of section 402(a)(5)(A)(i).
Petitioners maintain that they are taxable currently on only those portions of the distributions that result from contributions made after the loss of tax-qualified and exempt status. The other portions of the distributions, they assert, are excludable from income under section 402(a)(5), because they were rolled over into IRAs.
We agree with petitioners.
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OPINION
Chabot, Judge-.
Respondent determined deficiencies in Federal individual income tax, and in Federal excisé tax under section 4973,1 against petitioners as follows:
Deficiency Year Income tax Excise tax2
Donald L. Benbow and Patricia J. Benbow 1978 $542.50 $130.20
Daniel W. Cass, Jr., and Barbara L. Cass 1978 $811.00 294.00
Daniel W. Cass, Jr. 1979 294.00
Earl R. Lueckel and Lois B. Lueckel 1978 6,722.11 1979 913.87 913.87
Frederic E. Saunders and Mary Alice Saunders 1978 1,897.00 304.50
William H. Strong and Ella K. Strong 1978 1979 1980 4,558.31 653.10 653.10 653.10
The issues for decision3 are as follows:
(1) Whether any portion of the terminating distributions from a pension plan received by petitioner-husbands in 1978 may be "rolled over” tax free to individual retirement accounts under section 402(a)(5), the plan having lost its tax-qualified status for periods after December 31, 1975.
(2) Whether petitioner-husbands are liable for excise taxes under section 4973 on excess contributions to individual retirement accounts and, if so, in what amounts.
The instant case has been submitted fully stipulated; the stipulations and the stipulated exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.
When the petition in the instant case was filed, petitioners Donald L. Benbow (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Benbow) and Patricia J. Benbow, husband and wife, resided in North Ridgeville, Ohio; petitioners Daniel W. Cass, Jr. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Cass), and Barbara Cass, husband and wife, resided in Wolcottville, Ind.; petitioners Earl R. Lueckel (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Lueckel) and Lois B. Lueckel, husband and wife, resided in Westlake, Ohio; petitioners Frederic E. Saunders (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Saunders) and Mary Alice Saunders, husband and wife, resided in Angola, Ind., and petitioners William H. Strong (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Strong) and Ella K. Strong, husband and wife, resided in Fairview Park, Ohio.
Electric Cord Sets, Inc. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Electric), an Ohio corporation, instituted a pension plan (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the plan) for its employees in 1958. In 1959, the plan became tax qualified under section 401(a) and the plan’s trust (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the trust) became exempt under section 501(a). In 1963, the plan was amended and the Internal Revenue Service recognized the plan’s tax-qualified status under section 401(a) and the trust’s exempt status under section 501(a).
On July 18, 1978, Electric terminated the plan effective for the plan year ended December 31, 1977, and filed a final tax return Form 5500-C for the plan year ended December 31, 1977. In 1978, the trustees of the trust distributed the assets of the trust to the participants in the plan.
Each petitioner-husband was an employee of Electric and a participant in the plan. Each petitioner-husband received a terminating distribution from the trust in 1978 and invested his distribution in an individual retirement account (hereinafter sometimes referred to as an IRA), described in section 408(a).
Throughout the duration of the plan and the trust, none of the petitioners was a trustee of the trust or a shareholder or member of the board of directors of Electric. Throughout the duration of the plan and the trust, none of the petitioners held any decision-making positions with reference to the plan and the trust.
Benbow became president of Electric in April of 1977 and held that position during 1978.
In 1979, the plan and the trust were examined by respondent. Based on this examination, it was determined that the plan discriminated among salaried employees. In September of 1979, a preliminary letter proposing revocation of the plan’s tax-qualified status under section 401(a), and the trust’s exempt status under section 501(a), was issued by respondent. On February 15, 1980, respondent revoked the plan’s tax-qualified status and the trust’s exempt status retroactively, effective as of January 1, 1976.
On January 1, 1976, and thereafter, the plan was not a tax-qualified plan under section 401(a), and the trust was not exempt under section 501(a). In particular, when the terminating distributions from the trust were made to petitioner-husbands in 1978, the plan was not a tax-qualified plan and the trust was not exempt.
