Beaird v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas

Beaird v. State

734 S.W.2d 17, 1987 Tex. App. LEXIS 7111

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

DecidedApril 30, 1987

Docket01-86-0514-CR

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 734 S.W.2d 17 (Beaird v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Beaird v. State, 734 S.W.2d 17, 1987 Tex. App. LEXIS 7111 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).

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OPINION

DUNN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction for the felony offense of rape of a child.

On September 12, 1985, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment alleging that on or about July 15, 1981, appellant committed aggravated rape and rape of a child.

After the defense rested, the State waived the count alleging aggravated rape, and the court submitted the case to the jury on the count alleging rape of a child. The jury found appellant guilty, and the court assessed punishment at 10 years confinement.

The appellant contends, in his first point of error, that his conviction is void because the indictment was barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 12.01(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987). We agree.

At the time of the offense, July 15, 1981, the period of limitations for rape of a child was three years from the date of the commission of the offense. Id.1 Effective September 1, 1983, the legislature amended article 12.01 and added subsection (3)(C), extending to five years the limitation period for rape of a child:²

Except as provided in Article 12.03, felony indictments may be presented within these limits, and not afterward:

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(3) five years from the date of the commission of the offense:

(C) rape, aggravated rape, sexual abuse, aggravated sexual abuse, rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child....

This amendment permissibly extended to five years the limitations period for the offense committed by appellant, unless the offense had been barred by limitations prior to the effective date of the extension. Archer v. State, 577 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). At trial, the State introduced testimony of the victim that established that appellant committed the offense during the period January through November 1981. The earliest date upon which the three-year limitation period could have run was January 1, 1984. The limitations period was extended to five years on September 1, 1983; thus, appellant’s indictment was not barred as of the effective date of the extension and the five-year limitation period applied.³

In 1985, the legislature again amended article 12.01. Effective August 26, 1985, approximately two weeks before [19]*19the grand jury returned appellant s indictment, the subsection (3)(C) that listed “rape of a child” as an offense to which a five-year limitation period applied was repealed.⁴ Article 12.01 no longer specifically listed “rape of a child” in any subsection. Therefore, on August 26, 1985, the offense of rape of a child fell into the catch-all three-year limitation period applicable to “all other felonies” contained in subsection (4). Three years from the date of the offense alleged in the indictment was July 15, 1984. Accordingly, appellant’s indictment became barred on August 26, 1985, the effective date of the act shortening the limitation period for “rape of a child” to three years, prohibiting his conviction for that offense.

Appellant’s first point of error is sustained.

The judgment is reversed, and the prosecution ordered dismissed.

HOYT, J., dissents.

³

. We are aware of another amendment to article 12.01 adding a second subsection (3)(C), also effective on September 1, 1983. Ch. 977, sec. 7, 1983 Tex.Gen.Laws 5312. This amendment created a new offense in the Penal Code entitled "sexual assault” and established a limitations period of five years for it. Sections 3 and 7. Although the appellant’s indictment substantially tracks the language of Tex.Pen.Code Ann. sec. 22.011(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.1987), he could not have been charged with sexual assault, nor is the five-year limitations period for sexual assault applicable, because the changes in the law contained in the amendatory act did not apply to offenses committed prior to the act’s effective date, September 1, 1983:

(a) The change in law made by this Act applies only to an offense committed on or after the effective date of this Act.

(b) An offense committed before the effective date of this Act is covered by the law in effect at the time the offense was committed, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose. • For purposes of this section, an offense is committed before the effective date of this Act if any element of the offense occurs before the effective date.

Sections 13 & 14. Therefore, we may not apply the five-year period of limitations for sexual assault because appellant allegedly committed the offense on July 15, 1981, before September 1, 1983, the effective date of the "sexual assault" amendments.

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OPINION

DUNN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction for the felony offense of rape of a child.

On September 12, 1985, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment alleging that on or about July 15, 1981, appellant committed aggravated rape and rape of a child.

After the defense rested, the State waived the count alleging aggravated rape, and the court submitted the case to the jury on the count alleging rape of a child. The jury found appellant guilty, and the court assessed punishment at 10 years confinement.

The appellant contends, in his first point of error, that his conviction is void because the indictment was barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 12.01(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987). We agree.

At the time of the offense, July 15, 1981, the period of limitations for rape of a child was three years from the date of the commission of the offense. Id.1 Effective September 1, 1983, the legislature amended article 12.01 and added subsection (3)(C), extending to five years the limitation period for rape of a child:²

Except as provided in Article 12.03, felony indictments may be presented within these limits, and not afterward:

[[Image here]]

(3) five years from the date of the commission of the offense:

(C) rape, aggravated rape, sexual abuse, aggravated sexual abuse, rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child....

This amendment permissibly extended to five years the limitations period for the offense committed by appellant, unless the offense had been barred by limitations prior to the effective date of the extension. Archer v. State, 577 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). At trial, the State introduced testimony of the victim that established that appellant committed the offense during the period January through November 1981. The earliest date upon which the three-year limitation period could have run was January 1, 1984. The limitations period was extended to five years on September 1, 1983; thus, appellant’s indictment was not barred as of the effective date of the extension and the five-year limitation period applied.³

In 1985, the legislature again amended article 12.01. Effective August 26, 1985, approximately two weeks before [19]*19the grand jury returned appellant s indictment, the subsection (3)(C) that listed “rape of a child” as an offense to which a five-year limitation period applied was repealed.⁴ Article 12.01 no longer specifically listed “rape of a child” in any subsection. Therefore, on August 26, 1985, the offense of rape of a child fell into the catch-all three-year limitation period applicable to “all other felonies” contained in subsection (4). Three years from the date of the offense alleged in the indictment was July 15, 1984. Accordingly, appellant’s indictment became barred on August 26, 1985, the effective date of the act shortening the limitation period for “rape of a child” to three years, prohibiting his conviction for that offense.

Appellant’s first point of error is sustained.

The judgment is reversed, and the prosecution ordered dismissed.

HOYT, J., dissents.

³

. We are aware of another amendment to article 12.01 adding a second subsection (3)(C), also effective on September 1, 1983. Ch. 977, sec. 7, 1983 Tex.Gen.Laws 5312. This amendment created a new offense in the Penal Code entitled "sexual assault” and established a limitations period of five years for it. Sections 3 and 7. Although the appellant’s indictment substantially tracks the language of Tex.Pen.Code Ann. sec. 22.011(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.1987), he could not have been charged with sexual assault, nor is the five-year limitations period for sexual assault applicable, because the changes in the law contained in the amendatory act did not apply to offenses committed prior to the act’s effective date, September 1, 1983:

(a) The change in law made by this Act applies only to an offense committed on or after the effective date of this Act.

(b) An offense committed before the effective date of this Act is covered by the law in effect at the time the offense was committed, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose. • For purposes of this section, an offense is committed before the effective date of this Act if any element of the offense occurs before the effective date.

Sections 13 & 14. Therefore, we may not apply the five-year period of limitations for sexual assault because appellant allegedly committed the offense on July 15, 1981, before September 1, 1983, the effective date of the "sexual assault" amendments.

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734 S.W.2d 17, 1987 Tex. App. LEXIS 7111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beaird-v-state-texapp-1987.

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