***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX 02-JUN-2025 10:05 AM Dkt. 16 SO
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
CHEYENNE BELFORD, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent/Defendant-Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1CC171001287)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Recktenwald, C.J., McKenna, Eddins, Ginoza, and Devens, JJ.)
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant Cheyenne Belford
severed part of her finger with a circular saw during a prison
workline training class at the Women’s Community Correctional
Center, where she was incarcerated. At the time of her injury,
her instructor had left the immediate area to assist other
inmates. Belford brought an action in the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit (circuit court) against the State of Hawaiʻi,
alleging negligent instruction and supervision. Following a ***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
bench trial, 1 the circuit court concluded that Belford’s injuries
were not legally caused by the State, which owed a general duty
of reasonable care to prevent foreseeable injury to persons in
its custody. (Citing Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 376, 604
P.2d 1198, 1201 (1979)). The circuit court found that, under
the circumstances, the State had not breached its duty to
reasonably supervise or train Belford in the operation of a
circular saw. Final judgment was entered in favor of the State,
which was awarded costs in the amount of $2,544.41 as the
prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1) (eff. 2000) of the Hawaiʻi
Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP). 2
Belford timely appealed both the circuit court’s
determination of liability and the award of costs to the State.
The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed and Belford sought
review by this court.
Belford argues that the State owes a heightened duty
to workline prisoners under Haworth v. State, 60 Haw. 557, 592
P.2d 820 (1979). Belford also challenges the circuit court’s
weighing of the evidence at trial, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding
1 The Honorable Bert I. Ayabe presiding.
2 HRCP Rule 54(d)(1) provides in relevant part: “Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs[.]”
2 ***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
that the State had provided reasonable training and supervision
under the circumstances. Finally, Belford contends that the
circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded costs to the
State against an indigent defendant.
“[T]his court reviews a trial court’s conclusion of
law with regard to the duty of care that a defendant owes to a
plaintiff in a negligence action ‘de novo, under the right/wrong
standard’ of review.” Doe Parents No. 1 v. State, Dep’t of
Educ., 100 Hawaiʻi 34, 57, 58 P.3d 545, 568 (2002), as amended
(Dec. 5, 2002) (brackets omitted) (quoting Ruf v. Honolulu
Police Dep’t, 89 Hawaiʻi 315, 320, 972 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1999)).
However, conclusions of law that present mixed questions of fact
and law will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Chun v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of the State of Haw., 106
Hawaiʻi 416, 430, 106 P.3d 339, 353 (2005). A mixed question of
law or fact is not clearly erroneous unless it is not supported
by substantial evidence, which is to say “credible evidence
which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a
person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” Leslie
v. Estate of Tavares, 91 Hawaiʻi 394, 399, 984 P.2d 1220, 1225
(1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting
State v. Kotis, 91 Hawaiʻi 319, 328, 984 P.2d 78, 87 (1999)).
“[T]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony are within the province of the trier of fact and, 3 ***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
generally, will not be disturbed on appeal.” Tamashiro v.
Control Specialist, Inc., 97 Hawaiʻi 86, 92, 34 P.3d 16, 22
(2001) (citation omitted).
To the extent that Belford argues the circuit court
erred in concluding that the State did not breach its duty of
care to Belford under the facts of this case, we disagree.
Belford’s argument that Haworth imposes a heightened duty of
care on the State in the context of prison workline injuries is
without merit. Our caselaw is clear: the same general
principles of tort liability that apply to private individuals
apply to the State in a correctional setting. Figueroa, 61 Haw.
at 375-76, 604 P.2d at 1202; Doe Parents, 100 Hawaiʻi at 71-72,
58 P.3d at 82-83 (footnote omitted) (“[I]f the State has entered
into a custodial relationship with a particular person, then the
State owes that person an affirmative duty to take reasonable
steps to prevent any harm—which the State foresees or should
reasonably anticipate—befalling its ward, either by his or her
own hand or by that of another.”). Nothing in Haworth demands a
different outcome. 3 Instead, this court made clear in Haworth
3 Haworth involved an injury sustained by a prisoner while working at the minimum-security Olinda Honor Camp, where he was “required” to remove rocks from an embankment at a roadwork project. 60 Haw. at 557, 592 P.2d at 821. The trial court concluded that the prisoner’s own negligence proximately caused his injury. Id. at 559, 592 P.2d at 822. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court disagreed, holding that assumption of the risk does not apply in the context of prison labor because the doctrine of assumption of the risk is premised upon the employee’s capacity to voluntarily accept or reject employment, which is not present for prison laborers. Id. at 561-62, 592 (. . . continued) 4 ***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
that the State’s duty to prevent foreseeable injuries to those
in custody is the general duty of reasonable care under the
circumstances. 60 Haw. at 565, 592 P.2d at 825 (“Since the
danger arose from the exercise of the State’s authority over
appellant as a prisoner, a duty to exercise reasonable care to
avoid the danger arose on familiar tort principles.”).
