1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 BANNER LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 10 Case No. 25-cv-00845-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING FINAL 12 JUDGMENT MARIA MOORE, et al., 13 Defendants. 14
15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiff Banner Life Insurance (“Banner”) finds itself in the center of a dispute between 17 Defendants regarding $500,000 owed under a life insurance policy. Plaintiff now moves for final 18 judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the motion is granted. 19 II. BACKGROUND 20 The factual background in this case has been set out in pervious orders. See Dkts. 46, 51. 21 In summary, Banner filed this interpleader action in January 2025 regarding $500,000 owed under 22 the life insurance policy (the “Policy”) of murder victim, Dominic Sarkar. At the time of his death, 23 the Policy listed Maria Moore, who was later convicted for Mr. Sarkar’s murder, and her son 24 Marcus Moore as primary and contingent beneficiaries (together, “Moore Defendants”). However, 25 California law precludes someone who feloniously and intentionally kills another, as well as their 26 heirs, from receiving the deceased’s life insurance benefit. 27 Meanwhile, Elizabeth Sarkar, one of Mr. Sarkar’s daughters and a former contingent 1 insurance benefit. In light of the potentially conflicting claims between the Moore Defendants and 2 Sarkar’s daughters, Banner sought leave to deposit its triggered policy benefits with the Clerk of 3 the Court. That motion was granted on March 15, 2025, and Banner deposited $533,702.67 with 4 the registry of this Court. 5 On August 14, 2025, the Court entered default judgments on a request from Banner against 6 the Moore Defendants. Defendants Elizabeth Sarkar, Martha Sarkar, and Mary Sarkar (“Sarkar 7 Defendants”), all daughters of Mr. Sarkar, filed answers to the First Amended Complaint on 8 September 24, 2025. Banner now seeks final judgment order in interpleader, as set out below. 9 III. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 and the interpleader statute 28 U.S.C. § 1335 “allow a 11 party to file a claim for interpleader if there is a possibility of exposure to double or multiple 12 liability.” Lee v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 13 1335; Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a)(2)). “ ‘The purpose of the interpleader is for the stakeholder to protect 14 itself against the problems posed by multiple claimants to a single fund.’ ” Id. (quoting Mack v. 15 Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d 1010, 1024 (9th Cir. 2010)). 16 First, the district court must decide “ ‘whether the requirements for rule or statutory 17 interpleader action have been met by determining if there is a single fund at issue and whether 18 there are adverse claimants to that fund.’ ” Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d at 1023–24 (quoting Rhoades 19 v. Casey, 196 F.3d 592 (5th Cir.1999)). If so, the district court “may discharge the plaintiff [in interpleader] from further liability,” enjoin “claimants… from instituting or prosecuting any 20 [further] proceedings… affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the 21 interpleader,” and “make all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment,” 28 U.S.C. § 22 2361, including “ ‘mak[ing] a determination of the respective rights of the claimants.’ ” 23 Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d at 1024 (citation omitted). 24 In an interpleader action, the district court also has discretion to award attorney fees and 25 costs to the stakeholder when doing so is fair and equitable. See, e.g., Trustees of Directors Guild 26 of America-Producer Pension Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000); Island Title Corp. 27 1 v. Bundy, 488 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1093–94 (D. Haw. 2007) (same). The rationale for such awards 2 rests on the need to “ ‘compensate’ ” a disinterested and faultless stakeholder “in possession of a 3 fund claimed by contending parties” that otherwise would have to bear its own costs. South Adams 4 Savings Bank v. Martel, 540 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (D. Mass. 2008) (citation omitted).1 “[T]he parties who have benefited from the stakeholder's efforts should bear the costs incurred thereby.” 5 Id. 6 IV. DISCUSSION 7 In light of the risk of competing claims for the Policy’ benefits by the Moore Defendants 8 and Sarkar Defendants and the resulting risk of double liability exposure, Banner’s interpleader 9 action is proper under both Rule 22 and federal interpleader statute 28 U.S.C. § 1335. 10 Accordingly, as set forth below, final judgment is entered in favor of Banner against the 11 Defendants, and the Defendants are enjoined from prosecuting any claim against Banner with 12 regards to the Policy. 13 Banner also requests $22,068.50 in attorneys’ fees be awarded from the insurance benefit 14 funds deposited with the Court. This is 4% of the funds already deposited with the Court and 15 $8,000 less than the total fees incurred by Banner thus far. Finding the request reasonable and 16 noting that the Sarkar Defendants filed no opposition and, in fact, stipulated with Banner that 17 Banner should receive these funds, see Dkt. 59, the requested award is granted. 18 Finally, the Sarkar Defendants request that the Court distribute the life insurance benefits 19 equally amongst themselves. See Dkt. 53. As the only remaining claimants in light of this Court’s 20 entry of default judgment against the Moore Defendants, distribution amongst the remaining 21 Defendant claimants, Elizabeth, Martha, and Mary Sarkar, is proper as set forth below. 22 23
