UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BARON JAMAL BELL, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 23-2036 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 22 : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Baron Jamal Bell sued the District of Columbia pro se following his termination
from the Department of Health. This Court previously granted the District’s motion to dismiss
Bell’s original complaint as unclear and overly long in violation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8. Bell then filed a 15-count Amended Complaint alleging various violations of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act (“DCWPA”), the D.C. Human Rights Act
(“DCHRA”), and the D.C. Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”), as well as five
theories under D.C. tort law. The District moves to dismiss once more, arguing that the
Amended Complaint also violates Rule 8 and that Bell fails to state a claim under any of his
theories. The Court agrees that Bell fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983 and declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining D.C. law claims.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Bell is a Black man who worked for the District of Columbia Department of Health’s
HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis, STD and TB Administration (“HAHSTA”) for four years prior to his
termination. Am. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 17. In January 2021, while participating in an Anti- Racism Group organized by a HAHSTA administrator, he believed that he witnessed a
coworker, who was a Black woman, being bullied over email by another coworker, Ivan Eaton.
Id. ¶ 12. Bell alleges that during this incident, Eaton “accused” the coworker of “making no
sense.” Id. Bell later emailed the Anti-Racism Group “demanding the incident be addressed,”
and after no action was taken Bell filed a report with the Department of Health’s Employee and
Labor Relations Manager. Id. ¶ 13. He states that this report was not investigated. Id. ¶ 14.
Bell alleges that Eaton launched a retaliation plot in response to these reports, which
resulted in the Employee and Labor Relations Manager requesting to meet with Bell about “a
communication” he wrote to Eaton in December 2020. Id. ¶ 15. During that meeting, the
manager “informed” Bell “that as a condition of his continued employment, he must submit an
affidavit denouncing any intent on killing, maiming, murdering, or injuring any DC government
officials or employees.” Id. ¶ 16. Bell’s supervisor later shared his understanding that Bell had
“threatened to kill” Eaton. Id. ¶ 18. Bell was then summoned to four mediation meetings
between April 28, 2021, and June 24, 2021, to address allegations that he created a hostile work
environment for a coworker, Sherita Grant. Id. ¶¶ 22–29.
On July 9, 2021, Bell filed a 17-page complaint with the District of Columbia
Department of Human Resources, and he alleges that he received no response. Id. ¶¶ 30–33. On
the same day, Bell “inform[ed] his supervisor that he [could not] perform in such a hostile
work environment” and requested unpaid extended leave. Id. ¶ 34. On July 27, 2021, that
request was denied, and Bell was placed on “absent without leave (AWOL)” status the following
day because he had not been reporting to work. Id. ¶¶ 35, 37. On December 14, 2021, the
District sent him a proposed separation letter for job abandonment, to which he responded by
“notifying the Defendant of his hostile and dangerous work environment.” Id. ¶¶ 45–46.
2 On June 2, 2022, the District informed Bell that due to a procedural error, his proposed
separation was being rescinded. Id. ¶ 53. On that same day, Grant sent Department of Health
Director LaQuandra Nesbitt a 19-page email Bell had sent to her personal email address. See id.
¶ 56; Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 22-1. 1 In that email sent on June 1, 2022, Bell
accused Grant of lying, chastised her at length, and discussed “those whores in the hood from
[her] childhood,” among numerous other topics. Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 7. The email
also referenced violence. One exclamation included, “[y]ou are the mother of a son who has
been convicted of murder and you want to play with violence Sherita?” Id. at 9. After Grant
responded that Bell should “[g]et [h]elp,” Bell replied that he hoped Grant would “be confident
in [her] TRUTH,” “[f]or when we have no fear of TRUTH then we are prepared to meet our
Lord on the Day of Reckoning.” Id. at 3. Some time after Director Nesbitt received this email,
Bell was instructed not to report to work. Am. Compl. ¶ 60.
1 A court considering a motion to dismiss is generally precluded from considering “matters outside the pleadings” unless the motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, “[a] district court may consider a document that a complaint specifically references without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The document must be “referred to in the complaint and . . . integral to [the plaintiff’s] claim.” Id. (quoting Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); see also Hinton v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 624 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that courts may consider “documents ‘upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies’ even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss”). The Amended Complaint quotes from the June 1, 2022, email to Grant and explains that the message led to recission of the instruction to return to work and ultimately Bell’s termination. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55–59. Bell’s Fourth Amendment and whistleblower claims additionally rely on the document. See id. ¶¶ 167–74, 107–15. Furthermore, Bell does not dispute that the email is authentic in his opposition to the District’s motion to dismiss. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11–12. As such, the Court concludes that the Amended Complaint specifically references the email and that it is integral to Bell’s claim. The Court may thus consider the contents of the email in resolving the motion to dismiss.
