Banner Health v. Sebelius

55 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2014 WL 3052654, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91668
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJuly 7, 2014
DocketCivil Action No. 2010-1638
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 55 F. Supp. 3d 1 (Banner Health v. Sebelius) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Banner Health v. Sebelius, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2014 WL 3052654, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91668 (D.D.C. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs are twenty-nine organizations that own or operate hospitals participating in the Medicare program. They have sued the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”), challenging certain regulatory actions taken by her in the course of administering Medicare’s reimbursement scheme. 1 Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the Secretary’s flawed promulgation and implementation of various payment regulations, they were deprived of more than $350 million dollars in Medicare “outlier” payments for services provided during fiscal years ending 1998 through 2006. Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ [108] Motion for Leave to Further Amend and Supplement First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs seek to add allegations and claims under 5 U.S.C. § 553 regarding the Secretary’s failure to disclose a 2003 filter- *3 im Final Rule. Upon a review of the parties’ submissions 2 , the applicable authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint. The Court denies Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to include claims that the Secretary’s failure to disclose the Interim Final Rule and its contents violated 5 U.S.C. § 553. However, the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to include factual allegations concerning the Interim Final Rule.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant statutory and regulatory background underlying Plaintiffs’ claims and the lengthy procedural history of this litigation are set out in detail in the Court’s prior opinions. See Banner Health v. Sebelius, 797 F.Supp.2d 97 (D.D.C.2011); id., 905 F.Supp.2d 174 (D.D.C.2012); id., 945 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.2013). Accordingly, the Court provides herein only a brief summary of the facts and history of this case, as relevant to the present motion.

Plaintiffs are twenty-nine organizations that own or operate hospitals participating in the Medicare program. Am. Compl., ECF No. [16], ¶ 22. On December 23, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint, which remains the operative iteration of the Complaint in this action. See Am. Compl., ECF No. [16]. As this Court has previously observed, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is “sprawling”; it contains over two hundred paragraphs, spans fifty-nine pages, and appends two lengthy exhibits. Plaintiffs challenge the validity of a series of regulations establishing the methodology for calculating outlier payments (the “Outlier Payment Regulations”), 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.80-412.86, as well as the Secretary’s annual promulgation of the regulations through which she set the fixed loss threshold for the upcoming fiscal year, for fiscal years 1998 through 2006 (the “Fixed Loss Threshold Regulations”). 3

In enacting a system for Medicare reimbursement, “Congress recognized that health-care providers would inevitably care for some patients whose hospitalization would be extraordinarily costly or lengthy” *4 and devised a means to “insulate hospitals from bearing a disproportionate share of these atypical costs.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1009 (D.C.Cir.1999). Specifically, Congress authorized the Secretary to make supplemental “outlier” payments to eligible providers. Id. Outlier payments are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A). See also 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.80-412.86 (implementing regulations). Each fiscal year, the Secretary determines a fixed dollar amount that, when added to the DRG prospective payment — the standardized calculation for how much a hospital is paid for treating a particular case — serves as the cutoff point triggering eligibility for outlier payments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(ii), (iv); 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(a)(2)-(3). This fixed dollar amount is known as the “fixed loss threshold.” If a hospital’s approximate costs actually incurred in treating a patient exceed the. sum of the DRG prospective payment rate and the fixed loss threshold, then the hospital is eligible for an outlier payment in that case. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(ii)-(iii); 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(a)(2)-(3). In this way, the fixed loss threshold represents the dollar amount of loss that a hospital must absorb in any case in which the hospital incurs estimated actual costs in treating a patient above and beyond the DRG prospective payment rate. An increase in the fixed loss threshold reduces the number of cases that will qualify for outlier payments as well as the amount of payments for qualifying cases.

As noted, the Secretary “establishes] the fixed [loss] thresholds beyond which hospitals will qualify for outlier payments” at the start of each fiscal year. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 192 F.3d at 1009. In each of the fiscal years at issue in this action, the Secretary set fixed loss thresholds at a level so that the anticipated total of outlier payments would equal 5.1% of the anticipated total of payments based on DRG prospective payment rates. Similarly, the amount of the outlier payment is “determined by the Secretary” and must “approximate the marginal cost of care” beyond the fixed loss threshold. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iii). During the time period relevant to this action, the implementing regulations generally provided for outlier payments equal to eighty percent of the difference between the hospital’s estimated operating and capital costs and the fixed loss threshold. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(k).

In this litigation, Plaintiffs claim that the Outlier Payment Regulations, in the form they existed prior to 2003, 4 contained “vulnerabilities” that made them “uniquely susceptible to manipulation” by unscrupulous hospitals. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52-98, 138.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Davila Calixto v. Acosta
District of Columbia, 2021
Schonzeit v. Zinke
District of Columbia, 2020
Powell v. Internal Revenue Service
District of Columbia, 2019
Thorp v. District of Columbia
District of Columbia, 2018
Banner Health v. Thomas Price
867 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Circuit, 2017)
Lee Memorial Hospital v. Sebelius
District of Columbia, 2016
Banner Health v. Sebelius
126 F. Supp. 3d 28 (District of Columbia, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
55 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2014 WL 3052654, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91668, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/banner-health-v-sebelius-dcd-2014.