Bell Semiconductor, LLC v. NXP USA, Inc.

District Court, S.D. California·Decided January 12, 2023·No. 3:22-cv-01527·Unknown

Opinion

BELL SEMICONDUCTOR, INC., Case No. 22-cv-0594-BAS-KSC Case No. 22-cv-1267-BAS-KSC Plaintiff, Case No. 22-cv-1527-BAS-KSC v. Case No. 22-cv-1794-BAS-KSC

ORDER: Defendant. (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR A MANDATORY STAY OF PLAINTIFF’S ’803 INFRINGEMENT CLAIM; and (2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A STAY OF ALL

Plaintiff Bell Semiconductor, Inc. (“Bell”) owns a portfolio of patents that relate to semiconductor-design technologies, including the Asserted Patents in the above-captioned matters: U.S. Patent Nos. 7,007,259 (the “’259 Patent”), 6,436,807 (the “’807 Patent”), 7,149,989 (the “’989 Patent”), 7,260,803 (the “’803 Patent”), 7,231,626 (the “’626 Patent”), and 7,396,760 (the “’760 Patent”) (defined previously as, “Asserted Patents”). Bell commenced four suits against Defendant NXP USA, Inc. (“NXP”) alleging infringement of the Asserted Patents: 22-cv-0594 (alleging infringement of the ’259 and ’807 Patents), 22-cv-1267 (alleging infringement of the ’803 and ‘989 Patents), 22-cv-1527 (alleging infringement of the ’626 Patent), and 22-cv-01794 (alleging infringement of the ’760 Patent). Specifically, Bell alleges the Asserted Patents “are used by NXP in the production of its” semiconductor device, the NXP LS1043A Quad-Core Networking Processor device (“Accused Product”). (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 1, 22-cv-0594, ECF No. 69-1.) Bell claims NXP “employs a variety of design tools, for example, Cadence, Synopsys, and/or Siemens [(“Suppliers”)] tools,” to manufacture the Accused Product, “as recited in the [Asserted Patents].” (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 46–48, 60–63.) The Court held in abeyance Bell’s case against NXP alleging infringement of the ’626 Patent pursuant to the mandatory stay provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1659, pending final resolution of parallel U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) proceeding. See Electronic Devices, Semiconductor Devices, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA- 1340 (the “ITC Proceeding”). Still, Bell’s three other cases remain active. Now before the Court is (1) NXP’s unopposed motion seeking a partial mandatory stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1659 of Case No. 22-cv-1267 as to Bell’s infringement claims relating to the ’803 Patent only (not the ’989 Patent) (Case No. 22-cv-1267, ECF No. 26 (“Unopposed § 1659 Mot.”)), and (2) NXP’s motion for a discretionary stay of Bell’s infringement claims with respect to the subset of Asserted Patents that are not at issue in the ITC Proceeding (Case No. 22-cv-0594, ECF No. 74 (“NXP’s Stay Mot.”)).1 For the sake of easy identification, the Court refers to the ’626 and the ’803 Patents as the “ITC Patents” and the remaining Asserted Patents as the “non-ITC Patents.” Bell opposes NXP’s Stay Motion. (Case No. 22-cv-0594, ECF No. 78 (“Opp’n”).)

1 NXP’s Stay Motion also contains a motion to consolidate. Because the Court ordered a hearing on the issue of consolidation and will address that issue in a subsequent, forthcoming order, the Court On January 5, 2023, this Court heard oral argument on whether Bell’s cases against NXP—as well as Bell’s three other related cases against Defendant Maxlinear Inc.— should be consolidated and, if so, how and for what purpose. At the hearing, NXP and Bell also addressed their respective positions concerning the Stay Motion and proffered argument in support thereof. Based on the briefs submitted and oral argument proffered, the Court GRANTS the Unopposed § 1659 Motion and DENIES NXP’s Stay Motion for the reasons set forth below. I. Motion to Stay Under 28 U.S.C. § 1659 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1659, “at the request of a party to the civil action that is also a respondent in the proceeding before the Commission, the district court shall stay, until the determination of the Commission becomes final, proceedings in the civil action with respect to any claim that involves the same issues involved in the proceeding before the Commission.” The purpose of this mandatory stay “is to prevent separate proceedings on the same issues occurring at the same time” and to avoid duplicative and inefficient consumption of the court and parties’ resources. In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Polmyer Tech. Sys., Inc. v. ACON Lab’ys, Inc., No. 18-CV-0805- H-HLB, 2018 WL 3388123, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2018) (applying stay provision). NXP seeks a mandatory partial stay of Bell’s claim asserting infringement of the ’803 Patent on the ground an identical claim is also lodged in the ITC Proceeding. (Unopposed § 1659 Mot.) Bell does not oppose. The Court finds § 1659 applies here. Hence, the Court GRANTS the Unopposed § 1659 Motion (ECF No. 26) and STAYS Bell’s claims in this action relating to the ’803 patent, pending final decision in the ITC Proceeding. II. Motion to Stay Non-ITC Infringement Claims NXP asks this Court to exercise its discretion to stay Bell’s claims alleging infringement of the non-ITC Patents for the sake of judicial efficiency and in the interest of avoiding the parties’ duplication of work, even though the mandatory stay provision of § 1659 does not apply to those Patents. Were this request granted, each of Bell’s four lawsuits against NXP would be stayed entirely. NXP avers adjudication of the non-ITC Patents should be delayed until the ITC reaches a final decision in its Proceeding and/or until adjudication of the Suppliers’ actions filed against Bell in the District of Delaware, which seek declarations that the Suppliers’ software design tools do not infringe any of the Asserted Patents and that the Asserted Patents are invalid (Synopsis and Cadence Lawsuit, Ex. E to Mangini Decl., ECF No. 74-2; Siemens Lawsuit, Ex. G to Mangini Decl.).2 “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). This power to stay proceedings includes the discretion to grant stays “pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). “This rule applies whether the separate proceedings are judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court.” I.K. ex rel. E.K. v. Sylvan Union Sch. Dist., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 2010). The question whether to stay a case “calls for an exercise of a sound discretion” and a balancing of “competing interests.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). Those interests include: (1) “the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay”; (2) “the possible damages which may result from the granting of a stay”; and (3) “the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward[.]” Id.; accord Pathway Innovations & Techs., Inc. v. Adesso, Inc., No. 15-cv- 1538 JLS (JLB), 2016 WL 4595532, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr.

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Bell Semiconductor, LLC v. NXP USA, Inc., (S.D. Cal. 2023).

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