Bantuelle v. Renfroe

620 S.W.2d 635, 1981 Tex. App. LEXIS 3797
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 3, 1981
Docket20905
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 620 S.W.2d 635 (Bantuelle v. Renfroe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bantuelle v. Renfroe, 620 S.W.2d 635, 1981 Tex. App. LEXIS 3797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinions

ON MOTION TO CONTEST FILING OF RECORD WITHOUT PAYMENT OF COSTS

GUITTARD, Chief Justice.

This appeal is before us on an affidavit of appellant’s inability to pay the costs or give security under rule 355 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as amended January 1, 1981. Appellees have filed in this court a “motion to contest,” in which they alleged that they never received a notice of filing of the affidavit, as required by rule 355(b). They ask this court to “set an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Appellant complied in all respects with Rule 355.” Appellant contends that under the provision of rule 355(e), the allegations of the affidavit must be taken as true because, although a timely contest was filed by the district clerk, no ruling on the contest was made within ten days after its filing, as required by amended rule 355(e). Since there is a fact dispute as to whether appellant gave notice of the filing of the affidavit within two days, as required by rule 355(b), we grant appellees’ motion and direct the trial court to hear evidence and make fact findings on the question of compliance with rule 355.

Before considering the questions raised by appellees’ motion, we must dispose of appellant’s objection that when the clerk of this court accepted and filed the transcript, a final decision was made that the appeal was duly perfected. We disagree. When our clerk accepts a transcript for filing, she is required by rule 388 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to make a preliminary determination of whether a proper appeal bond or affidavit in lieu thereof has been given. That determination, however, is not an adjudication by the court itself and is subject to review. See, e. g., Glidden Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 155 Tex. 591, 291 S.W.2d 315, 318 (1956) (appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because bond was not filed in time required).

We consider, therefore, the effect of the recent amendment to rule 355. The pur[637]*637pose of that amendment was to avoid leaving an appellant without time to perfect his appeal if a contest to his affidavit in lieu of bond is sustained. In order to avoid undue delay, time limits are prescribed for notice of filing the affidavit, filing the contest, and ruling on the contest. These limits are prescribed in the following subdivisions of the rule:

(b) The appellant or his attorney shall give notice of the filing of the affidavit to the opposing party or his attorney within two days after the filing; otherwise, he shall not be entitled to prosecute the appeal without paying the costs or giving security therefor.
(c) Any interested officer of the court or party to the suit may, by sworn pleading, contest the affidavit within ten days after the affidavit is filed, whereupon the court trying the case (if in session) or (if not in session) the judge of the court or county judge of the county in which the case is pending shall set contest for hearing, and the clerk shall give the parties notice of such setting ....
(e) If no contest is filed in the allotted time, or if no ruling is made on the contest within ten days of its filing, the allegations of the affidavit shall be taken as true.

The obvious purpose of the two-day notice in subdivision (b) is to give the appellee an opportunity to file his contest within the time prescribed in subdivision (c). Whether that notice was given in the present case is the principal question in dispute.

The record shows that the affidavit of inability to pay costs was filed on February 25 and that the district clerk filed a contest on the same day. Appellees allege in their motion to contest that their attorney received no notice of the filing of the affidavit until March 12, when he received notice of a hearing on the contest filed by the clerk. Another “motion to contest” was filed in this court by the court reporter, who attaches an uncertified copy of an order purportedly signed by the trial judge on March 20, reciting that a hearing was held on that date and that counsel for appellant appeared, but presented no evidence showing that appellant gave a timely notice or that appellant was unable to pay the costs. The order provides that because of failure to give such notice, appellant is not entitled to prosecute the appeal without paying the costs or giving security therefor and that the contest of the district clerk is sustained.

In response to these motions, appellant has filed in this court an affidavit stating that he mailed a copy of the February 25 affidavit to appellees’ attorney on the day it was filed.

We hold that whether appellant has perfected his appeal depends on whether he gave the notice required by rule 355(b). If he did, then, notwithstanding the clerk’s contest, the allegations of the affidavit must be taken as true under rule 355(e) because no ruling was made on the contest within ten days after the contest was filed. We cannot consider the order of March 20, if properly before us, as determining that the notice was not given because on that date the time for ruling on the contest had already expired. On the other hand, if appellant did not give notice of the filing of the affidavit within two days, his appeal has not been perfected because he is not entitled to prosecute the appeal without paying the costs or giving security, as provided by rule 355(b). In the absence of the notice, no hearing or ruling on the contest was required.

Appellees assert in their motion that they are entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether the notice was given. Although the time for ruling on the contest has expired, we have authority to determine whether the notice was given as a matter affecting our jurisdiction. Article 1822 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon 1964) empowers the courts of civil appeals “upon affidavit or otherwise as by the courts may be thought proper, to ascertain such matters of fact as may be necessary to the proper exercise of their jurisdiction.” In this case, since the crucial facts appear to be contested, affidavits would not provide satisfactory basis for decision. Although we may hear evidence on [638]*638such a matter and make the determination from that evidence, as held in Setter v. Marschall, 105 Tex. 205, 147 S.W. 226, 229 (1912), the preferable procedure is to request the trial judge to hold a hearing to ascertain the pertinent facts and certify his findings to us for our further action. See Texas Rubber Supply, Inc. v. Jetslide Int’l, Inc., 466 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex.1971); Service Finance Corp. v. Grote, 133 Tex. 606, 131 S.W.2d 93 (1939). Accordingly, we direct the trial court to hear evidence and report to this court his findings concerning the following matters of fact:

(1) Did appellant mail a notice of the filing of his affidavit to appellees to their counsel within two days after filing the affidavit?
(2) If so, was such notice sent by registered or certified mail, as provided in rules 21a and 21b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure?
(3) Was the notice, if any, actually received by appellees or their counsel?

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Bluebook (online)
620 S.W.2d 635, 1981 Tex. App. LEXIS 3797, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bantuelle-v-renfroe-texapp-1981.