Bates v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.

81 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2610, 2000 WL 150809
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Florida
DecidedJanuary 21, 2000
Docket4:97CV394-RH
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 81 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (Bates v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bates v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2610, 2000 WL 150809 (N.D. Fla. 2000).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW OR NEW TRIAL

HINKLE, District Judge.

Plaintiff Donna Bates was an employee of defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc. She asserts that Greyhound fired her because of her race. A jury agreed and awarded damages. Greyhound now moves for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, asserting there was no evidence from which a jury reasonably could have found the firing motivated by race. I deny the motion.

FACTS 1

Ms. Bates’s Employment

Greyhound is a national bus line with corporate headquarters in Dallas, Texas. *1294 Greyhound has district offices in various locations that oversee the individual terminals located in the many cities the company serves. The district office that oversees the Tallahassee terminal is in Savannah, Georgia.

Ms. Bates started work for Greyhound at its Pensacola terminal in 1993. (Tr. 237, 239; Pl.Ex. 249.) In July 1995, she sought and obtained a transfer to the Tallahassee terminal, in order to increase her hours. (Tr. 239.) As a customer service agent, she sold tickets (including for cash) and performed various other duties. (Tr. 241-42.) Ms. Bates was, according to her terminal managers, an excellent employee. (Tr. 113, 134-35.) Greyhound apparently acknowledges this. (Tr. 87.) On May 10, 1996, however, Greyhound fired Ms. Bates, ostensibly because her $496 deposit of one day’s cash receipts was missing when Greyhound’s safe was opened the following morning. (Tr. 254.)

The Cash Deposit System

At the end of each day, each customer service agent balanced his or her cash drawer (much as a bank teller would do), placed his or her cash into an envelope, and inserted the envelope into a freestanding safe on Greyhound’s premises. (Tr. 247-48; Pl.Ex. 249.) Prior to April 1996, Greyhound’s policy called for each customer service agent to have each deposit verified and witnessed by another customer service agent. (Tr. 247-48; PI. Ex. 249.) In April 1996, Greyhound discontinued the requirement for dual verification and witnessing, leaving each customer service agent solely responsible for his or her own deposit. (Tr. 248; Pl.Ex. 245a.)

A Wells Fargo employee, in the presence of a designated Greyhound employee, picked up the deposits directly from the safe the next morning. (Tr. 252-53.) If working properly, the safe could be opened only by the Wells Fargo employee (who had a necessary key) and Greyhound employee jointly, thus assuring that any deposit made by a customer service agent at the end of a day would be present when the safe was opened by the Wells Fargo employee the next morning. (Id.) But the safe did not always work properly; it could be opened without the key by applying pressure to or kicking the handle. (Tr. 211-12.) When terminal manager Sheila Smith learned this in December 1995, she called a repairman, who told her the safe was “just too old, the hinges were bad, the handle would stick.” (Tr. 152.) He said “there wasn’t much he could do to it.” (Id.) The repairman “oiled things, he tightened springs,” (id.), and he changed the key and combination, (Tr. 199), but the safe still could be opened inappropriately, at least if it had not been properly locked; one “had to be real careful” to lock the safe properly. (Tr. 199; see also Tr. 215-16.) Ms. Smith reported the situation to corporate headquarters in Dallas and was promised a response, but she never received one. (Tr. 152-53.) The defective safe remained in use throughout the period at issue. (Tr. 214-15.)

The Missing Deposits

Ms. Bates performed her duty of accounting for her cash proceeds particularly well; she balanced to the penny every day. (Tr. 113.) This placed her performance markedly ahead of at least some other customer service agents. Shortages in the Tallahassee terminal among other customer service agents were not uncommon. (Tr. 119-20, 140-41, 144, 151, 156, 213.)

On two occasions, however, a deposit made by Ms. Bates was missing when the safe was opened the next morning. (Tr. 249-53.)

The first instance was in December 1995 (Tr. 249), when Greyhound’s dual verification and witnessing requirement was still in effect. (Tr. 248.) Ms. Bates and another employee, Barbara James, verified the deposit at issue and dropped it in the safe. (Tr. 249, 151.) It was the absence of this *1295 deposit from the safe the next morning that led to the disclosure by yet another employee, Albert Joseph, that the safe could be opened by pressing on or kicking the handle; Mr. Joseph demonstrated this to then terminal- manager Sheila Smith. (Tr. 211-12, 151-52.) Ms. Smith imposed no discipline on Ms. Bates or, apparently, on Ms. James, because she had no way of knowing whether someone else opened the safe and took the deposit. (Tr. 152.) 2 Greyhound makes no claim that Ms. Bates did anything wrong in her handling of this deposit.

The second missing deposit occurred in May 1996 and led to Ms. Bates’s firing. (Tr. 250-54.) By that time Greyhound no longer required deposits to be verified or witnessed by another employee. (Tr. 248.) Even so, Ms. Bates had continued her practice of having her deposits to the safe witnessed by another employee, perhaps because she did not trust the safe. (Tr. 248, 250-51.) On the afternoon of May 8, 1996, Ms. Bates balanced her transactions and compiled her cash deposit as usual. (Tr. 250-51.) She asked a new employee she had been training to witness her deposit, and the new employee did so. (Tr. 250-51.) Ms. Bates heard the deposit (which included change) drop to the bottom of the safe, assuring it had been properly inserted all the way into the safe. (Tr. 251.)

When the safe was opened by the Wells Fargo representative the next morning, however, Ms. Bates’s deposit was missing. (Tr. 252-53.)

Ms. Bates worked all that day and the next. (Tr. 253-54.) At the end of that next day, May 10, 1996, Greyhound’s new terminal manager Xavier Collins called Ms. Bates into his office. (Tr. 254.) Mr. Collins asked Ms. Bates what happened to her May 8 deposit. (Id.) Ms. Bates said she dropped the deposit in the safe, exactly as she was supposed to do. (Id.) Mr. Collins showed Ms. Bates a standard Greyhound form she had signed saying, “I understand that any mishandling or carelessness related to monies entrusted to my care, in the conduct of the company’s business, will result in my dismissal.” (Pl.Ex. 249; Tr. 254.) Mr. Collins asked Ms. Bates whether it was her signature on the form. (Tr. 254.) When she said it was, Mr. Collins said, “According to this, I have to terminate you.” (Id.) Ms. Bates was fired, effective immediately. (Tr. 254-55.) 3

The testimony in this record is uncontra-dicted that Ms. Bates handled the deposit properly in all respects and that, if Greyhound had checked with the new employee, Greyhound would have been able to verify that. (E.g., Tr. 250-51.) Greyhound apparently makes no claim that Ms.

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Bluebook (online)
81 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2610, 2000 WL 150809, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bates-v-greyhound-lines-inc-flnd-2000.