Beaton v. Internal Revenue Service

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedDecember 8, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-01575
StatusUnknown

This text of Beaton v. Internal Revenue Service (Beaton v. Internal Revenue Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beaton v. Internal Revenue Service, (E.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 PAUL NIVARD BEATON, Case No. 1:21-cv-01575-NONE-SAB

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DECLARE PLAINTIFF TO BE A 13 v. THREE-STRIKE LITIGANT AND REVOKE PLAINTIFF’S IN FORMA 14 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PAUPERIS STATUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 15 Defendant.

16 17 18 19 20 I. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Paul Nivard Beaton (prisoner no. AS-1346) (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se 23 and in forma pauperis (IFP), filed this action against the Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue 24 Service (“IRS”) on October 25, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges a Bivens action and violations 25 of his rights pursuant to an “Act of Congress” and Article I of the United States Constitution. (See 26 generally id.) Plaintiff generally complains that while he received the first Economic Impact 27 Payment (EIP) check of $600 pursuant to the March 11, 2021 American Rescue Plan, he never 28 received the second EIP check for $1,400, and various IRS and prison officials did not respond to 1 his inquiries. (Id.) On October 26, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP. 2 (ECF No. 3.) However, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court recommends that Plaintiff be 3 declared a three-strike litigant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), that Plaintiff’s IFP status be 4 revoked in this matter, and that Plaintiff be required to pay the full filing fee before he is permitted 5 to proceed in this litigation or face dismissal.1 6 II. 7 LEGAL STANDARD 8 As mentioned, the Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP. (ECF No. 3.) 9 Nevertheless, IFP status may be revoked at any time, either on motion or sua sponte, if the Court 10 determines that such status should not have been granted. See, e.g., Schwerdtfeger v. Paramo, No. 11 19-cv-2255 JLS (JLB), 2021 WL 1186831, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2021) (collecting cases). 12 Indeed, Andrews v. King implicitly allows the Court to sua sponte raise the § 1915(g) problem, so 13 long as the court notifies the prisoner of the earlier dismissals considered to support a revocation 14 of IFP status and provides the prisoner an opportunity to be heard on the matter before dismissing 15 the action. See Andrews v. King (King), 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). This is because IFP 16 status “is not a constitutional right.” Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999); see 17 also Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 197 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Leave to proceed [IFP] is a privilege, 18 not a right[;] courts have the discretion to revoke that privilege when it no longer serves its goals”) 19 (citation omitted). Rather, it may be acquired and lost during the course of litigation. Stehouwer 20 v. Hennessey, 841 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Cal. 1994), vacated in part on other grounds by Olivares 21 v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109 (9th Cir. 1995). 22 The plain language of the statute, known as the “Three Strikes” provision of the Prison 23 Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), makes clear that a prisoner is precluded from bringing a civil action 24 or an appeal IFP if he has brought three actions or appeals (or any combination thereof totaling 25 three) that were previously dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. See 26 Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1723 (2020) (citing § 1915(g)); see also Rodriguez, 169 F.3d

27 1 The Court notes Plaintiff consented to magistrate jurisdiction over this litigation on November 10, 2021. (ECF No. 6.) However, the Court additionally notes that not all parties have consented to magistrate jurisdiction because 28 Defendant IRS has not yet been served or appeared in this matter. 1 at 1178. More specifically, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) states: 2 In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 3 incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in the United States that was dismissed on grounds that it was 4 frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 5 physical injury. 6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015) (holding a dismissal that 7 is on appeal counts as a strike during the pendency of the appeal); Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1727 (a 8 dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under § 1915(g), regardless of whether the 9 dismissal was with or without prejudice); Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048 10 (9th Cir. 2016) (reviewing dismissals that count as strikes). 11 To determine whether a dismissal counts as a strike, a reviewing court looks to the 12 dismissing court’s actions and the reasons underlying the dismissal. Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 13 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013); see also El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 14 (the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial). However, a dismissal qualifies 15 as a strike only where the entire action was dismissed for a qualifying reason under the PLRA. 16 Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d. 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (in multi-claim case, all causes of action 17 must be dismissed under the PLRA) (citing Washington, 833 F.3d at 1057); see also Harris v. 18 Harris, 935 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that if one reason supporting a dismissal is not a 19 reason enumerated under § 1915A, then that reason “saves” the dismissal from counting as a strike). 20 If a prisoner has “three strikes” under § 1915(g), he may not proceed without paying the 21 full filing fee unless “the complaint makes a plausible allegation” that the prisoner “faced 22 ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ ” at the time his complaint was filed. Andrews v. 23 Cervantes (Cervantes), 493 F.3d 1047, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2007). In evaluating whether the 24 imminent danger exception applies, the court must construe the prisoner’s “facial allegations” 25 liberally to determine whether the allegations of physical injury are plausible. Williams v. Paramo, 26 775 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2015). However, assertions of imminent danger “may be rejected as 27 overly speculative or fanciful, when they are supported by implausible or untrue allegations.” 28 Cervantes, 493 F. 3d at 1057 fn. 11 (collecting cases and noting normal preclusion principles will 1 prevent a prisoner from avoiding the three-strike rule based on allegations rejected in an earlier 2 case). 3 III. 4 DISCUSSION 5 A.

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Beaton v. Internal Revenue Service, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beaton-v-internal-revenue-service-caed-2021.