Barker v. Weatherford Police Department

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: April 2, 2026
• Docket: 25-6069
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 2, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court DERRICK DUANE BARKER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-6069 (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-00235-R) CITY OF WEATHERFORD EX REL. (W.D. Okla.) WEATHERFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT; RYAN HETHERINGTON; SEAN LANIER; NORMANDO GUYTON; DYLAN OWENS; DEREK BECK; CHASE MURLEY; JUSTIN BLATNICK; HAGAN ARD, in their individual capacities,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before HARTZ, KELLY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Derrick Barker brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging officers of the

City of Weatherford Police Department used excessive force while arresting him

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 2

following a traffic stop. Barker brought his civil rights claims against the City of

Weatherford and the eight individual officers who took part in his arrest.

The officers asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment.

The district court granted their motion, finding Barker failed to show the officers

violated a constitutional right, and even if they had, the constitutional right the

officers allegedly violated was not clearly established. This appeal followed.

We AFFIRM because we agree with the district court on both prongs of the

qualified immunity analysis.

I. Background 1

On the evening of November 27th, 2021, Officer Hetherington observed

Barker driving his vehicle in Weatherford, Oklahoma without his vehicle tag

illuminated, and conducted a traffic stop. See Hetherington Dash at 00:39–00:44

1 Barker disputes the district court’s recitation of the facts. He argues the district court “relied on inaccurate facts” and “ignored material facts,” although he concedes “[t]he district court correctly identifies the facts of the incident up until Mr. Barker is tased.” Aplt. Br. at 10, 13–17. But because two separate dash cameras and three different officer body cameras captured the incident, we take “what is indisputably shown by the videos . . . as a matter of fact.” Kapinski v. City of Albuquerque, 964 F.3d 900, 903 n.2 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)). And although under the summary judgment standard we view the facts in the light most favorable to Barker as the nonmoving party, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), we will not adopt a version of the facts that is “blatantly contradicted by the record, [such] that no reasonable jury could believe it,” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. After a careful analysis of the videos, we agree with the district court’s characterization of the incident.

The Appellees submitted the dash and body camera videos as supplemental appendices 9–13. See Supp. App. 9 (“Hetherington Dash”); Supp. App. 10 (“Hetherington Body”); Supp. App. 11 (“Owens Dash”); Supp. App. 12 (“Owens Body”); Supp. App. 13 (“Guyton Body”). 2 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 3

(Barker’s vehicle tag not illuminated). Barker parked his vehicle, stepped out of it

while the engine was still running, and walked toward Hetherington’s police cruiser.

Hetherington instructed Barker to get back into his vehicle three times, but Barker

did not comply. Hetherington then radioed for backup.

Barker eventually returned to his vehicle and reached in to grab a cell phone.

Heatherington approached Barker, again instructing him to get in his vehicle, and

asked him why he got out of his vehicle. Barker responded, “I just got out of the

vehicle.” Hetherington Body at 00:57. Barker then reached in his vehicle again,

turned back toward Hetherington, and put his hand in his pocket. Hetherington

instructed Barker a fifth time to get in his vehicle. In response, Barker slowly turned

to his vehicle and spent several seconds rummaging inside it, before finally sitting in

the driver’s seat.

Hetherington informed Barker that he pulled him over because his license

plate was not illuminated. Without speaking, Barker exited his vehicle, and

attempted to move past Hetherington toward the rear of the vehicle. Hetherington

placed his hand on Barker’s chest, extended his arm, and instructed Barker to get

back in his vehicle. Barker did not comply, but instead raised his hand to point to the

rear of the vehicle, stating he wanted to check his tag light. Hetherington again

instructed Barker to return to his vehicle, at which point Barker swiped

Hetherington’s hand away from his chest and yelled, “Get your hand off me!”

Hetherington Body at 01:31–01:33. Hetherington warned that he would arrest Barker

3 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 4

for obstruction if he did not comply. Barker still refused to comply and attempted to

force his way around Hetherington.

