Baolin Chang v. Todd Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 17, 2026
• Docket: 16-70616
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BAOLIN CHANG; SHA CHANG, No. 16-70616

Petitioners, Agency Nos. A087-842-598 A087-842-599 v.

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 15, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: RAWLINSON, R. NELSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Baolin Chang and Sha Chang, natives and citizens of China, seek

review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing the

appeal of an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal

and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition.

1. The agency gave “specific and cogent reasons” for its adverse credibility

determination. Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010)). For instance, the agency

noted that Petitioners voluntarily returned to China after leaving the country

following Baolin’s allegedly persecutorial arrest and beating. “[A] petitioner’s

voluntary return may be considered in rendering an adverse credibility finding.”

Loho v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1016, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Jie Cui v.

Holder, 712 F.3d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Cui’s ability to travel to Mexico, his

lack of efforts to then enter the United States, and his voluntary decision to return

to China go to the heart of his asylum claim because they undermine his assertions

that he feared persecution.”). “[O]nly the most extraordinary circumstances will

justify overturning an adverse credibility determination,” Dong v. Garland, 50

F.4th 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Iman, 972 F.3d at 1064), and those

circumstances are not present here. Because the non-testimonial evidence in the

record is insufficient to independently establish any of Petitioners’ claims, this

adverse credibility determination is dispositive. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048 &

n.6; Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006).

2. We deny Petitioners’ request for a remand to correct the defect in the

transcript because they have not exhausted their administrative remedies with

2 respect to this request. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Murillo-Chavez v. Bondi, 128

F.4th 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2025) (“Although the exhaustion requirement is non-

jurisdictional, we must apply it when, as here, it is invoked by the government.”).

PETITION DENIED.1

1 Petitioners’ motion for a stay of removal, Dkt. 1, is denied.