24 1 Some courts have declined to exercise their discretion to award attorney fees and costs to stakeholders where those stakeholders “face multiple claims in their ordinary course of 25 business.” Furia v. McGrew, No. 19-cv-00942, 2020 WL 4208274, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2020). Other courts, however, have awarded costs when warranted regardless of whether the 26 stakeholder was a repeat player in the interpleader arena. See Fidelity Nat. Title Co. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 13-cv-02030, 2014 WL 6390275, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014); Martel, 540 27 F. Supp. 2d at 268, 273–74. 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 3 A. Banner Life Insurance Company is granted leave to deposit the proceeds of life insurance policy No. 181174445 together with interest, if applicable, with this honorable Court or its 4 clerk at the Court’s direction, subject to further Order of this Court; 5 B. Maria Moore, Marcus Moore, Elizabeth Sarkar, Martha Sarkar, and Mary Sarkar are 6 enjoined during the pendency of this case and thereafter permanently and perpetually, from commencing or prosecuting any proceeding or claim against Banner Life 7 Insurance Company in any state or federal court or other forum with respect to the remaining proceeds payable under the terms of life insurance policy No. 181174445 8 and on account of the death of Dominic Sarkar, the owner and insured, and that said 9 injunction issue without bond or surety; 10 C.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 BANNER LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 10 Case No. 25-cv-00845-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING FINAL 12 JUDGMENT MARIA MOORE, et al., 13 Defendants. 14
15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiff Banner Life Insurance (“Banner”) finds itself in the center of a dispute between 17 Defendants regarding $500,000 owed under a life insurance policy. Plaintiff now moves for final 18 judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the motion is granted. 19 II. BACKGROUND 20 The factual background in this case has been set out in pervious orders. See Dkts. 46, 51. 21 In summary, Banner filed this interpleader action in January 2025 regarding $500,000 owed under 22 the life insurance policy (the “Policy”) of murder victim, Dominic Sarkar. At the time of his death, 23 the Policy listed Maria Moore, who was later convicted for Mr. Sarkar’s murder, and her son 24 Marcus Moore as primary and contingent beneficiaries (together, “Moore Defendants”). However, 25 California law precludes someone who feloniously and intentionally kills another, as well as their 26 heirs, from receiving the deceased’s life insurance benefit. 27 Meanwhile, Elizabeth Sarkar, one of Mr. Sarkar’s daughters and a former contingent 1 insurance benefit. In light of the potentially conflicting claims between the Moore Defendants and 2 Sarkar’s daughters, Banner sought leave to deposit its triggered policy benefits with the Clerk of 3 the Court. That motion was granted on March 15, 2025, and Banner deposited $533,702.67 with 4 the registry of this Court. 5 On August 14, 2025, the Court entered default judgments on a request from Banner against 6 the Moore Defendants. Defendants Elizabeth Sarkar, Martha Sarkar, and Mary Sarkar (“Sarkar 7 Defendants”), all daughters of Mr. Sarkar, filed answers to the First Amended Complaint on 8 September 24, 2025. Banner now seeks final judgment order in interpleader, as set out below. 9 III. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 and the interpleader statute 28 U.S.C. § 1335 “allow a 11 party to file a claim for interpleader if there is a possibility of exposure to double or multiple 12 liability.” Lee v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 13 1335; Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a)(2)). “ ‘The purpose of the interpleader is for the stakeholder to protect 14 itself against the problems posed by multiple claimants to a single fund.’ ” Id. (quoting Mack v. 15 Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d 1010, 1024 (9th Cir. 2010)). 16 First, the district court must decide “ ‘whether the requirements for rule or statutory 17 interpleader action have been met by determining if there is a single fund at issue and whether 18 there are adverse claimants to that fund.’ ” Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d at 1023–24 (quoting Rhoades 19 v. Casey, 196 F.3d 592 (5th Cir.1999)). If so, the district court “may discharge the plaintiff [in interpleader] from further liability,” enjoin “claimants… from instituting or prosecuting any 20 [further] proceedings… affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the 21 interpleader,” and “make all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment,” 28 U.S.C. § 22 2361, including “ ‘mak[ing] a determination of the respective rights of the claimants.’ ” 23 Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d at 1024 (citation omitted). 