3 On July 20, 2022, Bell received a final summary removal notice from Director Nesbitt.
Id. ¶¶ 70–74. That notice indicated that the Department of Health’s summary removal action
issued on June 6, 2022, “is the appropriate resolution of this matter.” Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot.
Dismiss at 2. 2 “Accordingly, your last official day with the District of Columbia government
will remain June 6, 2022.” Id. Director Nesbitt reasoned that Bell’s conduct constituted an
“immediate hazard to the agency” and its staff and that his actions were “detrimental to the
public health safety, or welfare.” Id. She also cited Bell’s off-duty conduct and use of abusive
or otherwise unacceptable language. Id. That letter informed Bell that he had “the right to
challenge” his summary removal through the Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”). Id. at 4.
The record contains no indication that Bell appealed his termination to the OEA.
Bell initiated this lawsuit on July 14, 2023, filing a 136-page, 14-count complaint against
the District of Columbia. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 1. On June 5, 2024, this Court granted the
District’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Bell’s complaint was unclear and overly long,
affording him the opportunity to amend. See Mem. Op. at 14, ECF No. 16. Bell filed that
Amended Complaint on July 5, 2024, listing 15 counts against the District. See generally Am.
Compl.
The Amended Complaint includes claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of
the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, including procedural and
substantive due process violations. See id. ¶¶ 91–166 (Counts One, Two, and Three). Bell
alleges a violation of the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act for his report that a coworker was
2 The Notice of Final Decision of Summary Removal is quoted at length in Bell’s Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70–84. As the Amended Complaint necessarily relies on the notice, and Bell does not contest its validity, the Court may consider the full document at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Banneker Ventures, 798 F.3d at 1133; Hinton, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
4 being bullied and for his subsequent complaints. See id. ¶¶ 167–74 (Count Four). He alleges
that he experienced discrimination under the D.C. Human Rights Act based on sex, sexual
orientation, and religion. See id. ¶¶ 175–92 (Counts Five, Six, and Seven). Relatedly, he also
alleges constructive discharge and a hostile work environment. See id. ¶¶ 205–15 (Counts Nine
and Ten). Bell claims that the District violated the CMPA by placing him on absent without
leave status and then terminating him. See id. ¶¶ 193–204 (Count Eight). Finally, Bell claims
injury under five tort theories, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation,
invasion of privacy and false light, negligence, and wrongful termination. See id. ¶¶ 216–51
(Counts Eleven through Fifteen). The District filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the
Amended Complaint remains too long and convoluted, and that Bell fails to state a claim on the
merits. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 22. Bell opposes the motion to dismiss. See Pl.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 25. 3
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint” by asking whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim for which
relief can be granted. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). In considering such a motion, the complaint must be construed “liberally in
3 Bell moves to file a surreply. See Mot. for Leave to File Surreply, ECF No. 27. The decision to grant or deny leave to file a surreply “is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.” Banner Health v. Sebelius, 905 F. Supp. 2d 174, 187 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Akers v. Beal Bank, 760 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2011)). “A court determining whether to allow a surreply considers whether the reply raises new arguments, whether the proposed surreply would be helpful to the resolution of the pending motion, and whether the other party would be unduly prejudiced.” Jackson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 19-cv-1487, 2022 WL 888180, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2022) (citing Glass v. Lahood, 786 F. Supp. 2d 189, 230–31 (D.D.C. 2011)). Here, the District does not oppose the motion, the surreply purports to address new arguments raised in the District’s reply, and the District would not be prejudiced were leave to file granted. The Court therefore grants Bell’s motion to file the surreply.
5 the plaintiff’s favor with the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.”
Stewart v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Kowal v. MCI
Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). But a court may disregard “inferences
drawn by a plaintiff if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.”
Nurriddin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting Kowal, 16 F.3d at
1276).
Thus, although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, [if] accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are
insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Similarly,
there is no obligation to accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, nor to presume the truth of
legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
Court may consider “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and
matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial
Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d
1015, 1017–18 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Finally, because Bell is proceeding pro se, the Court will construe the Amended
Complaint liberally and hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). Thus, the Court may “examine other pleadings to understand the nature and basis
of [the plaintiff’s] pro se claims” as alleged in his complaint. Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113,
6 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, even a pro se plaintiff is not excused from adhering to the
applicable procedural rules and must “plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more
than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Therefore, despite the liberality afforded pro
se complaints, the Court “need not accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged in the
complaint or ‘legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.’” Kaemmerling v. Lappin,
553 F.3d 669, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 684 (D.C.
Cir. 1994)).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court first considers Bell’s civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
concluding that he fails to plausibly plead municipal liability. Having dealt with these federal
law claims, the Court considers whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bell’s twelve
remaining state law causes of action under the DCWPA, DCHRA, CMPA, and D.C. tort law.