The amounts of the total distributions, and the amounts attributable to contributions made for periods after December 31, 1975, are shown in table l.4
TABLE 1
Participant Total distribution Post-1975 portion
Benbow $2,170.00 $2,170.00
Cass 4,900.00 3,488.88
Lueckel 15,231.13 1,938.46
Saunders 5,075.00 1,529.86
Strong 10,885.00 4,036.36
Each petitioner-husband made the maximum allowable contribution to his IRA, for each of the years before the Court for which a deficiency of section 4973 tax has been determined, in addition to the rollover of his 1978 distribution from the trust.
I. Income Tax
Under section 402(a)(5),5 if a participant in a tax-qualified plan receives a lump-sum distribution from the plan’s exempt trust and rolls it over into an IRA, then the participant is not to include in gross income the amount so rolled over.
Section 402(b)6 provides that distributions from a nonexempt trust are to be taxed under section 72, which generally provides for current taxation of distributions as ordinary income.
Respondent contends that, since the plan was not tax qualified and the trust was not exempt when the distributions here involved were made, the distributions are includable in their entirety in petitioner-husbands’ gross incomes under section 402(b) and are taxable as ordinary income. Respondent concedes that each of the rollovers would meet the requirements of current excludability under section 402(a)(5) if the trust were a "qualified trust,” within the meaning of section 402(a)(5)(A)(i).
Petitioners maintain that they are taxable currently on only those portions of the distributions that result from contributions made after the loss of tax-qualified and exempt status. The other portions of the distributions, they assert, are excludable from income under section 402(a)(5), because they were rolled over into IRAs.
We agree with petitioners.
The proper tax treatment of distributions from formerly exempt employees’ trusts has been examined in opinions of the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits and opinions of the judges of this Court in Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1966), revg. in part 44 T.C. 137 (1965); Woodson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981), revg. 73 T.C. 779 (1980); and Baetens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152 (1984).
The position of this Court is that, to the extent a distribution is attributable to the exempt life of the trust, that portion of the distribution is to be treated as one to which sections 402(a) and 402(e) apply, with the remainder being treated as a distribution to which section 402(b) applies. Baetens v. Commissioner, supra.
Baetens, Woodson, and Greenwald involved profit-sharing plans, while in the instant case, the parties have stipulated that the plan is a "pension” plan. The parties have not enlightened us as to whether this plan is a defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan (e.g., a money-purchase pension plan). See secs. 414(i) and 414(j). We do not have precedent as to how to compute the amount of the "qualified assets” (Baetens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. at 170) of a defined benefit plan. However, we take the parties’ stipulations as to the amounts "attributable to contributions made after December 31, 1975”, as their agreement that the amounts so. described are to be treated as the nonqualified assets (to be dealt with under sec. 402(b)) and the remaining amounts of the distributions are to be treated as the qualified assets (to be dealt with under sec. 402(a)). The computations under Rule 155, Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, are to be made in accordance with this allocation. See table 1 supra.
Respondent brings to our attention the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Gunnison v. Commissioner, 461 F.2d 496 (1972), affg. 54 T.C. 1766 (1970). In Gunnison, it was held that the taxpayer was not entitled to lump-sum distribution treatment for distributions received by him from an exempt trust which was part of a tax-qualified plan, because the distribution was not made on account of any of the reasons specified in section 402(a)(2) as then in effect. (These qualifying reasons are now set forth in section 402(e)(4)(A), which is referred to in section 402(a)(5)(D)(i)(II). See note 5 supra.) In affirming our decision in Gunnison, the Court of Appeals stated as follows (461 F.2d at 499):
The general rule is that distributions from employees’ trusts qualified under the Code are taxed as ordinary income when received. An exception is provided in § 402(a)(2) for capital gains treatment in specific cases. * * * The exception was always strictly construed. * * *
Further expansion of the favored treatment specifically provided in § 402(a)(2) as an exercise of legislative grace is a function for the Congress, not for the Courts. See United States v. Johnson, 5 Cir., 1964, 331 F.2d 943, 954; United States v. Martin, 8 Cir., 1964, 337 F.2d 171, 175.
Our decision in the instant case with regard to the Indiana residents (Cass and Barbara Cass, and Saunders and Mary Alice Saunders) is appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (sec. 7482(b)(1)(A)). However, we do not believe that that Court’s opinion in Gunnison is so clearly dispositive of the issue we face in the instant case as to justify application of the "Golsen rule” (Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-758 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971)). See, e.g., David Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42, 72-74 (1981), affd. 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982).
We hold for petitioners on this issue.