24 In an interpleader action, the district court also has discretion to award attorney fees and 25 costs to the stakeholder when doing so is fair and equitable. See, e.g., Trustees of Directors Guild 26 of America-Producer Pension Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000); Island Title Corp. 27 1 v. Bundy, 488 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1093–94 (D. Haw. 2007) (same). The rationale for such awards 2 rests on the need to “ ‘compensate’ ” a disinterested and faultless stakeholder “in possession of a 3 fund claimed by contending parties” that otherwise would have to bear its own costs. South Adams 4 Savings Bank v. Martel, 540 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (D. Mass. 2008) (citation omitted).1 “[T]he parties who have benefited from the stakeholder's efforts should bear the costs incurred thereby.” 5 Id. 6 IV. DISCUSSION 7 In light of the risk of competing claims for the Policy’ benefits by the Moore Defendants 8 and Sarkar Defendants and the resulting risk of double liability exposure, Banner’s interpleader 9 action is proper under both Rule 22 and federal interpleader statute 28 U.S.C. § 1335. 10 Accordingly, as set forth below, final judgment is entered in favor of Banner against the 11 Defendants, and the Defendants are enjoined from prosecuting any claim against Banner with 12 regards to the Policy. 13 Banner also requests $22,068.50 in attorneys’ fees be awarded from the insurance benefit 14 funds deposited with the Court. This is 4% of the funds already deposited with the Court and 15 $8,000 less than the total fees incurred by Banner thus far. Finding the request reasonable and 16 noting that the Sarkar Defendants filed no opposition and, in fact, stipulated with Banner that 17 Banner should receive these funds, see Dkt. 59, the requested award is granted. 18 Finally, the Sarkar Defendants request that the Court distribute the life insurance benefits 19 equally amongst themselves. See Dkt. 53. As the only remaining claimants in light of this Court’s 20 entry of default judgment against the Moore Defendants, distribution amongst the remaining 21 Defendant claimants, Elizabeth, Martha, and Mary Sarkar, is proper as set forth below. 22 23
24 1 Some courts have declined to exercise their discretion to award attorney fees and costs to stakeholders where those stakeholders “face multiple claims in their ordinary course of 25 business.” Furia v. McGrew, No. 19-cv-00942, 2020 WL 4208274, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2020). Other courts, however, have awarded costs when warranted regardless of whether the 26 stakeholder was a repeat player in the interpleader arena. See Fidelity Nat. Title Co. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 13-cv-02030, 2014 WL 6390275, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014); Martel, 540 27 F. Supp. 2d at 268, 273–74. 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 3 A. Banner Life Insurance Company is granted leave to deposit the proceeds of life insurance policy No. 181174445 together with interest, if applicable, with this honorable Court or its 4 clerk at the Court’s direction, subject to further Order of this Court; 5 B. Maria Moore, Marcus Moore, Elizabeth Sarkar, Martha Sarkar, and Mary Sarkar are 6 enjoined during the pendency of this case and thereafter permanently and perpetually, from commencing or prosecuting any proceeding or claim against Banner Life 7 Insurance Company in any state or federal court or other forum with respect to the remaining proceeds payable under the terms of life insurance policy No. 181174445 8 and on account of the death of Dominic Sarkar, the owner and insured, and that said 9 injunction issue without bond or surety; 10 C. Banner Life Insurance Company has no further liability to Maria Moore, Marcus Moore, Elizabeth Sarkar, Martha Sarkar, Mary Sarkar or to any person or entity 11 claiming through them, for the proceeds payable under the terms of the life insurance policy No. 181174445 and on account of the death of Dominic Sarkar; 12 D. Banner Life Insurance Company has acted in good faith by interpleading the remaining 13 proceeds of life insurance policy No. 181174445 with the Court or its clerk; 14 E. Banner Life Insurance Company is excused from further attendance in connection with 15 this cause, and the adverse and potentially adverse claimants, Maria Moore, Marcus Moore, Elizabeth Sarkar, Martha Sarkar, and Mary Sarkar are ordered to litigate their 16 claims and contentions concerning the remaining proceeds of life insurance policy No. 181174445 without further involving Banner Life Insurance Company; 17 F. Judgment is entered in favor of Banner Life Insurance Company, and against Maria 18 Moore, Marcus Moore, Elizabeth Sarkar, Martha Sarkar, and Mary Sarkar on its 19 Interpleader claim with an express finding of finality pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 20 G. Banner Life Insurance Company is awarded $22,068.50 in attorneys’ fees and costs to 21 be deducted from the amount deposited with the Court or its clerk; and, 22 H. The Clerk of Court is directed to disburse the interpleader funds, including accrued interest, held in the Court Registry to Defendants Elizabeth Sarkar, Martha Sarkar and 23 Mary Sarkar through their counsel of record Navneet Chugh, Chugh LLP, 15925 24 Carmenita Road, Cerritos, 19 California 90703, as attorney for Sarkar Claimants. 25 26 27 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 3 Dated: December 1, 2025 4 RICHARD SEEBORG 5 Chief United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 a 12
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