FOX, P. J.
Plaintiff bank brought this suit to impose a constructive trust upon certain assets standing in the name of the Ryans and for an accounting. Plaintiff alleges, in effect, that during the time defendant John A. Ryan
was an officer
of plaintiff bank he ocenpied a confidential and fiduciary relationship with and to the bank and that he violated the duty thus imposed; that he was guilty of fraudulent conduct; and that he was part of a conspiracy with his wife and others to defraud plaintiff. In sum, the bank charges that as a trusted official Ryan induced numerous borrowers from the bank to pay him fees, commissions, gratuities and gifts of substantial value for inducing the bank to approve their applications for loans and for persuading the bank to make the loans in question to such borrowers; and that in other transactions defendant used and personally profited by information that was available to him by reason of his position with and relationship to the bank. The defendants have appealed from an adverse judgment.
In view of some of the arguments that are made, it is important to have a comprehensive and accurate picture of defendant’s various positions and responsibilities with plaintiff. The findings provide such a picture. They reveal that defendant went to work for plaintiff in May 1934 and that his connection with the bank was terminated on August 2, 1957. During all of this period he was a full-time employee and agent of the bank in a variety of capacities from teller to supervisor of loans, supervisor of loan development, assistant vice president and manager of one of plaintiff’s branches. From July 1, 1938, to the termination of his connection with the bank, defendant was “a trusted officer of plaintiff.” During the five-year period from 1937 to 1942 defendant’s duties included the making and servicing of real estate loans to individuals but not to contractors and builders. During this period he acquired specialized knowledge in making and servicing such loans. In approximately April 1944 defendant was assigned to special duties by plaintiff at its Los Angeles headquarters which included the investigation of and reporting on matters relating to the making of loans by plaintiff that were insured by the Federal Housing Administration ; in May 1946 defendant was appointed a supervisor of loan development. In April 1955 defendant became assistant vice president of plaintiff; in June 1957 he was made manager of the Santa Monica-Vermont Branch.
More specifically, with respect to plaintiff’s lending operations it appears that commencing in May 1946 defendant’s duties were to review and supervise the making, servicing and collection of loans made by plaintiff through its several branches to persons engaged in the business of building houses
in subdivisions. By November 1949 defendant’s duties were expanded to receiving and processing applications for loans to finance subdivision building operations. Such duties included discussion of the general terms of such financing with prospective borrowers and with branch managers where the applications were originated; the obtaining and analyzing of credit and other pertinent information, the formation of judgments and recommendations based on such information and analysis, and the submission of such information to other more senior officers of plaintiff who were charged with final decisions in such matters, with his (defendant’s) recommendation as to what action should be taken by plaintiff on the application for credit and as to the terms of the proposed credit. The court further found: “Plaintiff at all times placed trust in and reliance upon said defendant in the performance of his said duties and believed that the information obtained and submitted by said defendant with respect to proposed borrowers was truthful and accurate and believed that recommendations made by said defendant for the granting or withholding of credit and the terms and conditions upon which such credit should be granted were made in good faith by said defendant, and believed that in submitting such applications and recommendations said defendant was motivated solely to protect the best interests of plaintiff in the conduct of its banking business of extending credit”; also, that “During all of the time the said John A. Ryan was employed by plaintiff, the plaintiff reposed the utmost faith, confidence and trust in him, believed in and relied upon his honesty and integrity and believed that the said John A. Ryan would deal fairly and honestly with plaintiff in all things and would not abuse the power and authority vested in him ...” and that during the time defendant was an officer of plaintiff (since July 1, 1938) he “occupied a confidential relationship with and to plaintiff.”
At the time of defendant’s employment on a permanent basis in November 1934 he agreed in writing that he would not use any information that he might receive as an employee of plaintiff for any purpose other than for the advancement of the interests of plaintiff.
In finding V the court stated: “Said John A. Ryan during his employment by plaintiff embarked upon and effected a scheme, practice and course of conduct beginning in 1944 by which he obtained fees, commissions, gratuities and gifts of substantial value from borrowers and customers of plaintiff
as a result of and by virtue of his position with plaintiff and in violation and breach of his position with plaintiff and of his confidential and fiduciary relationship with and to plaintiff, which course of conduct was concealed from plaintiff. Pursuant to the said scheme, practice and course of conduct said John A. Ryan exacted from such borrowers and customers of plaintiff or persuaded them to pay to him or to persons designated by him for his benefit sums of money for his assistance to such borrowers and customers in obtaining loans from plaintiff, ...”