Hetherington then informed Barker he was under arrest, grabbed Barker’s arm,

and commanded him to put his hands behind his back. Barker pulled his arm away

and attempted to get back into his vehicle. Hetherington grabbed Barker’s arm again,

to which Barker exclaimed, “This has gone far enough,” before pulling himself back

into his vehicle. Hetherington Body at 01:49. During this struggle, Hetherington

commanded Barker to put his hands behind his back at least four times, yet Barker

never complied. Hetherington finally backed away and pulled out his taser.

While pointing his taser at Barker, Hetherington commanded him to exit his

vehicle. Barker responded, “First you tell me to get in, now you want me to get out?”

Hetherington Body at 02:13. Hetherington instructed Barker to exit his vehicle at

least six times before Officer Lanier arrived, at which point Hetherington asked

Lanier to “cover” Barker with his taser so Hetherington could remove Barker from

the vehicle. Id. at 02:36–02:40. For about fifteen seconds, Hetherington tried to pull

Barker from his vehicle, but Barker resisted by bracing himself and holding onto the

steering wheel. Id. at 02:41–57; Hetherington Dash at 03:23–03:38. During that

time, both officers continued to demand that Barker exit his vehicle and warned him

he would be tased if he did not comply. After Lanier issued a final warning,

Hetherington instructed Lanier to tase Barker.

Officers Owens and Guyton arrived just after Lanier tased Barker, to which

Owens observed that Barker was “still fighting.” Owens Body at 00:33; Guyton

4 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 5

Body at 00:33. Guyton ran to help Hetherington remove Barker from his still-

running vehicle, while Owens deployed his baton. After being tased, Barker was still

sitting upright, holding onto the steering wheel with his right hand, Owens Body

at 00:44, and had both feet inside the vehicle, Owens Dash at 01:24; Guyton Body

at 00:43. Hetherington and Guyton then extracted Barker from his vehicle. While

the officers tried to pull Barker to the ground, Barker planted his feet and pushed

himself back toward his vehicle. Id. at 00:45; Owens Dash at 01:30; Owens Body

at 00:45. Guyton tried to sweep Barker’s legs with his foot, and Owens struck

Barker’s right leg below the knee with his baton. Id. at 00:46; Hetherington Dash

at 04:00–04:02; Owens Dash at 01:30–01:34. Yet Barker remained standing. Id.

at 01:34. Owens then struck Barker’s legs again below the knees while Guyton

attempted another leg sweep; this time Barker fell to the ground. Id. at 01:35;

Owens Body at 00:47; Guyton Body at 00:47. Owens wound up for a third baton

strike, but stopped his swing when he saw Barker fall. Hetherington Dash at 04:03.

Barker landed on his right side with both hands out in front of him, before

turning onto his stomach. Owens Body at 00:47–00:48. Hetherington and Guyton

got on top of Barker and tried to pull his arms behind his back, but Barker resisted

and placed his palms on the ground out to either side of his body. Owens Dash

at 01:37; Hetherington Body at 03:26; Guyton Body at 00:57. After watching his

colleagues struggle to secure Barker’s hands for several seconds, Owens performed

an x-bar pressure point maneuver on Barker’s left shin. Owens Dash at 01:42;

Owens Body at 00:54. Hetherington and Owens were then able to move Barker’s

5 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 6

hands behind his back, at which point Owens stopped the x-bar maneuver and put his

baton away. Id. at 01:03; Hetherington Body at 03:29; Owens Dash at 01:45–01:51;

Hetherington Dash at 04:08–04:18. Hetherington then handcuffed Barker and

arrested him.

II. Discussion

Barker contends that he has produced sufficient evidence for a jury to find that

the officers deployed excessive force when they subdued him after tasing him for

failing to exit his car.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity

grounds de novo. Kapinski, 964 F.3d at 904. But “our review of summary judgment

orders in the qualified immunity context differs from that applicable to . . . other

summary judgment decisions” because “[q]ualified immunity is intended to give

officials ‘breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments.’” Id. (quoting

Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013)). Accordingly, when a public official asserts

qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

demonstrate: (1) the official violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was

clearly established at the time of the official’s alleged violation. Id. at 905.

