Barrett v. Apple Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided June 13, 2022·No. 5:20-cv-04812·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 CARL BARRETT, et al., Case No. 5:20-cv-04812-EJD 9 Plaintiffs, AMENDED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 10 v. MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DENYING 11 APPLE INC., et al., MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TO STAY 30(B)(6) DEPOSITION Defendants. 12 13 Re: Dkt. No. 61 14 15 Plaintiffs Carl Barrett, Michel Polston, Nancy Martin, Douglas Watson, Eric Marinbach, 16 Michael Rodriguez, Maria Rodriguez, Guanting Qiu, and Andrew Hagene bring this putative class 17 action against Defendants Apple, Inc., Apple Value Services LLC (collectively, “Apple”), and 18 Does 1-100. In their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiffs assert the following claims: 19 (1)unfair practices in violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. 20 Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.; (2) unfair practices in violation of the California Unfair Competition 21 Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; (3) unlawful practices in violation of the CLRA; 22 (4)unlawful practices in violation of the UCL; (5) deceptive practices in violation of the CLRA; 23 (6)deceptive practices under the UCL; (7) violation of the California False Advertising Law 24 (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500; (8) receiving, retaining, withholding, or concealing 25 stolen property in violation of California Penal Code § 496; (9) conversion; (10) aiding and 26 abetting intentional torts; and (11) declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. First Am. Class 27 Action Compl. (“FAC”), Dkt. No. 59. 1 Before the Court is Apple’s motion to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 2 Procedure 12(b)(6), as well as Apple’s motion for a protective order to stay depositions pursuant 3 to Rule 30(b)(6). Defs. Apple Inc. and Apple Value Servs., LLC’s Not. of Mot. and Mot. to 4 Dismiss First Am. Compl. (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 61; Defs. Apple Inc. and Apple Value Servs., LLC’s 5 Not. of Mot. and Mot. for Protective Order to Stay 30(b)(6) Deposition, Dkt. No. 85. The Court 6 finds the matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having 7 considered the parties’ written submission, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 8 the motion to dismiss and DENIES the motion for a protective order. 9 I. BACKGROUND 10 A. Factual Background 11 Defendant Apple Inc. is a California corporation with its principal place of business in 12 Cupertino, California. FAC ¶ 16. Apple Value Services, LLC, is a Virginia corporation with its 13 principal place of business in Cupertino, California. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiffs are residents of Maryland, 14 Oregon, California, New York, Massachusetts, and Missouri, all of whom fell victim to scams 15 involving the purchase of Apple’s App Store & iTunes gift cards. Id. ¶¶ 7-15, 112-177. 16 The Federal Trade Commission has reported that, between 2015 and 2019, scammers stole 17 more than $93.5 million by carrying out a formulaic gift card scam. FAC ¶ 58. FTC data 18 indicates that gift card scammers steal more and more money with each passing year. Id. Gift 19 card scammers stole approximately $24.4 million in 2019 alone, and $29.4 million in 2020 alone. 20 Id. These figures may indicate only a fraction of the theft occurring each year, as many scam 21 victims may not file a report. Id. About a quarter of all reported gift card scams involve Apple 22 gift cards. Id. 23 According to Plaintiffs, the scam works as follows: The scammer contacts an individual. 24 Id. ¶¶ 63-71. The scammer induces panic or urgency in the individual or otherwise induces the 25 individual to give money to the scammer. Id. The scammer may, for example, tell the individual 26 that the individual has a time-sensitive opportunity to receive a vaccine for COVID-19. Id. The 27 scammer tells the individual that the individual can transfer money to the scammer by using 1 iTunes gift cards. Id. The scammer tells the individual to go to a nearby retailer to buy one or 2 more gift cards. Id. The scammer tells the individual to give to the scammer the unique code(s) 3 located on the back of the gift card(s). Id. If the individual complies, the scammer may ask the 4 individual to purchase more gift cards and share their codes as well. Id. 5 Once the scammer is in possession of a gift card code, the scammer is in possession of the 6 value associated with the gift card—at least until the individual who was the victim of the scam or 7 someone else with access to the code uses up that value. Id. At this point, the scammer does one 8 of two things. Id. The scammer may sell the code to a third party in exchange for money. Id. 9 Alternatively, the scammer may input the code into an Apple ID account controlled by the 10 scammer. Id. If the scammer inputs the code into their Apple ID account, the scammer can use 11 the value of the gift card as if it were their own and carry out transactions in either the iTunes 12 Store or the App Store. Id. For example, the scammer may purchase songs or movies on iTunes, 13 or they may spend the money on or within applications (“apps”) controlled by a third party. Id. 14 Some apps are free but some cost money to download; moreover, some apps allow or induce users 15 to pay money within the app itself—for example, to get access to special features of the app. Id. 16 In a typical version of the scam, however, the scammer will not spend the gift card value in 17 the iTunes Store or on or within third-party apps. Id. Instead, scammers spend the value on or 18 within an app that the scammer theirself controls. Id. This means that, prior to contacting the 19 individual and inducing the individual to buy a gift card, the scammer has often already created 20 their own app or otherwise obtained control over an app someone else created. Id. In order to 21 create an app offered in Apple’s App Store, one must become an Apple Developer. Id. ¶¶ 33-36. 22 To become an Apple Developer, one must create an Apple ID, enroll in the Apple Developer 23 Program, enter into the Apple Developer Program License Agreement, and pay a fee of $99 per 24 year. Id. Whenever a purchase is made on or within an app (either with gift card value or with 25 other loaded monetary value), Apple retains 100% of the value of that purchase until 26 approximately 45 days after the end of the fiscal month, at which point Apple either pays 70% of 27 the value to the Apple Developer controlling the app or retains the entire amount based on indicia 1 of fraud. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 71. Either way, Apple retains at least 30% of the value. Id. The scam, or at 2 least one cycle of the scam, is complete when the Apple Developer-scammer receives their 3 payment from Apple. The scammer has at this point effectively converted gift card codes into 4 money. 5 Plaintiffs allege that Apple has control of its iTunes and App Store such that it knew or 6 should have known about specific iTunes gift card scams as they were occurring or soon after they 7 occurred. See, e.g., id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs allege that Apple knew or should have known: which 8 Apple IDs had uploaded the codes of stolen gift cards; which iTunes Store or App Store purchases 9 had been made with the value uploaded from stolen gift cards; and which Apple Developer 10 accounts were associated with purchases made with the value uploaded from stolen gift cards. See, 11 e.g., id. ¶ 73. More generally, Plaintiffs allege that Apple knew or should have known how the 12 iTunes gift card scam works, and that it is a widespread and impactful phenomenon. See, e.g., 13 FAC ¶ 63.

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Barrett v. Apple Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2022).

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