With respect to Mrs. Ryan’s connection with defendant’s activities the court found that she had “full knowledge” of her husband’s scheme and practice of obtaining fees, commissions, gratuities and gifts of substantial value from borrowers from plaintiff bank by reason of his position with the bank and in violation of his confidential and fiduciary relation to it, and with such knowledge she connived, colluded and participated with her husband in carrying out and concealing said scheme and practice.
The court further found
that plaintiff had no knowledge of defendant’s said scheme and course of conduct until August 1, 1957.
The initial question is: upon what theory is defendant liable to plaintiff? Reference to a few analogous cases and the principles there developed will be helpful in answering this question. In the early case of
Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank
v.
Downey,
53 Cal. 466 [31 Am.Rep. 62], it appears that defendant who was president of the bank loaned bank funds to the purchasers of a certain piece of property. The borrowers executed a note in favor of the bank for the amount of the loan with interest. As a part of the same transaction Downey made an agreement with the borrowers to the effect that he was to have one-sixth of the profits on the purchase and sale of the property.
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FOX, P. J.
Plaintiff bank brought this suit to impose a constructive trust upon certain assets standing in the name of the Ryans and for an accounting. Plaintiff alleges, in effect, that during the time defendant John A. Ryan
was an officer
of plaintiff bank he ocenpied a confidential and fiduciary relationship with and to the bank and that he violated the duty thus imposed; that he was guilty of fraudulent conduct; and that he was part of a conspiracy with his wife and others to defraud plaintiff. In sum, the bank charges that as a trusted official Ryan induced numerous borrowers from the bank to pay him fees, commissions, gratuities and gifts of substantial value for inducing the bank to approve their applications for loans and for persuading the bank to make the loans in question to such borrowers; and that in other transactions defendant used and personally profited by information that was available to him by reason of his position with and relationship to the bank. The defendants have appealed from an adverse judgment.
In view of some of the arguments that are made, it is important to have a comprehensive and accurate picture of defendant’s various positions and responsibilities with plaintiff. The findings provide such a picture. They reveal that defendant went to work for plaintiff in May 1934 and that his connection with the bank was terminated on August 2, 1957. During all of this period he was a full-time employee and agent of the bank in a variety of capacities from teller to supervisor of loans, supervisor of loan development, assistant vice president and manager of one of plaintiff’s branches. From July 1, 1938, to the termination of his connection with the bank, defendant was “a trusted officer of plaintiff.” During the five-year period from 1937 to 1942 defendant’s duties included the making and servicing of real estate loans to individuals but not to contractors and builders. During this period he acquired specialized knowledge in making and servicing such loans. In approximately April 1944 defendant was assigned to special duties by plaintiff at its Los Angeles headquarters which included the investigation of and reporting on matters relating to the making of loans by plaintiff that were insured by the Federal Housing Administration ; in May 1946 defendant was appointed a supervisor of loan development. In April 1955 defendant became assistant vice president of plaintiff; in June 1957 he was made manager of the Santa Monica-Vermont Branch.
More specifically, with respect to plaintiff’s lending operations it appears that commencing in May 1946 defendant’s duties were to review and supervise the making, servicing and collection of loans made by plaintiff through its several branches to persons engaged in the business of building houses
in subdivisions. By November 1949 defendant’s duties were expanded to receiving and processing applications for loans to finance subdivision building operations. Such duties included discussion of the general terms of such financing with prospective borrowers and with branch managers where the applications were originated; the obtaining and analyzing of credit and other pertinent information, the formation of judgments and recommendations based on such information and analysis, and the submission of such information to other more senior officers of plaintiff who were charged with final decisions in such matters, with his (defendant’s) recommendation as to what action should be taken by plaintiff on the application for credit and as to the terms of the proposed credit. The court further found: “Plaintiff at all times placed trust in and reliance upon said defendant in the performance of his said duties and believed that the information obtained and submitted by said defendant with respect to proposed borrowers was truthful and accurate and believed that recommendations made by said defendant for the granting or withholding of credit and the terms and conditions upon which such credit should be granted were made in good faith by said defendant, and believed that in submitting such applications and recommendations said defendant was motivated solely to protect the best interests of plaintiff in the conduct of its banking business of extending credit”; also, that “During all of the time the said John A. Ryan was employed by plaintiff, the plaintiff reposed the utmost faith, confidence and trust in him, believed in and relied upon his honesty and integrity and believed that the said John A. Ryan would deal fairly and honestly with plaintiff in all things and would not abuse the power and authority vested in him ...” and that during the time defendant was an officer of plaintiff (since July 1, 1938) he “occupied a confidential relationship with and to plaintiff.”
