UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ALAN BEAUREGARD,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 10-cv-1972 (RLW)
HONORABLE RAY MABUS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff Alan P. Beauregard, (“Beauregard”), father and personal representative of the
late First Lieutenant James J. Beauregard (“Lt. Beauregard”), brings this action against Secretary
of the Navy, Honorable Ray Mabus, seeking judicial review of the March 15, 2006 decision of
the Board for Correction of Naval Records (“the Board”) under the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”). 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2000). Beauregard challenges the Board’s decision
regarding the delay and denial of the promotion of Lt. Beauregard, the characterization of Lt.
Beauregard’s discharge, and the correction of Lt. Beauregard’s military records. (See generally
Compl.). Beauregard alleges that the Board’s actions in denying Beauregard’s application for
relief were arbitrary and capricious.
1 This unpublished memorandum opinion is intended solely to inform the parties and any reviewing court of the basis for the instant ruling, or alternatively, to assist in any potential future analysis of the res judicata, law of the case, or preclusive effect of the ruling. The Court has designated this opinion as "not intended for publication," but this Court cannot prevent or prohibit the publication of this opinion in the various and sundry electronic and legal databases (as it is a public document), and this Court cannot prevent or prohibit the citation of this opinion by counsel. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. Nonetheless, as stated in the operational handbook adopted by our Court of Appeals, “counsel are reminded that the Court's decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the Court sees no precedential value in that disposition.” D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 43 (2011). 1
Defendant has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, arguing that
the Board used an adequate decision making process as to all issues relating to Lt. Beauregard’s
promotion and discharge. (Dkt. No. 9 at 11-12). Plaintiff has cross-moved for summary
judgment, arguing that summary judgment should be granted in Plaintiff’s favor because the
Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. (Dkt. No. 14 at 17). Upon
a complete review of the administrative record (“AR”), and for the reasons set forth below, the
Court concludes that the administrative record supports the Board’s determination. Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied.
BACKGROUND
Lt. Beauregard entered active duty as an officer candidate in the United States Marine
Corps on May 10, 1996. (AR at 4). In March 2001, Lt. Beauregard became the subject of a
criminal investigation by both civilian and military authorities regarding allegations of larceny
and several other related offenses. (Compl. at ¶ 28-29). While this investigation was pending,
Lt. Beauregard was selected for promotion from First Lieutenant to Captain and his name was
added to the promotion list on June 1, 2001. (Compl. at ¶ 27; AR at 5, 40). On June 8, 2001, Lt.
Beauregard’s Commanding Officer recommended that his promotion be delayed and that his
name be possibly removed from the promotion list due to the ongoing investigation. (Compl. at
¶ 49; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 8; AR at 182). On June 25, 2001, Lt. Beauregard acknowledged the
promotion delay by submitting a written response to his Commanding Officer regarding the
decision to withhold his promotion. (Compl. at ¶ 50; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 9; AR 42). On June 28,
2001, the official “Notification of Promotion Delay and Possible Removal from Fiscal Year 2002
Promotion List” notice was issued recommending to the Commandant of the Marine Corps that
due to the “serious nature of the pending charges” the Commander of the First Marine Division
“strongly recommend[ed] that [Lt. Beauregard’s] promotion be delayed until his case is
resolved.” (Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 11; AR at 44, 183). On July 11, 2001, the Staff Judge Advocate to
the Commandant of the Marine Corps ordered that Lt. Beauregard not be separated, promoted, or
transferred without coordination with the Judge because of the pending charges. (Dkt. No. 9 at ¶
15; AR at 5, 49-51).
