Barnes v. the Railroads

84 U.S. 294, 21 L. Ed. 544, 17 Wall. 294, 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1328
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided March 18, 1873·Published·Cited by 16 cases

Opinions

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD,

now, March 8d, 1873, delivered, the judgment of the court in all the cases, dividing them, as they had been argued, into two classes; the first class being where the dividend was declared prior to the 1st of January, 1870, and made payable afterwards; the second where it had been both declared and made payable afterwards.

I. IN THE EIRST CLASS.

Power to lay and collect taxes for Federal purposes, being vested exclusively in Congress, it becomes necessary,.whenever the validity of such a tax is drawn in question, to examine the act imposing the tax, as the question in every case must necessarily. depend upon its true construction, unless it appears that the tax is not apportioned as requii’ed, or not uniform, or the object taxed is one not taxable for such a purpose.'

Railroad companies indebted for any money for which bonds or other evidences of indebtedness have been issued, payable in one or more years after date, subject to interest or with coupons representing interest, are by the 122d section of the act of the 13th of July, 1866, made liable to the infernal revenue tax imposed by that section.

Provisions upon the subject differing essentially from [300] those contained in that section had previously been enacted; but the Congress, on that day, amended the corresponding section in the prior law by striking out all after the enactiug clause, and inserting in lieu thereof the section under consideration, which also provides that “ ány such company that may have declared any dividend in scrip or money, due or payable to its stockholders, including non-residents, whether citizens or aliens, as part of the earnings, profits, income, or gains of such company, and all profits of such company, carried to the account of any fund, or used for construction, shall be subject to, and pay a tax of 5 per centum on the amount of all such interest or coupons, dividends or profits, whenever and wherever the same shall be payable, and to whatsoever party or person the same may be payable, including non-residents, whether citizens or aliens.”*

By the act incorporating the railroad company it was provided that the dividends of so much of the profits of the company as it should appear advisable to the managers should be declared at least twice in every .year, payable to the stockholders subsequent to the expiration of ten days from the time it was so declared.

Apart from that it also appears that the railroad company, on the 22d of December, 1869, declared a dividend in money amounting in the whole to the sum of $1,527,531.59 on their capital stock, as part of their earnings, profits, incomes, and gains made, and which accrued between the 1st ot July of that year and the 1st of December of the same year. None of these matters are controverted, but .the dividend, though it accrued during the period described, and was declared at the date specified, was made payable to the stockholders on the 17th of January following, as appears by the record.

Due return of the said dividend, as required.by law, was made by-the railroad company to the assessor of the first collection district, and the proper revenue authorities assessed a tax of 5 per centum upon the. said dividend, amounting to the sum of $76,376.58, which the railroad company was required to pay within the period prescribed by law.

[301] Payment of the tax having been refused, after due notice given and demand made, the collector, and the other two defendants as his deputies, distrained the goods and chattels mentioned in the declaration to secure and enforce the payment of the tax, penalty, and interest, as directed in the warrant from the assessor. Distraint was made in due form, but the corporation plaintiffs, denying the legality of the tax, brought an action of trespass against the collector and his deputies in the State court to test that question, and the record shows that the suit, on the petition of the defendants, was regularly removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for trial. Both parties appeared in the Circuit Court, and the plaintiffs having filed their declaration the defendants pleaded the general issue, and' also a special plea, in bar of the action, setting up substantially the same matters as those set forth in the preceding statement. Issue was joined upon the first plea, but the plaintiffs demurred to the second, insisting that the matters pleaded do not constitute any defence to the action which is the principal question in the case. Judgment'was rendered for the plaiutiffs in the Circuit Court, and the defendants sued out a writ of error and removed the cause into this court.

Questions of importance to the parties, it may be conceded, are presented in the record for the decision of the court, but it must be admitted that they are all mere questions as to the construction of the act imposing the tax, as it is not pi’etended that the object taxed is one not taxable for Federal purposes, nor that the regulations prescribed for. the assessment and collection of the tax are subject to any constitutional objections. Stripped of every difficulty of that kind, as the case confessedly is, the great central question which arises is, what did the lawmakers mean when they enacted that any such company that may have declared any dividend in scrip or money, due or payable to its stockholders, including non-resideuts, whether citizens or aliens, as part of the earnings, profits, income, or gains of such company, and all profits of such company carried to the account of any fund, or used for construction, shall be [302] subject to and pay a tax of 5 per centum on the amount of all such interest or coupons, dividends or profits, whenever and wherever the same shall be payable ?”

Congress, it is .insisted by the United States, intended to tax that accrued fund in the hands of the railroad company, in whatever form it might be; whether it existed as accumulated interest or in coupons representing interest, or in a dividend declared, or in a special fund of any kind, and without respect to the time of payment or the person or persons to whom it was ultimately payable. .Ev.ery element of that proposition is denied by the plaintiffs, and as a means of refuting it they have entered into an extended and critical review of all the principal features of the prior acts providing for the collection of internal revenue duties.

Where a section or clause of a statute is ambiguous, much aid, it is admitted, may be derived in ascertaining its meaning by comparing the section or clause in question with prior statutes in pari materiti, but it cannot be admitted that such a resort is a proper one where the language employed by the legislature is plain and free of all uncertainty, as the true rule in such a case is to hold that the statute speaks its own construction.

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Barnes v. the Railroads, 84 U.S. 294, 21 L. Ed. 544, 17 Wall. 294, 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1328 (1873).

84 U.S. 294 (Barnes v. the Railroads) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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