Bell v. Paul

52 N.W. 1110, 35 Neb. 240, 1892 Neb. LEXIS 275
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 21, 1892
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 52 N.W. 1110 (Bell v. Paul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bell v. Paul, 52 N.W. 1110, 35 Neb. 240, 1892 Neb. LEXIS 275 (Neb. 1892).

Opinion

Nobval, J.

This is an action by George P. Paul against Norling & Reynolds, aspríncipals, and John T. Bell and Ed. L. Howe, as sureties, on a certain building contract bond. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff below in the sum of $1,418.86. A motion for a new trial having been filed by the defendants the plaintiff filed a remittitur for $122.36, whereupon the court overruled the motion for a new trial, and rendered judgment in plaintiff’s favor for the sum assessed by the jury, less the amount of said remittitur.' The sureties bring the cause into this court for review by petition in error.

A brief statement of the facts will assist in a proper Understanding of the questions presented. On the 30th day of April, 1887, Norling & Reynolds, contractors and builders, entered into a written contract with George P. Paul, by which they agreed to furnish all materials and perform all the labor necessary to build, finish, and complete in good,'first-class and workmanlike manner, for said Paul, in the city of Omaha, to his compílete satisfaction, a frame dwelling, pilumbing and heating excepted. The material was to be furnished and the labor pierformed 'under [242]*242the supervision and direction of George L. Fisher, architect,, and in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by him. The contractors were to receive the sum of $3,465, which was payable as the work progressed, on the estimates of the architect, which were to be based on the value of the work performed and material furnished, and the amount of each estimate was to be paid, less fifteen percent, which was to be retained until the expiration of ninety-days from the completion of the work and its acceptance by the architect and owner, and it was then to be payable only in the event that there were no liens upon the property for labor or materials supplied through the contractors. It was also stipulated in the contract that should Norling & Reynolds, at any time during the progress of the work, refuse or neglect to supply sufficient materials or workmen,, or cause any unreasonable suspension or neglect of the-work, or fail or refuse to comply with any of their agreements in said contract contained, then said Paul was to have-the right and power to enter upon and take possession of said premises, and provide materials and workmen sufficient to finish the work, after giving forty-eight hours'’ notice in writing. The expense of said notice and the costs, of finishing the work were to be deducted from the contract price. It was further provided that the contractors should give a bond in the sum of $1,200 for the faithful performance of the contract, and to complete the work at time specified, and turn over the building free from all incumbrances or liens for labor or material.

On the 3d day of May, 1887, the bond in suit was executed, which contained the following condition: “Now if said Norling & Reynolds furnish all material and perform all labor in connection with said building as per said plans and specifications and contract, and turn over said building free from liens for labor or materials furnished through said Norling & Reynolds, then these presents to be void,, otherwise to be of full force and effect.”

[243]*243Work was commenced under the contract in the month of May, and on the 3d day of September, 1887, the contractors, after having partially completed the building, either abandoned the contract or were excluded from the completion of the same by the owner, whereupon said Paul finished the job, paying for materials and labor used in completing the building the sum of $421.43. It also appears that the owner paid the contractors during the progress of the work, prior to the alleged abandonment, $2,422.50, and after which he paid about $2,500 without estimates, on orders of the contractors given to the mechanics who had worked under Norling & Reynolds, and to the persons who had furnished them materials for the erection of the building. The cost of the structure exceeded the contract price in nearly the sum of $1,900.

It is insisted that the contractors were prevented from completing the building by the owner taking possession thereof and excluding them therefrom; therefore the sureties were discharged from all liability on the bond. The question was fairly submitted to the jury, whether Norling & Reynolds voluntarily abandoned the work and refused to proceed with the same, or whether they were prevented from so doing without their consent, by Mr. Paul assuming the control of the building and the completion of the same, and they found that the contractors voluntarily abandoned the work. We think the testimony justified the finding. The reason they did not finish the job was because the architect declined to give an estimate on September 3,1887. The fact that one was refused furnished no valid excuse to the contractors to abandon the contract and refuse to complete the building, even had they been entitled to an estimate. Until one was furnished the owner was not obliged to pay; that is clear; nor was his failing so to do any justification for their abandonment of the job.

Counsel urge that the sureties are not liable because payments were made the contractors in violation of the terms [244]*244of the conlract. It is uncontradicted that the sum of $300 was paid Norling & Reynolds on May 21, 1887, without an estimate of the architect; the first estimate of the architect was not furnished until seven days later. The defendant in error contends, and such, we think, is the proper inference to be drawn from the evidence, that this sum was advanced to or loaned the contractors with the understanding that the same should be refunded when the first estimate was made; that on May 28 the architect gave an estimate certifying that the contractors were entitled to a payment of $600, less fifteen per cent. The $300 previously advanced was then deducted therefrom, and there was paid Norling & Reynolds, under the estimate, $210, and no more. We do not yield assent to the proposition that the advancement of the $300, under the circumstances, released the sureties. It was not in fact, nor in law, a payment upon the contract, but a mere loan of that amount of money, until an estimate was obtained, which did not in any manner violate the contract or discharge the sureties. But payments were made contrary to the provisions of the contract. It is conceded by both parties that but six estimates were given by the architect, which amounted in the aggregate to $2,850, less the fifteen per cent reserved by the contract, or $2,422:50 net. The last estimate bears date August 13, 1887. The proof shows that on September 3, Norling & Reynolds applied to the architect for a further estimate, which was refused, and no other estimate was ever given; yet, notwithstanding this, the defendant in error subsequently disregarded the terms of the contract by accepting and paying orders drawn on him by the contractors in favor of different parties, for materials furnished and labor performed in the erection of the building, amounting to several hundred dollars, without the consent of the sureties, so that the entire contract price, and more, was paid to the contractors, counting the amounts paid on their orders without estimates. By the contract fifteen per cent was to [245]*245be retained by Mr. Paul and was not to' be paid over by him until after the building was completed, and was then payable only in the event that there were no liens filed for labor performed or materials furnished.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
52 N.W. 1110, 35 Neb. 240, 1892 Neb. LEXIS 275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bell-v-paul-neb-1892.