Based on Lt. Beauregard’s position on the promotion list, he was set for promotion on
August 1, 2001; however, on August 16, 2001, the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved
the recommendation that Lt. Beauregard’s promotion be delayed due to “the potentially adverse
allegations of larceny and fraud.” (Compl. ¶ 37; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 16; AR at 5, 52-53). On August
12, 2001, Lt. Beauregard was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol
(“DUI”). (Compl. ¶ 37; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 18; AR at 5, 56-57). Investigative hearings on the
criminal charges were held on September 5, 2001 and October 4, 2001. (Compl. ¶33). During
the September 5, 2001 hearing, Lt. Beauregard testified to being charged with a DUI. (Compl. ¶
41). Lt. Beauregard admitted his guilt to the DUI offense to civilian authorities on September
17, 2001. (Compl. at ¶ 42; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 20; AR at 5-6, 67).
On May 22, 2002, the Commanding General withdrew and dismissed all charges against
Lt. Beauregard regarding his larceny and other related offenses. (Compl. ¶¶ 35-36; Dkt. No. 9 at
23; AR at 6). Lt. Beauregard’s Commanding Officer initiated separation actions on June 28,
2002. (Compl. at ¶ 60; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 24; AR at 6, 70-71). Lt. Beauregard was notified of the
separation proceedings on July 3, 2002, at which time Lt. Beauregard was informed of his
procedural rights, including his right to a Board of Inquiry hearing and his right to render his
resignation in lieu of separation processing. (Dkt. No. 9 at 25-26; AR at 72-73). On July 9,
2002, Lt. Beauregard submitted a resignation request in lieu of separation processing and waived
his right to a Board of Inquiry hearing. (Compl. ¶ 72; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 27-28; AR at 6, 74-75,
197). The First Endorsement of Lt. Beauregard’s separation was issued July 12, 2002, the
Second Endorsement was issued on July 25,2002, and the Third Endorsement was issued
October 9, 2002. (Compl. at ¶¶ 63, 69, 74; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 30, 31, 33; AR at 6, 77-83). Lt.
Beauregard’s resignation request was ultimately denied on October 2, 2002. (Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 32;
AR at 7, 80).
Lt. Beauregard was separated from the United States Marine Corps on October 15, 2002,
at which time he was issued a Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty (“DD Form
214”) indicating a discharge characterization of “Honorable” by reason of completion of his
required active service. (Compl. at ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 34-35; AR at 7, 84). On October 24,
2002, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower for Reserve Affairs directed that Lt.
Beauregard receive a “General” discharge by reason of unacceptable conduct. (Compl. at ¶ 75;
Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 36; AR at 7). Consequently, on February 6, 2003, Lt. Beauregard’s DD Form
214 was corrected by issuance of a DD Form 215 designating a “General” discharge by reason of
unacceptable conduct. (Compl. at ¶ 77; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 37; AR at 7, 85-86).
Following Lt. Beauregard’s death on August 6, 2004, his father and personal
representative completed the application process for the correction of records on behalf of his
son pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 723.3(a)(3). (Compl. at ¶ 7, 11-12, 80; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 38; AR at 87).
In his application, Beauregard requested that the Board: 1) void the existing DD-215 Form with
its “General” characterization; 2) reinstate the original DD-214 Form with its “Honorable”
characterization; 3) direct that Lt. Beauregard be posthumously promoted to Captain; 4) award
Lt. Beauregard’s back pay; 5) direct the removal from Lt. Beauregard’s official military
personnel file of all documents referencing the withdrawn and dismissed criminal charges.
(Compl. at ¶ 81; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 39; AR 88-111). On March 15, 2006, after the issuance of an
Advisory Opinion from the Military Law Branch of the Judge Advocate Division (“JAM”) that
recommended the denial of the application for relief, the Board issued its decision concluding
that, despite procedural deficiencies, the Department had substantially complied with all relevant
procedures. (Compl. at ¶ 13, 15; Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 40-48; AR at 3-12, 18). The Board denied
Beauregard’s application on all counts finding that Beauregard’s requests were without merit.