To the extent that Belford challenges the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial, we also disagree.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the
circuit court’s conclusions that: (1) Beford was reasonably
trained under the circumstances since she was competent and
trained to safely operate a circular saw; and (2) the State’s
intermittent supervision of Belford was reasonable under the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX 02-JUN-2025 10:05 AM Dkt. 16 SO
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
CHEYENNE BELFORD, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent/Defendant-Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1CC171001287)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Recktenwald, C.J., McKenna, Eddins, Ginoza, and Devens, JJ.)
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant Cheyenne Belford
severed part of her finger with a circular saw during a prison
workline training class at the Women’s Community Correctional
Center, where she was incarcerated. At the time of her injury,
her instructor had left the immediate area to assist other
inmates. Belford brought an action in the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit (circuit court) against the State of Hawaiʻi,
alleging negligent instruction and supervision. Following a ***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
bench trial, 1 the circuit court concluded that Belford’s injuries
were not legally caused by the State, which owed a general duty
of reasonable care to prevent foreseeable injury to persons in
its custody. (Citing Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 376, 604
P.2d 1198, 1201 (1979)). The circuit court found that, under
the circumstances, the State had not breached its duty to
reasonably supervise or train Belford in the operation of a
circular saw. Final judgment was entered in favor of the State,
which was awarded costs in the amount of $2,544.41 as the
prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1) (eff. 2000) of the Hawaiʻi
Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP). 2
Belford timely appealed both the circuit court’s
determination of liability and the award of costs to the State.
The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed and Belford sought
review by this court.
Belford argues that the State owes a heightened duty
to workline prisoners under Haworth v. State, 60 Haw. 557, 592
P.2d 820 (1979). Belford also challenges the circuit court’s
weighing of the evidence at trial, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding
1 The Honorable Bert I. Ayabe presiding.
2 HRCP Rule 54(d)(1) provides in relevant part: “Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs[.]”
2 ***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
that the State had provided reasonable training and supervision
under the circumstances. Finally, Belford contends that the
circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded costs to the
State against an indigent defendant.
“[T]his court reviews a trial court’s conclusion of
law with regard to the duty of care that a defendant owes to a
plaintiff in a negligence action ‘de novo, under the right/wrong
standard’ of review.” Doe Parents No. 1 v. State, Dep’t of
Educ., 100 Hawaiʻi 34, 57, 58 P.3d 545, 568 (2002), as amended
(Dec. 5, 2002) (brackets omitted) (quoting Ruf v. Honolulu
Police Dep’t, 89 Hawaiʻi 315, 320, 972 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1999)).
However, conclusions of law that present mixed questions of fact
and law will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Chun v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of the State of Haw., 106
Hawaiʻi 416, 430, 106 P.3d 339, 353 (2005). A mixed question of
law or fact is not clearly erroneous unless it is not supported
by substantial evidence, which is to say “credible evidence
which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a
person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” Leslie
v. Estate of Tavares, 91 Hawaiʻi 394, 399, 984 P.2d 1220, 1225
(1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting
State v. Kotis, 91 Hawaiʻi 319, 328, 984 P.2d 78, 87 (1999)).
“[T]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony are within the province of the trier of fact and, 3 ***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
generally, will not be disturbed on appeal.” Tamashiro v.
Control Specialist, Inc., 97 Hawaiʻi 86, 92, 34 P.3d 16, 22
(2001) (citation omitted).
To the extent that Belford argues the circuit court
erred in concluding that the State did not breach its duty of
care to Belford under the facts of this case, we disagree.
Belford’s argument that Haworth imposes a heightened duty of
care on the State in the context of prison workline injuries is
without merit. Our caselaw is clear: the same general
principles of tort liability that apply to private individuals
apply to the State in a correctional setting. Figueroa, 61 Haw.
at 375-76, 604 P.2d at 1202; Doe Parents, 100 Hawaiʻi at 71-72,
58 P.3d at 82-83 (footnote omitted) (“[I]f the State has entered
into a custodial relationship with a particular person, then the
State owes that person an affirmative duty to take reasonable
steps to prevent any harm—which the State foresees or should
reasonably anticipate—befalling its ward, either by his or her
own hand or by that of another.”). Nothing in Haworth demands a
different outcome. 3 Instead, this court made clear in Haworth
3 Haworth involved an injury sustained by a prisoner while working at the minimum-security Olinda Honor Camp, where he was “required” to remove rocks from an embankment at a roadwork project. 60 Haw. at 557, 592 P.2d at 821. The trial court concluded that the prisoner’s own negligence proximately caused his injury. Id. at 559, 592 P.2d at 822. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court disagreed, holding that assumption of the risk does not apply in the context of prison labor because the doctrine of assumption of the risk is premised upon the employee’s capacity to voluntarily accept or reject employment, which is not present for prison laborers. Id. at 561-62, 592 (. . . continued) 4 ***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
that the State’s duty to prevent foreseeable injuries to those
in custody is the general duty of reasonable care under the
circumstances. 60 Haw. at 565, 592 P.2d at 825 (“Since the
danger arose from the exercise of the State’s authority over
appellant as a prisoner, a duty to exercise reasonable care to
avoid the danger arose on familiar tort principles.”).
