Barnes v. State

170 S.W. 548, 75 Tex. Crim. 188, 1914 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 611
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas·Decided March 11, 1914·No. No. 2689.·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinions

Appellant was prosecuted under complaint and *Page 191 information containing two counts, one charging him with soliciting and taking orders for intoxicating liquors, the other for keeping and maintaining a cold storage, a place where intoxicating liquors were kept for others.

Appellant waived a jury and submitted his case to the court, and he was found guilty on both counts. The validity of both of these laws has heretofore been passed on by this court, and both have been sustained. (Edmanson v. State, 64 Tex. Crim. 413, 142 S.W. Rep., 887, and Ex parte Flake, 67 Tex. Crim. 216, 149 S.W. Rep., 146.) After a careful review of this question we see no reason to change our views as to the validity of these laws. So the only question presented by this record is, does the evidence show that appellant has been guilty of violating these laws.

The evidence would show that when prohibition was adopted in Marshall some members of the Elks' Lodge at that place organized an auxiliary society, the purpose of which was to obtain and keep for their own use intoxicating liquors. A plan was adopted which, it may be said, in behalf of those joining this auxiliary society, they did not think would be in violation of the law, but their good faith in this matter can not avail them, for if they were mistaken it would be a mistake of law and not a mistake of fact. They employed attorneys to devise for them a scheme or plan whereby they could obtain and keep intoxicating liquors on hand to be used by them in such quantities and at such times as they desired. But it appears to us that in an effort to evade the law, instead of doing so, a plan was devised that would be in violation of almost every law we have regulating and prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, and if this scheme could be lawfully carried out our prohibitory laws instead of being denominated prohibitory, should be labeled "laws to enable liquor to be sold without any regulation and without paying any tax."

The society was organized, a place rented, bar-room fixtures installed, a porter employed, who was to fill the place of bar-tender in the ordinary saloon. No orders were solicited in words, but they agreed amongst themselves they would place a locked box on the end of the bar counter, and each member who desired intoxicating liquor should write his name on a slip of paper, place in an envelope the amount of money he desired to expend that week for liquors, and drop the envelope in the box. It was first stipulated that a secretary should be elected, who would carry the key to this box, and would take out the name, money, etc., and order the liquors. When it was received by the society the secretary would then issue to him a card entitling him to the amount of liquor he had ordered, to be drunk when he pleased during that week. The evidence would show that only beer has been ordered, and if a man placed in a dollar, he would get a ticket entitling him to twenty glasses of beer, and so on, the beer always being calculated at 5 cents a glass, the same as the price at a regular saloon. The secretary was to take the money, figure the cost of rent, ice, etc., for one week, deduct this amount, and *Page 192 then order beer in bulk with the remainder of the money, and when received, keep it on ice, and have it dealt out to the holder of the ticket by the porter when called for. It is claimed if the beer did not hold out a man lost that much of his ticket, but if there was more beer than the ticket called for, then it was drunk indiscriminately by the members of the society free. In this wise a regular beer saloon was maintained by the members of the society and they could get their ice cold beer on tap at any and all times. However, the evidence would show that no secretary was elected, and the first year it was operated Mr. Clark, who was an officer of the lodge, attended to all the duties supposed to be performed by the secretary of the society; carried the key to the box, once weekly took out the money, calculated the expense, and then ordered beer with the remainder; issued tickets to those contributing the money, and had the porter keep it on ice and serve the members. When he ceased to be an officer appellant took over the business for one week and attended to it, and since then it has been understood and agreed that some member of the society should do so weekly. The only pay or consideration that he was to or would receive would be that if he attended to it one week, some other member would voluntarily attend to the business the next week. But each and every one was informed that if he desired intoxicating liquors it was only necessary to place the money in the box, with his name, and it would be forthcoming the next week. The placing of this box on the bar counter, with the understanding that the beer would be ordered, was but an invitation to do so, as much as if express personal solicitation had been made. It was an attempted evasion of the law, while the very thing to be done was what the law prohibited. He took the orders for beer out of the box, ordered the beer, and had it delivered to the person giving the order. He violated not only the express letter of the law, but its spirit and intent as well.

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Barnes v. State, 170 S.W. 548, 75 Tex. Crim. 188, 1914 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 611 (Tex. 1914).

170 S.W. 548 (Barnes v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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