(AR at 11). Beauregard timely filed his Complaint in this Court seeking review of the Board’s
decision on November 17, 2010. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Secretary of a military department, acting through a civilian board of the executive
part of that military department, “may correct any military record of the Secretary’s department
when the Secretary considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 1552(a)(1). Once a civilian board makes a final decision, that decision is “subject to review
under § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.” Pettiford v. Sec’y of the Navy, 774 F. Supp.
2d 173, 181 (D.D.C. 2011). Under the APA, a reviewing court may hold unlawful or set aside an
agency action that the court determines to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
When reviewing an agency’s action under the APA, it is not the role of the court to
resolve factual issues, rather the court need only “determine whether or not as a matter of law the
evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” Fuller v.
Winter, 538 F. Supp. 2d 179, 185 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d
766, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Given the language of 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a), which grants the Secretary broad discretion
to correct an error or injustice, federal courts review the decisions of military correction boards
with “an unusually deferential application of the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard.” Kreis v.
Secretary of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Orloff v. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953) (“[G]iven the special circumstances in which the military must operate,
the courts are ill-equipped to resolve controversies arising from the use of discretionary powers
specifically designed to provide military authorities with the freedom and flexibility needed to
establish and maintain a well-trained and well-disciplined armed force.”). “This deferential
standard is calculated to ensure that the courts do not become a forum for appeals by every
soldier dissatisfied with his or her ratings, a result that would destabilize military command and
take the judiciary far afield of its area of competence.” Cone v. Caldera, 223 F.3d 789, 793
(D.C. Cir. 2000). Moreover, there exists a “strong but rebuttable presumption that administrators
of the military, like other public officials, discharge their duties correctly, lawfully, and in good
faith.” Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Collins v. United States,
24 Cl. Ct. 32, 38 (1991), aff’d, 975 F.2d 869 (Fed Cir. 1992)).
Generally, summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows [through facts
supported in the record] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, when parties seek “review of a final agency action under
the Administrative Procedure Act, . . . the standard set forth in [Rule 56(a)] does not apply
because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record.” Calloway v.
Harvey, 590 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2008). Thus, “summary judgment [is] the
mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether agency action is supported by the
administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” Fuller, 538 F.
Supp. 2d at 185 (citing Richard v. INS, 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
The Court is permitted to “determine only whether the Secretary’s decision making
process was deficient, not whether his decision was correct.” Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1508.
Accordingly, the Court must defer to the Board’s decision unless the Secretary’s action in this
area was “arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statutes and regulations governing that
agency,” which resulted in an error in its own decision making process. Id. at 1512 (quoting
Dilley v. Alexander, 603 F.2d 914, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); Frizelle, 111 F.3d at 176. The court
“will not disturb the decision so long as the deciding body examine[d] the relevant data and
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.” Poole v. Harvey, 571 F.Supp.2d 120, 124 (D.D.C. 2008)
(citing Kreis, 406 F.3d at 686).
ANALYSIS A. Parties’ Arguments
Beauregard brings three counts under the APA alleging that the Board ignored significant
regulatory violations in its decision making process resulting in an arbitrary and capricious
decision. (Compl. at ¶¶ 25-38). In Counts One and Two, Beauregard challenges the Board’s
conclusions that the alleged procedural defects related to Lt. Beauregard’s promotion and
discharge characterization of service were harmless error because, according to Beauregard,
these conclusions were contrary to applicable law and regulations. (Compl. at ¶¶ 25-32). In
Count Three, Beauregard seeks a determination that the Board’s ultimate decision in denying the
full and complete relief requested by Beauregard—promotion, re-characterization of discharge,
awarding of back pay, and removing all mention of the withdrawn and dropped charges brought
against Lt. Beauregard—was arbitrary and capricious. (Compl. at ¶¶ 32-38).
Defendant contends that summary judgment is appropriate because there is no genuine
issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Dkt. No. 9 at 12).
Moreover, because military correction boards are reviewed under “an unusually deferential
application of the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard,” Defendant contends the Court is only
asked to determine whether the decision making process was deficient, not whether the decision
itself was correct. Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1515; Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396, 1405-
06 (D.C. Cir. 1995). For this reason, Defendant argues the Court should rule in its favor by
finding the Board’s decision making process was not conducted in an arbitrary manner. (Dkt.
