Barshop v. United States

192 F.2d 699
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 28, 1952
Docket13142_1
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 192 F.2d 699 (Barshop v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barshop v. United States, 192 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1952).

Opinions

McCORD, Circuit Judge.

We have carefully considered appellant’s motion for rehearing and motion for permission to reargue the case. The two counsel for appellant who appeared before our court to argue this case were given 55 minutes in which to be heard. We are of opinion, in view of the fact that counsel were permitted to argue for almost the maximum time allowable under the rules in support of the appeal, that the motion for oral reargument should be and the same is hereby overruled and denied.

On the merits of the case we have re-examined the entire record and voluminous briefs heretofore filed in the light of the various specifications of error now urged, and further review fails to disclose any error which prejudiced the substantial rights of appellant.

Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that “Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557. We think the errors urged by appellant, if any, come clearly within the orbit of this rule.

Counsel for appellant contends that the ruling of the trial court with respect to the testimony of the witness Dan Dreeben required the appellant to take the witness stand in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. This argument is without merit. Moreover, it is without support in the record. At the trial no intimation was ever given the court by way of objection or exception that such ruling was in prejudice of defendant’s constitutional rights and that it would force him to take the witness stand involuntarily, and we may fairly assume that neither appellant’s counsel nor the trial judge understood at the time that it would have such effect. The record further reveals not only that appellant’s counsel had already advised the court at the time of such ruling that the defendant would take the witness stand, but also that Dreeben was later permitted to testify as desired. Furthermore, no error in this regard was even suggested until the taking of this appeal. Under such circumstances, the ruling complained of did not constitute reversible error. See Molina v. United States, 5 Cir., 162 F.2d 198; United States v. Mascuch, 2 Cir., 111 F.2d 602; Hoskins v. United States, 8 Cir., 4 F.2d 804; Miller v. United States, 5 Cir., 287 F. 864.

[701]*701With reference to the further error alleged in excluding the letter accompanying the check, the case of Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 201, 29 S.Ct. 260, 53 L.Ed. 465, is readily distinguishable under its own facts, and is not controlling upon us here. There the exculpatory letter was written immediately after the charge was made and long before the trial. Here, the check for back income taxes in the amount of $260,105.15 was not mailed to the Collector until eleven days after the. indictment was returned, in spite of the fact that the defendant had been informed by his accountants long beforehand that he owed a large amount in unpaid income taxes. At the same time the self-serving letter was physically attached to the check in an obvious effort to secure its admission into evidence.

However, let us concede for the sake of argument that the exclusion of the self-serving letter accompanying the remittance was erroneous, and that the letter should also have been admitted. Such error, if any, was subsequently cured when the appellant was permitted to take the stand and testify over and over again not only as to everything the letter contained, but much more.1

[702]*702This court, in considering a somewhat similar situation in the recent case of Burton v. United States, 5 Cir., 175 F.2d 960, 965-966, rehearing denied, 5 Cir., 176 F.2d 865, certiorari denied 338 U.S. 909, 70 S.Ct. 347, 94 L.Ed. 560, has ruled: “Astorias fully testified in this trial that he was thus put in fear about his income taxes and got him a lawyer and on the lawyer’s advice and in his company he went to the district attorney and told all he knew, and was allowed to pay his income tax deficiency with penalties. There was thus already in evidence without contradiction all that these lengthy documents (Grand Jury records and prior statement) would tend to show on this line. If there was error in excluding pertinent parts of them offered for this not clearly expressed purpose, we do not think it is reversible error.” Cf. Dean v. United States, 5 Cir., 246 F. 568, 575; Garantlo v. United States, 8 Cir., 246 F. 910, 912-914; cf. also Hair v. United States, 7 Cir., 240 F. 333, 337; see also 3 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error p. 585, Sec. 1030 et seq.; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 1749 et seq., page 1057; cf. York v. United States, 9 Cir., 241 F. 656, 658.

It therefore becomes patent that if error was committed by the court in excluding the.letter accompanying the check it was error without injury, for the same proof was offered and admitted repeatedly throughout the record in defendant’s own testimony and that of his witnesses. The record is replete with defendant’s statements as to his good faith elicited from him through his counsel by means of improper and leading questions, to which no objection was interposed by the Government. Under such circumstances, when the evidence is so overwhelming as to appellant’s guilt, it is not our province to reverse the conviction merely because the jury did not believe appellant’s testimony that he never knew until after he was indicted that he owed the Government over a quarter of a million dollars. The jury listened to every phase of the evidence, heard the defendant’s every explanation and listened to a charge that was not only full and fair but emphasized repeatedly that he must go free unless they believed him guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. Thereafter they brought in a verdict of guilty as charged in all five counts of the indictment. We are unable to find any reversible error in this case, and the application for rehearing is therefore

Denied.

RUSSELL, Circuit Judge,

adheres to the views heretofore expressed in his concurrence in the judgment of affirmance and concurs in the order denying the petition for rehearing.

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Barshop v. United States
192 F.2d 699 (Fifth Circuit, 1952)

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Bluebook (online)
192 F.2d 699, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barshop-v-united-states-ca5-1952.