Benbow v. Commissioner

774 F.2d 740, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2379, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5998, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 23471
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedSeptember 30, 1985
DocketNo. 84-3036
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 774 F.2d 740 (Benbow v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Benbow v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 740, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2379, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5998, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 23471 (7th Cir. 1985).

Opinion

FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Taxpayers Daniel W. Cass, Jr. and Frederic E. Saunders2 were employees of Electric Cord Sets, Inc. In 1959 Electric Cord established a pension plan and related trust. In 1959, and again in 1963 upon the plan’s amendment, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) issued letters determining that the plan was “qualified” under § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 401(a), and the trust was therefore exempt from tax under § 501(a) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(a).

On July 18, 1978, Electric Cord terminated the plan effective for the plan year ending December 31, 1977. In 1978 the trustees distributed the plan’s assets to the participants, including taxpayers Cass and Saunders. Cass and Saunders then “rolled over” their distributions to individual retirement accounts (IRAs) relying on the tax-free rollover provisions of § 402(a)(5) of the Code. There had been no employee contributions.

In 1979 the plan and the trust were examined by the Commissioner. Based on this examination it was determined that the plan discriminated among salaried employees. A preliminary letter proposing revocation of the plan’s qualified status under § 401(a), and the trust’s exempt status under § 501(a), was issued by the Commissioner in September, 1979. On February 15, 1980 the Commissioner revoked the plan’s qualified status and the trust’s exempt status retroactively, effective as of January 1, 1976. Thus, when employer contributions were made in 1976 and 1977 and when the terminating distributions were made in 1978, the plan was not a tax-qualified plan and the trust was not exempt.

On audit the Commissioner determined that since the plan was not qualified at the date of distribution, the distributions from the trust in 1978 should have been reported as ordinary income and were ineligible for tax-free rollover treatment under § 402(a)(5) of the Code. The Commissioner also determined that the full amounts that the taxpayers had transferred into IRAs constituted “excess contributions” and thus were subject to the 6% excise tax of § 4973(a) of the Code.3

In the Tax Court taxpayers did not contest the Commissioner’s determination that [742]*742the plan was not qualified, nor the retroactive revocation of qualified status. They argued, however, that the tax treatment of the distributions should not be determined by the status of the plan at the time of distribution, but at the date of contributions to the trust. Thus, they argued that that portion of the distribution attributable to contributions made prior to January 1, 1976 should be entitled to the tax-free rollover treatment of § 402(a)(5).

The Tax Court agreed, holding that to the extent each 1978 distribution was attributable to pre-disqualification contributions, the amount thereof was to be treated as having been rolled over tax-free under § 402(a)(5), and not excess contribution to an IRA under § 4973. The remainder was treated as ordinary income under § 402(b). Benbow v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 941 (1984). The Commissioner appeals.

But for the rollover claimed to be authorized by § 402(a)(5), and giving the disqualification retroactive effect, the distributions would be includible in taxpayers' gross incomes for 1978. Section 402(b).

Section 402(a)(5) provides in pertinent part:

(5) ROLLOVER AMOUNTS—
(A) GENERAL RULE. — if—
(1) the balance to the credit of an employee in a qualified trust is to be paid to him in a qualifying rollover distribution,
(ii) the employee transfers any portion of the property he receives in such distribution to an eligible retirement plan, and
(iii) in the case of a distribution other than money, the amount so transferred consists of the property distributed, then such distribution (to the extent so transferred) shall not be includible in gross income for the taxable year in which paid.
(D) DEFINITIONS. — For purposes of this paragraph—
(iii) QUALIFIED TRUST. — The term “qualified trust” means an employees’ trust described in Section 401(a) which is exempt from tax under section 501(a).

(Emphasis added.)

The Commissioner maintains that on its face the text of § 402(a)(5) requires that for a distribution from an employee benefit trust to receive the benefits of tax-free rollover treatment, the trust must be one “which is exempt under Section 501(a)” at the time of distribution. (Emphasis added.) We agree that this is the ordinary, clear meaning of the terms employed.

In Woodson v. C.I.R., 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.1981), the Fifth Circuit similarly interpreted § 402(a)(2) of the Code.4 Section 402(a)(2) provides that, to a limited extent, a recipient of a lump sum distribution from an employee trust may treat a portion of the total taxable amount as capital gain rather than ordinary income. Sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5) contain identical statutory requirements concerning the status of the trust necessary for the preferential tax treatment provided, i.e., that it be one “which is exempt from tax under Section 501(a).” The parties agree there is no meaningful difference between these provisions. In Woodson, the Fifth Circuit held that “[s]ection 402(a)(2) explicitly limits [743]*743capital gains treatment of ‘lump sum distributions’ to instances in which the distribution flows from an employee trust ‘which is exempt from tax under section 501(a).’ ” 651 F.2d at 1095. The court noted that to uphold the Tax Court’s Woodson decision, which held that the trust’s status at the date of contribution — rather than at the date of distribution — controlled eligibility for capital gains treatment, it “would have to interpret ‘is exempt’ to mean ‘is or has been exempt’ and to read ‘which forms a part of a plan’ [26 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4)(A) (definition of lump sum distribution)]5 to say ‘which forms or has formed a part of a plan.’ ” 651 F.2d at 1095. The court also noted that

to uphold the tax court’s ruling would abrogate a Treasury Regulation on point, which states unambiguously: “The provisions of section 402(a) relate only to a distribution by a trust described in Section 401(a) which is exempt under Section 501(a) for the taxable year of the trust in which distribution is made.” Section 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii).

651 F.2d at 1096.

In Woodson, the Fifth Circuit declined to follow a 1966 Second Circuit decision, Greenwald v. C.I.R., 366 F.2d 538 (2d Cir.1966) which had reached the opposite conclusion. 651 F.2d at 1095 n. 3. The Treasury Regulation, quoted in Woodson, had not been referred to in Greenwald.

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Benbow v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
774 F.2d 740 (Seventh Circuit, 1985)

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Bluebook (online)
774 F.2d 740, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2379, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5998, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 23471, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benbow-v-commissioner-ca7-1985.