No. 9 at 13-15). Finally, Defendant submits that Plaintiff bears the burden to overcome the
strong but rebuttable presumption that the military administrators discharged their duties
correctly, lawfully and in good faith and that Beauregard failed to meet this burden. (Dkt. No. 9
at 13); Frizelle, 111 F.3d at 177.
B. Delay and Failure to Promote
Beauregard argues that the Board provided no legal basis for its conclusion that Lt.
Beauregard was not entitled to a promotion. With respect to the delay of Lt. Beauregard’s
promotion, Plaintiff contends that Lt. Beauregard was not provided with the requisite notice
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 624(d), and Department regulations Secretary of the Navy Instruction
(“SECNAVINST”) 1420.1A. Section 624(d)(3) provides that:
The appointment of an officer may not be delayed under this subsection unless the officer has been given written notice of the grounds for the delay, unless it is impracticable to give such written notice before the effective date of the appointment, in which case such written notice shall be given as soon as practicable. An officer whose promotion has been delayed under this subsection shall be afforded an opportunity to make a written statement to the Secretary concerned in response to the action taken. Any such statement shall be given careful consideration by the Secretary.
10 U.S.C. §624(d)(3). Plaintiff maintains that Lt. Beauregard was not properly notified of the
initial six-month promotion delay pursuant to Section 624(d)(3) because he was not notified of
the delay until August 16, 2001, two weeks after his scheduled promotion date. Beauregard also
contends that the original six-month promotion delay was never formally extended, in violation
of Section 624(d)(4), which provides that an officer’s promotion may not be delayed six months
beyond the date he would have been otherwise appointed unless the Secretary specifies a further
period of delay. 10 U.S.C. § 624(d)(4). Further, under Section 624(d)(4), “[a]n officer’s
appointment may not be delayed more than 90 days after final action has been taken in any
criminal case . . . or more than eighteen months after the date on which such officer would
otherwise have been appointed, whichever is later.” Id.
The Board acknowledged that there were procedural deficiencies with regard to the delay
of Lt. Beauregard’s promotion. Specifically, the Board noted that “ the delay itself was not
directed until about two weeks after [Lt. Beauregard] was due to be promoted, and the initial
period of delay was never formally extended.” (AR at 11). However, with respect to the initial
delay, the Board noted that: (1) Lt. Beauregard had been informed of the intent to delay his
promotion on June 8, 2001; (2) he replied to the June 8, 2001 notice on June 25, 2001, and his
statement was forwarded to the decision-maker; (3) he was again notified of the delay on August
16, 2001, and given another opportunity to respond. Id. With respect to Plaintiff’s contention
that the period of delay was never formally extended, the Board concluded that “although the
initial delay was never extended, the total period of delay did not exceed the maximum allowable
period of 18 months, and the Secretary essentially ratified further delay when [Lt. Beauregard’s]
separation was directed. (AR at 11-12). The Board also concluded that Lt. Beauregard’s DUI
provided additional grounds to delay Lt. Beauregard’s promotion even though the criminal
larceny and forgery charges had been dropped. (AR at 11-12). Although the Board conceded
that the initial delay was never extended, the Board provided a reasoned explanation for its
conclusion that the procedural deficiencies were harmless error.
Moreover, the Board concluded that these failures to comply with the procedural
requirements for delay do not compel promotion. It is well established that military officers do
not have a property or liberty interest in a promotion per se and, therefore, are not entitled to a
promotion as a matter of law. Blevins v. Orr, 721 F.2d 1419, 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also
Dysart v. United States, 369 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Pauls v. Secretary of the Air
Force, 457 F.2d 294, 297 (1st Cir. 1972). Additionally, although the language of Section
624(a)(1) indicates that officers on a promotion list shall be promoted to the next higher grade,
the President of the United States is afforded complete discretion to choose whether or not to
appoint an officer and the “statute does not [] alter that process by providing for automatic
appointment.”2 Dysart, 369 F.3d at 1311. Thus, after considering the evidence in the record, as
well as Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the procedural deficiencies in the delay action, the Board
rationally determined that the delay in receiving notice was harmless error and did not justify
Plaintiff’s requested remedy of promotion.