At the time of defendant’s employment on a permanent basis in November 1934 he agreed in writing that he would not use any information that he might receive as an employee of plaintiff for any purpose other than for the advancement of the interests of plaintiff.
In finding V the court stated: “Said John A. Ryan during his employment by plaintiff embarked upon and effected a scheme, practice and course of conduct beginning in 1944 by which he obtained fees, commissions, gratuities and gifts of substantial value from borrowers and customers of plaintiff
as a result of and by virtue of his position with plaintiff and in violation and breach of his position with plaintiff and of his confidential and fiduciary relationship with and to plaintiff, which course of conduct was concealed from plaintiff. Pursuant to the said scheme, practice and course of conduct said John A. Ryan exacted from such borrowers and customers of plaintiff or persuaded them to pay to him or to persons designated by him for his benefit sums of money for his assistance to such borrowers and customers in obtaining loans from plaintiff, ...”
With respect to Mrs. Ryan’s connection with defendant’s activities the court found that she had “full knowledge” of her husband’s scheme and practice of obtaining fees, commissions, gratuities and gifts of substantial value from borrowers from plaintiff bank by reason of his position with the bank and in violation of his confidential and fiduciary relation to it, and with such knowledge she connived, colluded and participated with her husband in carrying out and concealing said scheme and practice.
The court further found
that plaintiff had no knowledge of defendant’s said scheme and course of conduct until August 1, 1957.
The initial question is: upon what theory is defendant liable to plaintiff? Reference to a few analogous cases and the principles there developed will be helpful in answering this question. In the early case of
Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank
v.
Downey,
53 Cal. 466 [31 Am.Rep. 62], it appears that defendant who was president of the bank loaned bank funds to the purchasers of a certain piece of property. The borrowers executed a note in favor of the bank for the amount of the loan with interest. As a part of the same transaction Downey made an agreement with the borrowers to the effect that he was to have one-sixth of the profits on the purchase and sale of the property. The court held that Downey could not be permitted to retain for himself the profits thus contracted for but must turn them over to the bank. The court stated: “Upon well-settled principles governing Courts of Equity, the defendant cannot be permitted to retain these profits for himself. They constitute part of the consideration which the borrowers paid or agreed to pay in obtaining the loan, and are as clearly the property of the corporation as is the interest accrued and stipulated to be paid on the face of the note it
self.” In the course of the opinion the court quoted with approval from
Bain
v.
Brown,
56 N. Y. 285, 288: “When agents and others, acting in a fiduciary capacity, understand that these rules will be rigidly enforced, even without proof of actual fraud, the honest will keep clear of all dealings falling within their prohibition, and those dishonestly inclined will conclude that it is useless to exercise their wits in contrivances to evade it.”
Broadway Fed. etc. Loan Assn.
v.
Howard,
133 Cal.App.2d 382 [285 P.2d 61], was an action by a savings and loan association to recover secret profits made by Howard who was an officer of the association. In that case “[t]he court . . . found that in numerous transactions the lending powers of the association and its powers to purchase loans were employed by Howard in making secret profits; ... In order to further conceal from plaintiff his interest, Howard sometimes caused his profit in such transactions to be paid by plaintiff to Avalon [a corporation wholly owned by defendant Howard and his wife]. In other cases he concealed the profit by a cheek made payable to one of his ‘dummies’ or caused the check for his profits to be made payable to the seller or to some third person who had no connection with or interest in the transaction, without, however, the payee’s knowledge or consent. . . .
The court found that Howard, by the same devices as hereinbefore mentioned, procured loans from plaintiff for borrowers and received a fee or commission therefor, but concealed this fact from the association.”
