Belt v. Prince George's County Abstract Co.

10 L.R.A. 212, 20 A. 982, 73 Md. 289, 1890 Md. LEXIS 93
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedDecember 12, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 10 L.R.A. 212 (Belt v. Prince George's County Abstract Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Belt v. Prince George's County Abstract Co., 10 L.R.A. 212, 20 A. 982, 73 Md. 289, 1890 Md. LEXIS 93 (Md. 1890).

Opinion

Robinson, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellee is an Abstract Title Company, chartered hy the Legislature of this State, and the question is whether its officers and employés have the legal right themselves to examine and make abstracts or copies of the public records in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, without paying the fees which the law provides shall be paid to the Clerk for such services.

The broad contention is, that the public records are public property, and kept for the public benefit, and although their custody and safe-keeping are committed by law to the clerk, yet every one has the .right to examine them, and to make such copies as he may see fit, free of charge.

It is not pretended that this right is a common law right, and, if it exists, then it must be founded upon statutory law. What then are the provisions of the Code, upon the construction of which this question depends? Section lof Article IT, provides that “Every clerk shall have the custody of the hooks and papers pertaining to his office, and shall carefully keep and preserve the same, * * * and he shall give a copy of any paper or record in his office to any person applying for the same, upon beiüg paid the usual fees for transcribing such paper or record.”

[292]*292Then section 12 of Article 36, prescribes the fees which shall be paid to the clerk for such copies, and for making searches in regard to “any matter above a year's standing * * if found.”

Section 44 of Article-17, further provides, as one of the conditions of his official bond, that he shall duly and carefully loóle after and preserve, and shall deliver to his successor, all papers' and records in good order and repair. There is no provision in the Code such as will be found in the statutes of the several States referred to at bar, “that all persons shall have free access to the public records of a county, and shall have the right to examine and make copies or abstracts from the same.” On the contrary, while our Code provides that every one shall be entitled to copies of the records, and to the right of such information as they may afford, yet it provides that such copies and searches shall be made by the clerk himself, and on the payment of such fees as the law prescribes. And the reason of this is obvious. Upon the safe-keeping and preservation of the matters of record' in the clerk's office, the most important and valuable public and private rights depend. Here all deeds, mortgages, decrees, judgments, and liens are recorded. Here, too, are to be found all papers, proceedings, and docket entries in every suit at law, and in equity. And if every one, whether known or unknown to the clerk, whether trustworthy or untrustworthy, has the right to demand of the clerk that these records and papers shall be delivered to him, and that he himself shall examine and make abstracts from the samej then the law affords every facility to designing and interested persons to mutilate and to impair the integrity of such records. Every one knows that the mere dash of the pen, the addition or alteration of a word, may change entirely the legal effect and operation of the papers, matters of record; and if the appellee's contention he sound, then the law in requir[293]*293ing that the clerk shall safely keep and preserve such records, has imposed upon him a duty which it is impossible for him to perform. We have no hesitation in saying that nothing less than the plain and explicit terms of the statute, could justify a construction so fraught with danger to the highest public interest. There is nothing certainly in our Code which sustains such a construction. On the contrary, as we construe the several sections hearing upon the question, it would, in our opinion, he a breach of duty, bn the part of the clerk, to permit any one to examine and make searches of the records in his office, unless it he under the supervision of himself, or one of his deputies. And such being the case, we cannot suppose for a moment, that the Legislature meant to confer upon the appellee a privilege in this respect which is denied to the public. The appellee is a company chartered solely for its own private purposes, and the examination and copies of the records, which it proposes to make, are to he used by it in its business of guaranteeing titles to property, upon compensation to he paid for such services. And though its business may he a legitimate one, though it may he entitled under its charter to copies of the public records, and to the information they furnish, yet such copies and information must be obtained through the clerk, and upon the payment of the fees prescribed by law. The Constitution of this State provides that the salary or compensation of the clerks of the Circuit Courts, their £ £ assistants, and office expenses, shall always he paid out of the fees or receipts of the offices respectively.” And in requiring the several clerks to furnish to the appellee transcripts of the records, and to make an examination of the same, we cannot suppose the Legislature meant that these services should he rendered without the payment of such fees as the law prescribes for such services. We find nothing in the Code, or in the charter of the appellee, to support such a construction.

[294]*294And here we might rest our decision, hut in the ahle argument at bar, it was pressed that such a construction would be in direct conflict with the decisions of other States upon statutes, which did not differ substantially with the provisions of our Code. These decisions, we have carefully examined, and with the exception of the one in New Jersey, they do not, it seems to us, support this contention. Now, in Burton vs. Tuite, 78 Mich., 363, the statute provided that the officers having the custody of records should furnish proper and reasonable facilities for their inspection, for the purpose of making transcripts therefrom, “to all persons having occasion to make an examination of them for any lawful purpose,” provided, however, that such persons should not use pen and ink in making such transcripts or notes. And in construing this statute, the Court held, overruling a former decision, Webber vs. Townley, 43 Michigan, 534, delivered by Marston, O. J., and concurred in by Cooley, Campbell and Graves, J. that a person engaged in the abstract title business was a person within the meaning of the statute, although the transcripts and examination were made by him, to he used in his business for his own profit.

And so the Court decided in Hanson vs. Eichstaedt, 69 Wisconsin, 538, under a statute of that State, which provided that the clerk of the Circuit Court should “ open to the examination of any person all books,” etc., “required to be kept in his office,” and should “permit any person so examining to take notes and cogoies of such boohs, records, or papers.”

In Lum vs. McCarty, 39 N. J. Law, 287, the statute provided that all deeds, etc., should be recorded in books to be furnished by the clerks, “to lohich boohs every person shall have access at proper seasons, and may search the same, paying the fees allowed by law.’ And the Court overruling a former decision, Fleming vs. Clerk [295]*295of Hudson County, 30 N. J. Law,

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Bluebook (online)
10 L.R.A. 212, 20 A. 982, 73 Md. 289, 1890 Md. LEXIS 93, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/belt-v-prince-georges-county-abstract-co-md-1890.