To the extent that Belford challenges the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial, we also disagree.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the
circuit court’s conclusions that: (1) Beford was reasonably
trained under the circumstances since she was competent and
trained to safely operate a circular saw; and (2) the State’s
intermittent supervision of Belford was reasonable under the
circumstances since it was consistent with the procedures and
policies of the Department of Public Safety, and Belford’s
history of misconduct was not of the type that could reasonably
have put the State on notice that Belford would improperly
operate a circular saw. Thus, the circuit court’s mixed
(continued . . .) P.2d at 823-24. Instead, as this court explained in Haworth, “we have recognized a duty of the State to exercise ordinary care for the safety of prisoners in its custody.” Id. at 563, 592 P.2d at 824 (citing Upchurch v. State, 51 Haw. 150, 454 P.2d 112 (1969)). Because the record was insufficient as to the exercise of reasonable care by the State in this context, the Haworth court remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 565, 592 P.2d at 826.
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conclusions of fact and law were not clearly erroneous. See
Leslie, 91 Hawaiʻi at 399, 984 P.2d at 1225.
However, to the extent that Belford argues that the
circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded costs to the
State, we agree.
“The award of a taxable cost is within the discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear
abuse of discretion.” Wong v. Takeuchi, 88 Hawaiʻi 46, 52, 961
P.2d 611, 617 (1998) (quoting Bjornen v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 81 Hawaiʻi 105, 107, 912 P.2d 602, 604 (App. 1996)). “An
abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court has clearly
exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles
of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party
litigant.” Pulawa v. GTE Hawaiian Tel, 112 Hawaiʻi 3, 11, 143
P.3d 1205, 1213 (2006) (brackets omitted) (quoting Hac v. Univ.
of Haw., 102 Hawaiʻi 92, 101, 73 P.3d 46, 55 (2003)).
On August 6, 2020, Belford filed a Motion to Review
and Disallow Costs. Belford’s motion was supported by a
declaration from Belford’s attorney that stated in relevant
part:
(2) At the time Plaintiff was injured and during the course of the trial in this case she was incarcerated and had no earnings, income, or assets of any significant value.
(3) As the Court well knows, this was not a frivolous case, and Plaintiff suffered a serious injury from which she is and will be permanently disabled.
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(4) In light of these circumstances, it is unconscionable for the State of Hawaiʻi to seek and for this Court to allow costs to be taxed against the Plaintiff as a penalty for bringing her legitimate and meritorious claims.
Then, on December 10, 2020, Belford moved ex parte to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, which the circuit court
granted on December 23, 2020, the same day the circuit court
entered its written order denying Belford’s Motion to Review and
Disallow Costs. The December 10, 2020 motion was supported by a
declaration from Belford, in which Belford averred that “because
of my poverty, I am unable to pay the costs of said proceedings
[on appeal].” In her declaration, Belford stated that, at that
time, she was living “in a clean and sober house” following her
“recent[]” release from the Women’s Community Correctional
Center. She declared that she made between $300-$400 per month
while working at a restaurant and that, in addition to her
wages, “I receive $388 per month from welfare currently, and
approximately $240 in food stamps monthly.” Belford further
stated that she had no cash or checking or savings accounts, and
that she did not own any valuable property, including real
estate, stocks, bonds, notes, or automobiles.
Thus, viewed at the time the circuit court’s written
order was entered on December 23, 2020, it was inequitable for
the circuit court to award $2,544.41 in costs to the State
against an indigent plaintiff who brought a reasonable, non-
frivolous claim for a disabling injury that occurred on a prison
7 ***NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
workline where she was paid $0.25 an hour for her labor,
especially because the taxed costs amount to more than 6 to 8
months’ worth of her wages combined. See Pulawa, 112 Hawaiʻi at
11, 143 P.3d at 1213; cf. Knox v. City of Fresno, 208 F.Supp.3d
1114 (E.D.Cal. 2016) (holding that an award of costs against
relatives of a mentally ill woman who was shot and killed by
police would be “inequitable”). This outcome is particularly
inequitable because participation in a prison workline was
necessary to transition to work furlough and ultimately to
parole. On these facts, we hold that the circuit court erred
when it awarded the State costs against Belford.
Accordingly, the ICA’s January 15, 2025 Judgment on
Appeal and the Circuit Court’s January 5, 2021 Final Judgment
are reversed to the extent they award costs in favor of the
State and against Belford. The ICA’s January 15, 2025 Judgment
on Appeal is otherwise affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, June 2, 2025.
Eric A. Seitz /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald Jonathan M.F. Loo Michael D. Klinger /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna Rosalyn G. Payen (Della A. Belatti, /s/ Todd W. Eddins Gina Szeto-Wong, and Kevin A. Yolken, on the briefs) /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza for petitioner/plaintiff- appellant /s/ Vladimir P. Devens
Amanda J. Weston Corinne J. Carson for respondent/defendant- appellee 8