II. Excise Tax
Petitioners contend that the petitioner-husbands (see note 2 supra) should not be liable for penalty taxes under section 4973, even as to excess contributions, since (1) the entire rollover contributions appeared to them to be proper when the contributions were made, and (2) they "should be afforded a reasonable time to correct the excess contribution^].” Respondent maintains that willfulness is not a consideration in determining liability for the tax under section 4973; petitioner-husbands made excess contributions and so are liable for the tax.
We agree with respondent, to the extent that there are excess contributions.
In the case of an IRA, section 4973(a)7 imposes an excise tax for each taxable year in an amount equal to 6 percent of the excess contributions for the taxable year to the IRA. Section 4973(b)8 defines "excess contributions”, for purposes of the instant case, as the sum of (1) the excess of the amount contributed to the IRA for the taxable year over the amount allowable as a deduction under section 219, and (2) the amount determined to be excess contributions for the preceding taxable year. For purposes of these provisions, rollover contributions described in section 402(a)(5) are not to be taken into account.
We have held (Issue I, supra) that the rolled over amounts attributable to the exempt life of the trust are described in section 402(a)(5). These amounts, then, are not taken into account for purposes of determining the amounts of excess contributions. The remaining amounts, those attributable to the nonexempt life of the trust (see the right-most column of table 1 supra), are not described in section 402(a)(5) and are taken into account for section 4973 purposes. The parties have stipulated, and we have found, that for each year, each petitioner-husband made the maximum allowable contributions to his IRA, in addition to the rollovers that generated the dispute in the instant case.
Applying section 4973(b), each of the petitioner-husbands has, for each of the years in issue as to him, excess contributions in the amount of that portion of his rollover that is attributable to the nonexempt life of the trust. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1057, 1059-1061 (1980), affd. 661 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1981), for a more detailed explanation of how such calculations are to be made, both for the year in which the contribution was made (1978), and for the subsequent years as to which determinations have been made as to Cass (1979), Lueckel (1979), and Strong (1979 and 1980).
We have had occasion to consider the effect of a taxpayer’s purpose and intent in making the excess contributions. We concluded that: "Willfulness is not an element in imposition of the excise tax under section 4973.” Johnson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. at 1061. See Orzechowski v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 750, 756-757 (1978), affd. 592 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1979). In Orzechow-ski, we pointed out that the IRA is not invalidated by the excess contributions. (69 T.C. at 756.) The IRA continues to be exempt from current taxation on its earnings. (Sec. 408(e)(1).)9 The section 4973 tax is imposed to offset the benefit that would otherwise flow from exempting from current taxation the earnings on contributions that exceed the maximum permitted contributions.
We note that the Congress has made provision for relief from this tax in one situation where the excess contributions may have been inadvertent. Sections 4973(b)(2)(B) and 408(d)(5)10 combine to provide that, in general, if a taxpayer relies on erroneous information in making an excess rollover contribution to an IRA, then the IRA may distribute the excess amount without the taxpayer again paying income tax on this amount. Also, when the excess is distributed under these provisions, the amount so distributed reduces the amount of the preceding year’s excess contributions taken into account under section 4973(b). Accordingly, the taxpayer can avoid the 6-percent excise tax for the year of the distribution and thereafter. See H. Rept. 95-1739, at 10-11 (to accompany H.R. 13619); H. Rept. 95-1800 (Conf.), at 292 (Revenue Act of 1978), 1978-3 C.B. (Vol. 1) 521, 626; Staff of the Joint Comm, on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1978, at 103, 106-107.
However, even if a taxpayer qualifies for such relief,11 nothing in the statute or the legislative history authorizes relief from the section 4973 tax for the years during which the excess contribution remains in the IRA, capable of producing earnings that are not subject to current taxation.
In sum, the Congress has set the ground rules with precision, including those applicable to relief from section 4973. On the record in the instant case, each petitioner-husband is liable for a tax under section 4973 for each of the years in issue as to him, albeit in amounts which (as to four of the petitioner-husbands) are less than those determined in the respective notices of deficiency. On the record in the instant case, none of the petitioner-husbands qualifies for any relief provided by the Congress. We have no authority to rewrite the law to fashion our own relief.
We hold for respondent on this issue, except to the extent that our holding in Issue I, supra, results in reducing the amounts treated as excess contributions.
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.