Beaumont Independent School District v. Linda Wortham

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 14, 2006
Docket09-05-00443-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Beaumont Independent School District v. Linda Wortham (Beaumont Independent School District v. Linda Wortham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Beaumont Independent School District v. Linda Wortham, (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

In The



Court of Appeals



Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont



____________________



NO. 09-05-443 CV



BEAUMONT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant



V.



LINDA WORTHAM, Appellee



On Appeal from the 172nd District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. E-158573



MEMORANDUM OPINION

Linda Wortham sued Beaumont Independent School District (BISD) under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) for race discrimination. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.051 (Vernon 2006). The jury returned a verdict in Wortham's favor. The trial court's judgment awarded $38,711 for past lost wages, $250,000 for mental anguish damages, $112,637.16 for prejudgment interest, and $151,340 for attorney's fees. BISD raises seven issues on appeal, including an issue attacking the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence that race was a motivating factor for its decisions. Wortham filed a cross-appeal contesting the amount of interest awarded. We sustain BISD's factual sufficiency challenge and remand the cause for a new trial.

The Statute

Section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code provides in part that an employer commits an unlawful employment practice if the employer discriminates against an employee based on "race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age. . . ." See Tex. Lab. Code § 21.051. (1) Section 21.125(a) of the TCHRA provides that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complainant demonstrates that race . . . was a motivating factor for an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated the practice, unless race . . . is combined with objective job-related factors to obtain diversity in the employer's work force." Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.125(a) (Vernon 2006). The jury was instructed in this case that a "'motivating factor' in an employment decision is a reason for making the decision at the time it was made. There may be more than one motivating factor. . . ." (2) The defendant may attempt to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivation. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.125(b) (Vernon 2006). If the defendant establishes the "same action" defense, the statute restricts the remedies available to the plaintiff. Id.; see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (Title VII provides a similar affirmative defense for the employer.).

An employer is not liable under the statute for a "careless" decision that does not violate the statute. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. 2003). That is, the question is not whether Wortham should have been promoted earlier based on her qualifications. Rather, the ultimate question under the statute is whether race was a motivating factor in the decisions not to promote her at the time. (3) See id. at 739-40.

The Jury's Finding

Wortham had the burden at trial to demonstrate race was a motivating factor in BISD's decision not to promote her to certain positions for which she applied in 1996 and 1997. See Canchola, 121 S.W.3d at 739 (citing Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2001)). The jury found Wortham met that burden. The jury further found that BISD would not have taken the same action in the absence of racial discrimination.

The Standard of Review

First, BISD contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that race was a motivating factor. Whether there is any evidence to support a verdict is considered a question of law, not of fact, and so a no-evidence review is referred to as a legal sufficiency review. A legal sufficiency review must credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); see also Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. 2005); Canchola, 121 S.W.3d at 739 (citing Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2001)). A no-evidence challenge (4) fails if more than a scintilla of evidence supports the challenged finding. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810. Evidence that merely creates a suspicion of the existence of a vital fact is not legally sufficient. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). If there is no evidence to support a verdict, the appellate court reverses the trial court's judgment and renders a proper judgment. See generally Excel Corp. v. Apodaca, 81 S.W.3d 817, 819, 822 (Tex. 2002). In this case, if no evidence supports the jury's finding, the proper judgment would be that Wortham take nothing in her claim against BISD.

Second, BISD argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that race was a motivating factor. Article V, section 6 of the Texas Constitution states that decisions of courts of appeals are conclusive on all questions of fact. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 6(a). A factual sufficiency challenge differs from a legal sufficiency challenge both in the standard of review the appellate court applies and in the remedy sought. In a factual sufficiency issue, the reviewing court weighs all the evidence for and against the jury's finding and sets aside the verdict if the supporting evidence is so weak, or the evidence to the contrary is so overwhelming, that it is clear the finding is wrong and manifestly unjust. See Dyson v. Olin Corp., 692 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex. 1985); Western Atlas Int'l, Inc. v. Wilson, 930 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex.

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