Constitutional Violation

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable seizures,

which bars government officials from using “excessive force” to effect an arrest.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). To analyze a claim of excessive force,

we determine “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of 6 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 7

the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying

intent or motivation.” Id. at 397. This analysis requires us to judge the use of force

from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20

vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. Because “police officers are often forced to make

split-second judgments” under stressful and dangerous conditions, the Supreme Court

has cautioned that “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary

in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted). With these considerations in mind, we look to

the following Graham factors to assess the reasonableness of the officers’ use of

force: (1) the crime’s severity; (2) the potential threat posed by the suspect to the

officers’ safety and the public; and (3) whether the suspect was resisting arrest or

attempting to flee. Helvie v. Jenkins, 66 F.4th 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

Barker admits on appeal that the officers initially tasing him was “arguably []

reasonable” because it was only “minimal force.” Aplt. Br. at 20–21. But Barker

argues the officers’ subsequent use of force was unreasonable because he was

effectively subdued by the tasing. The post-tasing force that Barker alleges was

excessive includes Hetherington and Guyton removing Barker from his vehicle and

pulling him to the ground, Owens striking Barker twice on the shins with a baton, and

Owens performing the x-bar maneuver on his left leg. 2 After reviewing the videos,

2 An x-bar maneuver is a pain compliance technique where the officer uses his baton as leverage to apply pressure to sensitive body areas—here, Barker’s shin—so 7 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 8

and considering the circumstances confronting the officers, we conclude all three

Graham factors justify the level of force the officers used to arrest Barker.

The first factor, the severity of the crime at issue, might have weighed against

the use of force had the incident remained a routine encounter for a traffic violation.

Barker, however, “quickly escalated the situation” by refusing to comply with

Hetherington’s many legitimate commands, which resulted in Hetherington trying to

arrest Barker for obstruction. Helvie, 66 F.4th at 1241. The officers were thus

justified using “additional force to overcome [Barker’s] resistance to being removed

from his” vehicle. Id. As a result, the crimes at issue that required the officers’ use

of force, including obstruction and resisting arrest (and arguably attempting escape

from an officer)—are severe crimes that we have found to justify similar force in

previous cases. See id. at 1233–34, 1241 (finding officer was justified in dragging

the plaintiff from his car and dropping a knee on his chest—resulting in two fractured

ribs—because the plaintiff obstructed the officer and resisted arrest). This factor

accordingly favors the officers.

The second Graham factor, whether Barker posed an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or the public, also favors the officers. Barker’s behavior from

the start of the traffic stop was unusual, when he immediately exited his vehicle and

the officer may gain control over an active resister. Barker also alleges that while he was on the ground someone punched his body two times. Aplt. Br. at 7. He admits, however, that the punches are “not clear” in the videos. Id. From our review of the five videos, which cover multiple angles, we see nothing to indicate that any of the officers punched Barker. 8 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 9

walked toward Hetherington. 3 Barker’s unusual behavior quickly turned

confrontational when he refused to comply with Hetherington’s orders and repeatedly

reached into his vehicle and pants pocket. Additionally, throughout the incident,

Barker left his car running and his “path was not blocked by any police car.” Helvie,

66 F.4th at 1241. An objective officer in Hetherington’s situation might reasonably

have suspected Barker was perhaps “driving while impaired, thus presenting a

possible danger to the public if he were to flee and also suggesting that [Barker]

might have been acting with impaired judgment which might lead him to try to flee.”