Consequently, the Board is “free to draw [its] own reasonable inferences and conclusions
from the evidence before [it].” Mudd v. Caldera, 134 F. Supp. 2d 138, 143 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing
Mail Order Ass’n of America v. United States Postal Serv., 2 F.3d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
Furthermore, an agency’s decision need not be a model of analytic precision to survive, but
rather the agency needs only to have used its discretion in a reasoned manner. Frizelle, 111 F.3d
at 176; Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1512. As the Court must employ an “unusually deferential application
2 The President may, however, delegate this appointment power to another; in this case, the power was vested in the Secretary of the Navy. 10
of the arbitrary and capricious standard,” the Court concludes that the Board provided a
sufficient rational explanation for its conclusion that the procedural deficiencies in the delay of
Lt. Beauregard’s promotion amount to harmless error and, therefore, does not compel the
promotion requested by Plaintiff here. Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1514.
C. Separation and Characterization of Service
Plaintiff argues that the Board’s decision upholding Lt. Beauregard’s General discharge
characterization was arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law because the Marine Corps
impermissibly considered the withdrawn and dismissed larceny charges. Additionally, Plaintiff
contends that the Marine Corps did not adequately consider the meritorious aspects to Lt.
Beauregard’s record. Further, Plaintiff argues that the conduct that purportedly gave rise to
separation action—Lt. Beauregard’s DUI—does not provide an adequate basis for a less than
“honorable” service characterization. The Board’s decision addresses each of these arguments
and provides a rational basis for its ultimate conclusion. Essentially, the Board’s decision
indicates that Plaintiff’s arguments were not sufficient to “overcome the strong but rebuttable
presumption that administrators of the military, like other public officers, discharge their duties
correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.” Frizelle, 111 F.3d at 177. The Court defers to the
Board’s conclusion and reasoning that Lt. Beauregard could be processed for separation under
the notification procedure because the separation procedure was initiated before Lt. Beauregard
had attained five years of service. The Board’s determination is consistent with the binding
guidance which provides that an officer with less than five years of service may be processed for
separation with the notification procedure as long as he is notified of the separation and given the
opportunity to submit a statement. (AR at 8, 470-567) (SECNAVINST 1920.6B,
“Administrative Separation of Officers” (Dec. 13, 1999)). Furthermore, under the same
guidance, an officer need only be afforded the right to a Board of Inquiry if he or she is to be
discharged under an “other than honorable” service characterization, but need not be provided
this right if he or she is being discharged under a “general” or “honorable” service
characterization. ( Id.). The Court also defers to the Board’s conclusion that Lt. Beauregard’s
DUI conviction was sufficient basis for his separation by reason of misconduct. The directive
which provides guidance on the administrative separation of officers in the Navy and Marine
Corps explains that an officer may be released from active duty for cause on the basis of
misconduct if the officer has committed a military or civilian offense that could be punished by
confinement of six months or more. (Id.) Therefore, Lt. Beauregard’s DUI provided a sufficient
basis for administrative separation. Finally, the Court defers to the Board’s ultimate
determination that the “general” discharge characterization given to Lt. Beauregard was
appropriate. In making this determination, the Board explicitly stated that it considered “not
only the overall quality of [Lt. Beauregard’s] service, as reflected in his fitness reports, but also
that the officers in his chain-of-command recommended an honorable discharge.” (AR 12).
