Bascuñán v. Elsaca

927 F.3d 108
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJune 13, 2019
DocketDocket 18-2731; August Term 2018
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 927 F.3d 108 (Bascuñán v. Elsaca) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 927 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2019).

Opinion

WESLEY, Circuit Judge:

This is the second time we have been asked to decide whether Jorge Yarur Bascuñán and affiliated parties (collectively, "Bascuñán") can sue his cousin Daniel Yarur Elsaca and affiliated parties (collectively, "Elsaca") under civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 ("RICO") for their role in an alleged network of transnational fraudulent schemes. The first time this case was before us, we reversed an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J. ) 1 dismissing Bascuñán's claims as impermissibly extraterritorial. We remanded for the court to consider whether Bascuñán adequately pleaded a domestic injury in light of our opinion and any additional allegations in the then-pending Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). 2 On remand, the district court dismissed the SAC, finding that it failed to allege a domestic injury under RICO, impermissibly relied on extraterritorial applications of RICO predicate statutes, and failed to adequately allege a continuous pattern of racketeering activity. 3 For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

*112 BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background 4

Bascuñán is a resident and citizen of Chile. His grandfather founded Banco de Crédito e Inversiones ("BCI"), the third-largest bank in Chile. His father was the president and controlling shareholder of the bank. In the 1990s, Bascuñán inherited a large fortune from his parents (the "Bascuñán Estate," or "Estate") consisting of numerous companies, financial property, a significant stake in BCI, and a large trust administered in New York. For reasons not relevant here, Bascuñán was unable to manage his fortune at the time his parents died.

In 1999, Bascuñán hired Elsaca, his cousin, to manage the Bascuñán Estate. Elsaca is a citizen and resident of Chile and has a business degree from the London School of Economics. He is also a licensed accountant and prominent economist who formerly led the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (de Chile), which the SAC describes as Chile's equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Soon after Elsaca took the job, he and his attorney, Defendant José Pedro Silva Prado ("Silva"), persuaded Bascuñán to grant Elsaca power of attorney, giving him "complete control" over Bascuñán's finances. J.A. 615. Most notably, Elsaca gained the ability to transfer the Estate's property without obtaining Bascuñán's authorization.

The bulk of the SAC focuses on four sets of alleged schemes to steal and misappropriate money from the Bascuñán Estate that Elsaca conducted individually, with associates, and through alter-ego shell corporations. In total, the SAC alleges that Elsaca stole at least $ 64 million.

1. The New York Trust Account Scheme

The New York Trust Account Scheme involved the misappropriation of assets held in two trusts owned by the Estate. J.P. Morgan set up the "Afghan Trust" in the Cayman Islands in 1998-before Bascuñán hired Elsaca-and has since administered it from New York, where the Afghan Trust's J.P. Morgan bank account is located. The Afghan Trust's stated purpose was funding Bascuñán's charitable endeavors. In 2001, Elsaca asked UBS to set up the "Capri Star Trust." Capri Star was also a Cayman Islands trust purportedly intended to support Bascuñán's charitable endeavors. Elsaca funded the Capri Star Trust with money from the Afghan Trust that he placed in a UBS bank account located and administered in New York. 5 The only members of the Capri Star Trust Committee were Elsaca and Silva.

According to the SAC, the Capri Star Trust was a fraudulent enterprise, the "sole purpose" of which was "generat[ing] sham fees" for Elsaca and Silva. Id. at 617. Elsaca named himself "Investment Advisor" in Capri Star Trust documents and set his advisory fee at 1% per year of the assets under management. He withdrew his advisory fees by contacting UBS employees located in New York using the mail or wires and authorizing them to send money from Capri Star's New York bank *113 account to Elsaca's own accounts. This conduct was fraudulent, the SAC alleges, because Elsaca "provided no investment advice to the Capri Star Trust, whose assets were actively managed by UBS." Id. at 618. In total, Elsaca ordered at least seventeen transfers, totaling more than $ 2.7 million, from the Capri Star Trust to accounts and entities under his control.

Bascuñán also alleges that Elsaca used the Capri Star Trust Account to generate sham legal fees for Silva's law firm. Beginning in October 2001, Silva biannually mailed a $ 20,000 invoice for allegedly fictitious legal work to the Capri Star Trust. Elsaca then used the mail or wires to authorize UBS employees in New York to transfer money from Capri Star's New York bank account to Silva's firm. In 2005, Elsaca faxed a letter to UBS authorizing these biannual payments on a standing basis. Additionally, in 2001, Elsaca authorized a one-time wire transfer of $ 90,000 from Capri Star's New York bank account to Silva. In total, Elsaca sent Silva "at least $ 390,000." Id. at 621.

2. The Anacapri Investment Fund Scheme

The Anacapri Investment Fund Scheme involved four sub-schemes by which Elsaca and others allegedly stole over $ 60 million from the Bascuñán Estate. At the center of this activity was the ANACAPRI Private Investment Fund ("Anacapri"), created by Elsaca in 2003. Elsaca funded Anacapri with $ 48 million from three of Bascuñán's other companies. 6

i. The Fintair Misappropriation. Around June 2003, when the Estate owned Anacapri, Elsaca "caused Anacapri to acquire" Defendant-Appellee Fintair Finance Corp., a British Virgin Islands ("BVI") corporation that Elsaca owned and had formed earlier that year. Id. at 624. This acquisition made Fintair part of the Bascuñán Estate. 7 The SAC alleges that between 2003 and 2009, Elsaca falsely represented to Morgan Stanley that he, rather than the Bascuñán Estate, owned Fintair. Under this guise, Elsaca opened a New York-based Morgan Stanley bank account in Fintair's name and transferred $ 37,850,000 from the Bascuñán Estate into the account. 8 The transfers were directed through Defendant-Appellee GM & E Asset Management S.A. ("GM&E"), a Chilean corporation owned by Defendants-Appellees Cary Equity's Corp. and Hay's Finance Corp., which are themselves BVI corporations owned and controlled by Elsaca. 9 Elsaca then sent money from Fintair's New York bank account to himself and others in approximately 500 separate transfers and check deposits.

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Bluebook (online)
927 F.3d 108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bascunan-v-elsaca-ca2-2019.