Id.; see also Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007) (“An officer

could reasonably be concerned that Mecham might create a danger to herself or

others if not first subdued” when “she had her keys and [was in] control of the car

while refusing to cooperate.”). And even after Lanier tased Barker, potentially

neutralizing any safety concerns about his potential flight, Barker remained a threat

to the officers. The officers had no way of knowing whether Barker was armed, and

his arms and legs remained unsecured inside the car. Considering these facts, the

second factor justifies the officers’ use of force after tasing Barker. See id. (“With

the benefit of hindsight, one might have hoped for a different resolution,” but “[i]n

3 Barker argues this behavior was not unusual or aggressive because “other officers knew” Hetherington’s usual practice during a traffic stop was to have people exit their vehicle and approach his car. Aplt. Br. at 8. But even if true, that does not explain why Barker exited his vehicle before Hetherington ordered him to do so. Also, when Hetherington pulled Barker over, Barker stated that he did not get pulled over often, see Hetherington Body at 01:04; so it is unlikely Barker was accustomed to Hetherington’s alleged usual practice. 9 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 10

making an arrest, officers may inevitably ‘use some degree of physical coercion or

threat thereof to effect it.’” (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)).

The final factor, whether Barker actively resisted arrest, similarly justifies the

officers’ post-tasing use of force. The crux of Barker’s argument is that he was

“physically incapacitated after being tased” and thus incapable of resisting arrest.

Aplt. Br. at 16. He argues that at the very least, whether he was effectively subdued

by the tasing is a dispute of material fact a jury should decide. The video evidence,

however, shows otherwise; we do not credit his version of events that the record

contradicts. Scott, 550 U.S. at 372.

First, Barker argues his “body went horizontal” after Lanier tased him and that

“he was no longer in control of his body.” Aplt. Br. at 5. But the videos show that

after Lanier tased him, Barker was still sitting upright and holding onto the steering

wheel with his right hand before Hetherington and Guyton pulled him from the

vehicle.

10 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 11

Owens Body at 00:44. The officers were therefore justified in using force to remove

Barker from the vehicle. See Valencia v. De Luca, 612 F. App’x 512, 518–19

(10th Cir. 2015) (upholding officers’ conduct in “pulling on” a driver to get him out

of his vehicle by “using pressure points, and twisting his wrist and arm,” when the

driver was actively resisting arrest by “bracing his legs against the floorboard and

grabbing onto the steering wheel”). 4

Second, Barker argues a jury could conclude he was incapacitated because he

was “unable to stand on his own” after the tasing. Aplt. Br. at 16. The videos,

however, show that after Hetherington and Guyton pulled Barker from his vehicle, he

stood on his legs, pushed his body back toward his vehicle, and resisted the officers’

4 Barker argues the district court’s citation to Valencia and Simpson v. Kansas, see infra, was improper because they are unpublished cases. The district court cited those cases, as we do here as well, as illustrative factually analogous cases for its Graham analysis under the first prong of qualified immunity. 11 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 12

attempts to pull him to the ground. Barker alleges the officers were holding him up,

yet the videos show the opposite—the officers tried to get him on the ground by

sweeping his legs and pulling him down.

Owens Dash at 01:34.

Third, Barker claims he was not resisting the officers’ attempts to move his

hands behind his back, but instead, the officers could not secure his hands because

they were pinned beneath his incapacitated body. But again, the videos contradict

Barker’s story. While on the ground, Barker’s hands were out to either side of his

body and the officers only successfully secured his hands after Owens performed the

x-bar maneuver.

12 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 13

Owens Dash at 01:42.

At bottom, the video evidence shows Barker was not incapacitated after Lanier

tased him. We thus agree with the district court that Barker was still actively

resisting arrest and the officers’ subsequent use of physical force was reasonable

under the third Graham factor. See Mecham, 500 F.3d at 1206 (“The pepper spray

here was used to subdue and remove an uncooperative and unresponsive, belligerent

traffic violator from the car she still controlled, not to further incapacitate an already

subdued suspect.”); Simpson v. Kansas, 593 F. App’x 790, 796–97 (10th Cir. 2014)

(upholding officer’s use of force to remove an uncooperative motorist, which

included pulling motorist from her vehicle, throwing her on the ground, and putting a

knee to her back); Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. ___, 2026 WL 795469, at *3 (2026)

(per curiam) (Officer’s use of a “rear-wristlock” “pain compliance technique[]”

“to move a noncompliant protester after repeated warnings” was not a clearly

established violation of the Fourth Amendment.).

