Barnes v. New York State

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 22, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-01138
StatusUnknown

This text of Barnes v. New York State (Barnes v. New York State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barnes v. New York State, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JERMAINE BARNES, Plaintiff, 23-CV-1138 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL NEW YORK STATE, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, alleges that he is a civil detainee at the Central New York Psychiatric Center. He brings this action seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from the State of New York for his civil confinement in a maximum security prison in 2018, and in a jail facility in 2019, after he had fully served his sentence of conviction. By order dated February 10, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the action. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must

1 For purposes of the filing fee, a prisoner is defined as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Plaintiff alleges that he is civilly committed, and public records indicate that his sentences for his 1989 and 1999 convictions are fully served. See, e.g., Barnes v. Superintendent, No. 18-CV-6555 (LLS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2018) (“[T]he maximum expiration date of Plaintiff’s 1999 sentence was February 26, 2018, and he was “discharged” from DOCCS custody to another agency on July 25, 2018.”). The Court therefore does not consider him a prisoner for purposes of the filing fee. also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Jermaine Barnes alleges the following: I was wrongfully confined in maximum security prison for 5 months and in jail for 5 3/5 months, without being charged with committing any crime. I was held in Clinton C.F. from 4-26-18 to 7-25-18, in Green Haven C.F. from 2-26-18 to 4-26- 18, and in Rikers Island Jail (West Facility) from 1-9-19 to 6-27-19. My tort claim against New York State for the above was dismissed on 9-26-22. (ECF 2 at 4.) Plaintiff names the State of New York as the sole defendant in this action, and he seeks $1.5 million in damages. (Id. at 5.)

DISCUSSION A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity Plaintiff’s suit for damages against the State of New York, under Section 1983, cannot proceed in federal court. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting Section 1983, and New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977) (New York “consents to be

sued upon condition that the claimant brings suit in the [New York] Court of Claims”). The Eleventh Amendment therefore bars Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the State of New York from proceeding in federal court, and this suit is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). See Wallace v. New York, 40 F. Supp. 3d 278, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Plaintiffs cannot challenge the State’s sex offender regime by asserting claims against the State itself” because the State enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity). B. Leave to Amend District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects unless it would be futile to do so. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Here, Plaintiff can be understood as bringing a claim that, as a civilly committed sex

offender (or sex offender with pending civil commitment proceedings), he was detained in punitive conditions that violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (considering claims about conditions of confinement brought by an individual who was civilly committed, as a sexually dangerous person, in U.S. Bureau of Prisons custody); Jones v. Blanas,

Related

Ex Parte Young
209 U.S. 123 (Supreme Court, 1908)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Oscar W. Jones v. Lou Blanas County of Sacramento
393 F.3d 918 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Gollomp v. Spitzer
568 F.3d 355 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Thomas Matherly v. J.F. Andrews
859 F.3d 264 (Fourth Circuit, 2017)
Wallace v. State
40 F. Supp. 3d 278 (E.D. New York, 2014)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Barnes v. New York State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barnes-v-new-york-state-nysd-2023.