The Court determines that these claims are appropriate for resolution by the D.C. Superior Court
in the first instance.
The District encourages the Court to dismiss Bell’s Amended Complaint as inconsistent
with Rule 8. See Def.’s Mot. at 7–9. As the Court observed in its prior memorandum opinion, a
lengthy and confusing complaint can frustrate the defendant’s and the Court’s abilities to discern
the essential facts underlying a plaintiff’s legal claims. See Mem. Op. at 10. The Court
continues to experience some difficulty determining exactly which facts underly which counts of
the Amended Complaint. The Court can sufficiently determine the nature of Bell’s claims,
however, with respect to his allegations of municipal liability against the District. The Court
thus declines to dismiss the Amended Complaint as inconsistent with Rule 8.
7 A. Section 1983 Claims
Bell claims that the D.C. Department of Health violated his First Amendment rights by
penalizing him for speaking on a matter of public concern and engaging in religious expression,
see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91–106, that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights by initiating an
investigation based on the email Grant forwarded, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 107–15, and that it
violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by failing to comply with the
CMPA at various times, see ¶¶ 116–66. The District moves to dismiss these claims because Bell
fails to plead municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978), and the claims fail on their merits. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 1–19. Bell
asserts that he pleads municipal liability because Director Nesbitt is a final policymaker and the
Department of Health acted with deliberate indifference. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 18–20. The Court
concludes that Bell does not state facts sufficient to plead Monell liability.
To establish that a municipal entity is liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show that the local government’s official policy or custom was “the moving force
of the constitutional violation.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The D.C. Circuit has recognized four
pathways to Monell liability, under which a plaintiff must point to: (1) “the explicit setting of a
policy by the government that violates the Constitution,” (2) “the action of a policy maker within
the government,” (3) “the adoption through a knowing failure to act by a policy maker of actions
by his subordinates that are so consistent that they have become ‘custom,’” or (4) “the failure of
the government to respond to a need (for example, training of employees) in such a manner as to
show ‘deliberate indifference’ to the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional
violations.” Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306–07 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “Proof of
a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell,
8 unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional
municipal policy.” Parker v. District of Columbia, 850 F.2d 708, 711–12 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(quoting City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985)).
Bell suggests that the District of Columbia is liable for constitutional violations because
Director Nesbitt fired him, and she has “final policymaking authority” under D.C. law. Triplett,
108 F.3d at 1453; see also id. (“The issue of final policymaking authority is one of state law.”);
Pl.’s Opp’n at 18–20. Bell conflates a final decision-maker with a final policy-maker. He points
to provisions of D.C. law that empower Director Nesbitt to, for instance, supervise the
Department of Public Health and remove employees. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 19–20 (citing D.C.
Mun. Regs. tit. 6-B § 1616.3; D.C. Code § 7-153; D.C. Code § 1-523.01; D.C. Code § 1-610.51).
Yet these are not “specific provisions in the D.C. Code granting the director authority to
promulgate rules for the administration of [her] respective department with regard to” personnel
matters. Byrd v. District of Columbia, 807 F. Supp. 2d 37, 75 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Ryan v.
District of Columbia, 306 F. Supp. 3d 334, 343 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that fire chief was not
final policymaker because “Chapter 4 of Title 5 of the D.C. Code . . . does not delegate to the
Fire Chief the kind of broad employment, personnel, and discipline-related policymaking
authority”). Although Director Nesbitt may decide to terminate an employee, she lacks the
power to make final D.C. government policy that can deprive an employee of his constitutional
rights under Monell. See Triplett, 108 F.3d at 1453 (observing that the “authority to exercise
discretion” is insufficient). D.C. Code § 7-153, for instance, places the Department “under the
supervision and direction of a Director who shall be appointed by the Mayor” but does not grant
her the authority to make policy with regard to personnel issues. In addition, Bell points to D.C.
municipal regulations regarding summary suspension or removal of personnel. See Pl.’s Opp’n
9 at 19. There is no indication that Director Nesbitt promulgated these regulations, which are the
same ones she referred to when upholding Bell’s summary removal. See Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot.
Dismiss. She was therefore “constrained by policies not of [her own] making” in the isolated
decision of whether or not to terminate Bell. Byrd, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 75. Bell thus pleads
insufficient facts to show that his alleged constitutional injuries arose from the actions of a final
policymaker in the D.C. government.
Bell also contends that the District acted with deliberate indifference by failing to
respond to his “18-months of pleading for substantive and procedural due process.” Pl.’s Opp’n
at 20. “[A] city’s inaction, including its failure to train or supervise its employees adequately,
constitutes a ‘policy or custom’ under Monell when it can be said that the failure amounts to
‘deliberate indifference towards the constitutional rights of persons in its domain.’” Daskalea v.
