Bell v. Hayes-Ionia Co.

158 N.W. 179, 192 Mich. 90, 1916 Mich. LEXIS 737
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJune 1, 1916
DocketDocket No. 45
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 158 N.W. 179 (Bell v. Hayes-Ionia Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bell v. Hayes-Ionia Co., 158 N.W. 179, 192 Mich. 90, 1916 Mich. LEXIS 737 (Mich. 1916).

Opinion

Kuhn, J.

The claimant has been awarded compensation under Act No. 10, Extra Session 1912 (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 542B et seq.). The award was made in the first instance by a committee of arbitration, and was approved by the Industrial Accident Board, and that decision is brought to this court by certiorari, for a review of the findings.

[92]*92The substance of the testimony which bears on the alleged accident is that the claimant was employed by the respondent in work on automobile bodies ’ which required frequent lifting of them; that on May 29, 1914, the window of the room where he was working had been put down during a storm, and had swollen enough to make it stick; after the storm had ceased Bell put it up again, and it required considerable exertion. He testified:

That after lifting the window he “felt something come down that felt quite painful”; that “when I felt the pain after lifting the window I went to the toilet, and found a lump there. * * * The lump was about like an egg. It was on my right groin. I never noticed the lump before.”

This happened at 4 o’clock. He continued to work, lifting bodies, until 5:30 o’clock, closing time. On/ his way home he felt faint, and complained to his wife of an inclination to vomit. When asked whether he noticed any condition that made him think he had hernia, he said:

“It came down Friday night. I got it back Saturday, and Sunday it stayed in place. On Monday when I went to work it came out again.”

He did not work Saturday and Sunday, but returned to his usual work on Monday, and suffered pain all day. When he reached home that night, the doctor was called, and after some effort reduced the hernia. An operation proved necessary, and was performed, and the claimant was disabled for ten weeks. Compensation was awarded him for that period at $6.92 per week, in addition to medical and hospital expenses for three weeks, the period of his confinement.

Among the several points relied upon by respondents for disallowance of the claim the one most extensively discussed is that the injury did not result from an accident. The argument goes upon the theory [93]*93that a hernia is the result, “not of a single fortuitous event, but either of the anatomical defect of the claimant or of the long-continued lifting for a number of months”; that hernia is the result of a very gradual process; that it is not an accident, but a disease. Medical authorities are quoted from, and the testimony of expert witnesses presented, to substantiate the theory. But, whether this theory is correct or not, the argument is disposed of by the decision in the recent case of Robbins v. Engine Co., 191 Mich. 122 (157 N. W. 437).

There is evidence that the claimant felt a pain in the groin after raising the window, and discovered a hernial protuberance immediately afterward. He continued to work, and “both lifting the window and lifting the body caused this pain. I was pulling up the window when the pain came on, and also when I lifted the body.” The work on Monday, after he had “got the hernia back,” caused more pain, and brought it down again, so that the physician had difficulty reducing it. It is clear that the committee and the board were justified in finding that the hernia was pushed through and made so acute by the lifting of the window as to disable the claimant. See La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 190 Mich. 604 (157 N. W. 72). Such an injury entitled the claimant to compensation. See Skinner v. Accident Ass’n, 190 Mich. 353 (157 N. W. 105); Robbins v. Engine Co., supra.

The respondents offered in evidence the report of Dr. Knapp, who attended the claimant, in which it was stated:

“Patient says for two or three weeks been having pain in groin, and that while closing a window at factory felt strain which in two or three days resulted in strangulated hernia.”

It was presented in connection with the following testimony of Dr. Knapp:

[94]*94“I would call it a perfectly fresh puncture. It was evident to me that the hernia was caused as claimed. Indications are to the effect that the act of putting up the window and lifting the body from the work bench caused the bowel to go through and form a sac. * * * I believe, as near as. I can tell, he had no rupture before, and he had it afterwards. The preponderance of evidence seems to show that it came on at that time as the result of his work.
“Mr. Smith: Dr. Knapp, did he say anything to you about having had a p'ain in his side previous to this?
“Dr. Knapp: Afterwards I asked him how long he had had it, and he said he did not know anything about it; on Saturday he lifted the window and the body, and felt it come on him then.
“Mr. Smith: You reported to the insurance company, ‘Patient says for two or three weeks been having pain in groin’; is that so, Mr. Bell?
“Mr. Bell: I don’t remember saying that.
“Mr. Smith: The report was made June 9th; where do you suppose the doctor got that idea?
“Mr. Bell: I might have told him that. I have tried to be honorable and truthful, and always have. I don’t remember saying that, although I might have said it at that time.
“Mr. Smith: How do you account for this report?
“Dr. Knapp: He must have told me that he had had previous pain there, or I would not have made such report. It might be that this condition arose before if that is the same pain, or it might have been a pain in the abdomen lower down.”

The board rejected the report. This evidence might properly have been received, since it contradicted a part of Dr. Knapp’s testimony. But the error is not of sufficient importance to invalidate the findings. The presence of a structural weakness or actual pain, antedating the injury alleged, in the region where the injury occurred, does not preclude a recovery if the injury itself is distinct and the result of a particular strain causing a sudden protrusion of the intestine. As in Robbins v. Engine Co., supra, there was testi[95]*95mony to support a finding 'that the claimant made a distinct and unusual exertion, that he immediately felt unusual pain, and presently discovered a protrusion through the abdominal wall about the size of an egg. And it may be appropriately said here also that:

“It is assumed that it was the first time the sac had been forced through the abdominal wall. If it is also assumed that there was a certain lack of physical integrity in the parts where the injury was manifested, still I think claimant may have compensation for the injury he suffered.” Robbins v. Engine Co., supra.

See, also, La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra, and recent decisions of the Massachusetts court, Madden’s Case, 222 Mass. 487 (111 N. E. 379), and Crowley’s Case, 223 Mass. 288 (111 N. E. 786), for an application of the same principle. The rejected evidence could be given its due weight and accorded belief without requiring a finding of no accidental injury on May 29th resulting from the opening of the window.

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Bluebook (online)
158 N.W. 179, 192 Mich. 90, 1916 Mich. LEXIS 737, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bell-v-hayes-ionia-co-mich-1916.