13 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 14

Because all three Graham factors support the officers, the district court

correctly concluded Barker could not establish a constitutional violation. For that

reason, Barker has not established the officers violated the Fourth Amendment, and

thus he cannot overcome qualified immunity.

Clearly Established

Even if a jury could conclude the officers used excessive force, Barker cannot

show the officers violated a clearly established constitutional right. “Qualified

immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “A right is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Although this standard

“does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “In other words, immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

When looking for analogous existing precedent, we must be careful “not to

define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).

14 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 15

Specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context . . . . Use of excessive force is an area of the law in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case, and thus police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue.

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Barker cites this court’s opinion in McCoy v. Meyers and alleges the officers

violated his “clearly established right to be free from the continued use of force after

he was effectively subdued.” 887 F.3d 1034, 1048 (10th Cir. 2018). Barker argues

he was effectively subdued because Lanier tased him which caused Barker to no

longer be in control of his body. But Barker’s conclusory statement that he was

“effectively subdued” under McCoy defines the right at too high a level of generality.

See Zorn, 607 U.S. ___, 2026 WL 795469, at *2 (“Principles stated generally, such as

that ‘an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force,’ do not suffice.”

(quoting Kisela, 584 U.S. at 105)). Rather, we must determine whether McCoy, or

the precedents it relied on, make clear that every reasonable officer would have

known—under the specific facts here—that Barker was effectively subdued by the

tasing. See Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5; Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104.

As we outlined previously in our analysis of the third Graham factor, the

videos show that after Lanier tased him, Barker was still conscious, sitting upright,

and holding on to the steering wheel in his car. After Hetherington and Guyton

removed him from his vehicle, the videos show Barker stood on his feet and resisted

the officers’ efforts to pull him down. The videos further show that before Owens

used the x-bar maneuver, Barker’s arms and legs were unrestrained and that he was

15 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 16

resisting the officers’ efforts to secure his hands behind his back. None of the cases

Barker relies on squarely govern these facts. See id.

In McCoy, this court found the plaintiff was effectively subdued because he

was “rendered unconscious, handcuffed, and zip-tied.” 887 F.3d at 1050. Barker,

however, argues he was subdued despite being fully conscious, unrestrained, and still

able to resist the officers. And the precedents McCoy relied on to find the right was

clearly established are similarly distinguishable from Barker’s case. See Dixon v.

Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir. 1991) (Plaintiff subdued because “he had

already been frisked, had his hands up against the van with his back to the officers,

and was not making any aggressive moves or threats.”); Casey v. City of Fed.

Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2007) (Plaintiff subdued because he was

“not violent” and the officer never warned him he was under arrest.); Weigel v.

Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, 1152–53 (10th Cir. 2008) (Decedent subdued because he “was

handcuffed and his legs were bound . . . .”). It is accordingly not beyond debate that

Barker was effectively subdued when the officers used force against him after the

tasing. See Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104; see also Mecham, 500 F.3d at 1206 (“While the

facts of the cases compared need not be identical, they must be sufficiently analogous

to satisfy the particularized context necessary to support liability.” (internal citation

omitted)).

In sum, even if we concluded the officers used unreasonable force against

Barker, any such constitutional violation was not clearly established at the time of the

incident. The officers are thus also entitled to qualified immunity under this prong.

16 Appellate Case: 25-6069 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/02/2026 Page: 17

III. Conclusion

The officers are entitled to qualified immunity because Barker failed to show

both that they violated a constitutional right, and that any such right was clearly

established. Barker’s remaining failure-to-intervene and Monell claims also fail

because there is no underlying constitutional violation. See Trigalet v. City of Tulsa,

239 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2001).

We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

officers and the City.

Entered for the Court

Timothy M. Tymkovich Circuit Judge