Nonetheless, the Board concluded that the general discharge was appropriate, even though the
Board noted that a general discharge is “rarely appropriate when an officer is separated for
misconduct” and that officer misconduct normally warrants discharge under an “other than
honorable” service characterization. Id. Therefore, the Court defers to the Board’s conclusion
that Lt. Beauregard’s DUI conviction, even when balanced against his meritorious record,
provided sufficient basis for Lt. Beauregard’s general characterization of service.
Plaintiff contends that the Board failed to address two additional arguments which
Plaintiff raised in his Response to the JAM Advisory Opinion. First, Plaintiff takes issue with
the assertion in the JAM Advisory Opinion that the July 16, 2002 DD Form 214 should not have
issued due to the JAM’s July 11, 2001 request that no action to promote or separate Lt.
Beauregard be taken without prior coordination with the Judge Advocate Division. Plaintiff
argued in his response to the Advisory Opinion that this request was no longer relevant in July
2002 because the underlying criminal charges that were the basis for the request were withdrawn
and dismissed on May 22, 2002. Plaintiff now contends that the Board did not address this
argument and merely adopted the conclusion of the Advisory Opinion. The Court disagrees.
While it is true that the Board agreed with the JAM’s conclusion that the July 16, 2002 DD Form
214 should never have been issued, the Board reached that conclusion for a different reason. The
Board explained that the July 16, 2002 DD Form 214—which released Lt. Beauregard from
active duty on October 15, 2002 with an honorable service characterization—should have never
been issued because administrative separation proceedings had already been initiated on July 3,
2002. (AR at 12). The Board noted that Lt. Beauregard “never should have been released from
active duty on 15 October 2002, prior to Secretarial action on the pending administrative
separation and relies on the provision of the applicable regulation to the effect that a release
should not occur if separation for cause, clearly the situation here.” (Id.) (emphasis added).
Thus, the Board relied on the directive set forth in SECNAVINST 1920.6B, “Administrative
Separation of Officers,” which provides that an officer may be released from active duty unless
separation processing for cause is warranted. Consistent with this directive, the Board concluded
that Lt. Beauregard should not have been released from active duty on October 15, 2002 for
completion of his service term because administrative separation for cause had already been
initiated. Therefore, the Board did not rely on the July 11, 2001 order as a basis for its
conclusions. Although the Board did not squarely address Plaintiff’s argument concerning the
July 11, 2001 request, the Board has, however, given “a reason that a court can measure” for its
decision. Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1514.
Second, Plaintiff challenges the assertion in the Advisory Opinion that no DD Form 214
should have been issued until after the Secretary’s order of October 24, 2002 directing that Lt.
Beauregard receive a general service characterization. Plaintiff argues that the Secretary’s order
should be considered invalid because it was issued after Lt. Beauregard’s final End of Service
Date, October 15, 2002. Essentially, Plaintiff contends that because Lt. Beauregard was released
from active duty for “Completion of Required Active Service” on October 15, 2002, the
Secretary’s later order discharging Lt. Beauregard for cause should be invalid or ineffective.
Plaintiff cites to no authority for this proposition. Moreover, as previously discussed, the Board
explained that Lt. Beauregard’s October 15, 2002 release should not have occurred because
separation for cause had already been initiated. Accordingly, the Board directed that the record
should be corrected to reflect that Lt. Beauregard was not released from active duty, but instead
was retained on active duty until October 25, 2002, when he was issued a general discharge by
reason of misconduct/unacceptable conduct. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Board’s
decision addresses all of Plaintiff’s arguments and gives reasons, sufficiently supported by the
administrative record, for the Board’s ultimate decision.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, summary judgment will be entered in favor of the
defendant. An Order accompanies this Memorandum. Digitally signed by Judge Robert L. Wilkins DN: cn=Judge Robert L. Wilkins, o=U.S. District Court, ou=Chambers of Honorable Robert L. Wilkins, email=RW@dc.uscourt.gov, c=US Date: 2012.10.15 09:48:22 -04'00' Date: October 15, 2012 ROBERT L. WILKINS United States District Judge