District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 388–89 & n.7 (1989)). Deliberate indifference “is an objective standard, ‘determined
by analyzing whether the municipality knew or should have known of the risk of constitutional
violations, but did not act.’” Harvey v. District of Columbia, 798 F.3d 1042, 1053 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (quoting Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 601 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). “A municipality’s
culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to
train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). To prevail, a plaintiff must show more
than simple or even heightened negligence; the District’s indifference must be conscious, or at
least reckless. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.
Even assuming that the District of Columbia’s actions in this case were unconstitutional,
Bell pleads no facts showing that they arose from the city’s failure to train, properly supervise, or
correct any pervasive unconstitutional actions of its employees. Nor does he demonstrate that
10 officials were conscious of any shortcomings in a manner that might render those failures to be
official policy or custom within the District. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (requiring city officials
to be on “notice” that training is deficient). Instead, he points to his own case—a “single
incident of” alleged “unconstitutional activity”—as evidence of a broader policy. Parker, 850
F.2d at 711–12; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 20. This is insufficient, as “[a] pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate
deliberate indifference.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62; see also Harvey, 798 F.3d at 331–33 (finding
deliberate indifference after the District “disregard[ed] the medical needs of involuntarily
committed mental patients” for decades); Watson v. District of Columbia, No. 23-cv-1670, 2024
WL 3471262, at *5–6 (D.D.C. July 19, 2024) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint stated
facts justifying allegation of improper training); Bah v. District of Columbia, No. 23-cv-1248,
2024 WL 983329, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2024) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint
stated that reports and memoranda made D.C. jail aware of inadequate staffing and supervision
leading to violation of plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights). Bell alleges no such widespread
risks of constitutional harm within the D.C. government of which policymakers were made
aware. As such, he cannot rest Monell liability on a deliberate indifference theory.
The Court concludes that Bell fails to plead municipal liability under Monell, as he does
not show that the District was “the moving force of” any “constitutional violation.” Monell, 436
U.S. at 694. The District therefore cannot be held liable for any constitutional violations that its
employees may have committed. The Court thus grants the District’s motion to dismiss as to
Counts One through Three. Because Bell does not establish Monell liability, the Court does not
determine whether any underlying constitutional violations in fact occurred.
11 B. Remaining State Law Claims
Bell asserts that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining claims
brought under D.C. law. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 13; Am. Compl. at 2. 4 “When a federal court has an
independent basis for exercising federal jurisdiction, it may, in certain circumstances, also
exercise pendent, or supplemental, jurisdiction over related claims under state law.” Women
Prisoners of District of Columbia Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 920 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367. There is a two-part test for determining when it is
appropriate for a federal district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. First, the Court
determines “whether the state and the federal claims ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact’; if they do, the court has the power, under Article III of the Constitution, to hear the state
claim.” Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 920 (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). Second, “even if it concludes that it has that power, the district court
must then decide whether to exercise its discretion to assert jurisdiction over the state issue.” Id.
(citing United Mine Workers of America, 383 U.S. at 726). “State and federal claims share a
common nucleus of operative facts if the claims are such that the plaintiff would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.” Chelsea Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n v. 1815
A St., Condo. Group, LLC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing United Mine Workers
of America, 383 U.S. at 725). “A common nucleus of operative facts exists when there is a link
or overlap between the facts of the state and federal claims.” Id. (citing Women Prisoners, 93
F.3d at 921).
4 The Court observes that “the District is not subject to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
12 Courts determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after federal claims
have been dismissed must consider “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”
Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2005). While the decision is left to each
court’s discretion, see United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726, when all federal claims are
eliminated before trial, the “balance of the[] factors” weighs toward declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
350 (1988). As such, the D.C. Circuit has identified a clear preference for courts to exercise
their discretion to remand state claims back to District of Columbia courts once all federal
questions have “left the building.” Kyle v. Bedlion, 177 F. Supp. 3d 380, 400 (D.D.C. 2016)
(quoting Araya v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 775 F.3d 409, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
In Bell’s case, these factors weigh against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
his remaining state law claims. The three federal § 1983 claims over which the Court exercised
federal question jurisdiction are dismissed, and the remaining twelve claims are based entirely in
District of Columbia law. The D.C. Superior Court is better positioned to resolve these issues
regarding the DCWPA, DCHRA, and CMPA in the first instance. This also includes the
CMPA’s potential preclusion of Bell’s common law tort claims. See Def.’s Mot. at 21.
Furthermore, discovery in this case has not yet begun, and the case has not progressed in federal
court past the District’s motions to dismiss. The Court thus “decline[s] to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction” because it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Court additionally determines that the D.C. law claims at issue here
“substantially predominate[]” over the federal claims it has dismissed. Id. § 1367(c)(2).
13 V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the District of Columbia’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: March 25, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge