Bell v. Family Dollar Jane Doe

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 7, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-05307
StatusUnknown

This text of Bell v. Family Dollar Jane Doe (Bell v. Family Dollar Jane Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bell v. Family Dollar Jane Doe, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JAMES BELL, Plaintiff, 23-CV-5307 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND FAMILY DOLLAR STORE JANE, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. By order dated June 26, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint. On June 12, 2023, Plaintiff, a

Manhattan resident, entered the Family Dollar Store located at 226 Nagle Avenue in Manhattan. The aisles were “cluttered” with a “cart of inventory,” and Plaintiff “was limited to get items . . . that [weren’t] obstructed.”1 (ECF 1 ¶ III.) Plaintiff complained to the woman working at the checkout counter that the aisles should not “be obstructed according to ADA,” but she became “offended,” and “stated I leave store.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $20,000 in money damages and “new management sensitivity classes for staff.” (Id. ¶IV.)

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All grammar, punctuation, and spelling are in the original unless otherwise indicated. DISCUSSION A. Title III ADA The Court construes Plaintiff complaint as asserting claims under Title III of the ADA, which applies to places of public accommodation, including retail establishments. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Title III guarantees that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To state a claim under Title III, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff within the meaning of the ADA. Roberts v. Royal Atlantic Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 368 (2d Cir. 2008). With respect to the third element, “a plaintiff can base a disability discrimination claim on any of ‘three available theories: (1) intentional discrimination (disparate treatment); (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make a reasonable accommodation.’” Brief v. Albert Einstein Coll. of Med., 423 F. App’x 88,

90 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009)). Generally, the proper defendant in a claim under Title III is the entity. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that individuals can only be sued under the ADA in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief). As to individual liability under Title III of the ADA, it has been held that “ [t]he question of whether a person is a proper defendant . . . turns . . . on . . . whether the [individual] defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the ADA.” Doe v. NYSARC Trust Serv., Inc., No. 1:20-CV-0801, 2020 WL 5757478, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), report & recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7040982 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2020). Intentional Discrimination/Disparate Treatment To state a claim for intentional discrimination, or disparate treatment, a plaintiff must allege facts suggesting “that animus against the protected group was a significant factor in the

position taken” by defendants. Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 2002). This “significant factor” standard creates a “mixed-motive” theory of liability in which a plaintiff’s disability need not be a but-for cause of a defendant’s actions. See Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 336-37 (2d Cir. 2000). In other words, “the existence of additional factors causing an injury does not necessarily negate the fact that the defendant’s wrong is also the legal cause of the injury,” Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 278 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), so long as “the plaintiff can show that the disability was a substantial cause of the exclusion or denial . . . .” Id. at 291.

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Brief v. Albert Einstein College of Medicine
423 F. App'x 88 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Hill v. Curcione
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Camarillo v. Carrols Corp.
518 F.3d 153 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Roberts v. Royal Atlantic Corp.
542 F.3d 363 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Fulton v. Goord
591 F.3d 37 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Bacon v. Walgreen Co.
91 F. Supp. 3d 446 (E.D. New York, 2015)
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg
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Bluebook (online)
Bell v. Family Dollar Jane Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bell-v-family-dollar-jane-doe-nysd-2023.