(Emphasis added.) In affirming a judgment in favor of the savings and loan association, this court stated: “ It is admitted that during the time the transactions here in question took place Howard was a director, general manager, and president of plaintiff. Thus his fiduciary duty to plaintiff was established. A reading of the foregoing summary of the transactions amply supports the trial court’s determination that Howard personally profited from them at the expense of plaintiff through the use of the association, its facilities and assets and
that in so doing he violated his fiduciary duty to plaintiff.”
(Emphasis added.)
Fleishhacker
v.
Blum,
109 F.2d 543, which was an action by stockholders of the Anglo-California National Bank of San Francisco to recover for the bank profits or bonuses alleged to have been received by Fleishhacker, its president, as consideration for causing the bank to make certain loans to be used in a business venture in which he was interested, further illustrates the principle that a bank official “who receives a bonus
or other consideration for procuring a loan of the bank’s funds commits a breach of trust, and that the consideration so paid belongs to the bank and may be recovered by it.” The court further commented that “ [t]he Bank paid him a salary and had the right to command his undivided fealty in all matters pertaining to the lending of its funds.”
Applying these principles to the facts of the case at bench, as found by the trial court, it is apparent that defendant’s liability may properly be based either upon the violation of his fiduciary duty to the bank by reason of the position he occupied and his confidential
and fiduciary relation with and to it, or by reason of the violation of his duties as an agent of the bank and the confidence and trust thus reposed in him. But, argues defendant, the principles of the cited cases only apply to the president or other executive officers of a corporation ; that although he became an officer of the bank in July 1938, he was not of such stature either as an officer or agent of the bank that his acts in handling the bank’s business should be measured by the foregoing standards; that he was merely an employee and that any funds he may have received in any of these transactions from the borrowers created only a debtor-creditor relationship between him and the bank. This appraisal of defendant’s position and responsibility to the bank is purely sophistry. This is particularly true in view of the court’s findings as to the character of the duties that were assigned to him; the findings that he was an agent and officer of the bank; that the bank placed great trust and confidence in him; and that he occupied a confidential and fiduciary relationship with and to the bank.
If business is to be conducted on a responsible basis such as will command the confidence of the public, the high standards of business operations that are exacted of top management must also be demanded of those in the lower echelons, and even of those without managerial portfolio. As was said in
Fleishhacker:
“These high standards this court is not disposed to whittle down,” nor are we disposed to limit the group to which the standards apply to those who have executive status. This philosophy seems to underlie Restatement of the Law on this point in the fields of both Agency and Restitution. As to the former, it is stated (Rest. 2d Agency (1958) § 388): “Unless otherwise agreed, an agent who makes
a profit in connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of the principal is under a duty to give such profit to the principal.” “Comment c—Use of confidential information” is also pertinent: “An agent who acquires confidential information in the course of his employment or in violation of his duties has a duty not to use it to the disadvantage of the principal, see § 395. Pie also has a duty to account for any profits made by the use of such information, although this does not harm the principal. . . .” As to a fiduciary the Restatement declares: “Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or commission or other profit, he holds what he receives upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary. . . .” (Rest., Restitution (perm, ed.) §197, p. 808.) “The rule stated in this Section is applicable although the profit received by the fiduciary is not at the expense of the beneficiary. ...”
(Id.,
com. c, p. 809.) See also section 2860, Labor Code.
Defendant relies on
Lister & Co.
v.
Stubbs,
L.R. 45 Ch. Div. 1, decided in 1890, in support of his position that the relationship between Ryan and the bank was that of debtor and creditor. However this early English case does not represent the present law in California when dealing with the type of relationships and transactions that the trial court found to be involved in the instant case.
(Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank
v.
Downey, supra; Broadway Fed. etc. Loan Assn.
v.
Howard, supra; Fleishhacker
v.
Blum, supra;
Rest., Agency, § 388; Rest., Restitution, § 197.)
We shall now consider defendant’s contention that the court erred in denying his demand for a jury trial.
To be entitled as a matter of right to a jury trial the action must be one which was triable by a jury at common law as the common law existed in 1850.
(Farrell
v.
City of Ontario,
39 Cal. App. 351 [178 P. 740] ;
Bank of America
v.
Lamb Finance Co.,
145 Cal.App.2d 702 [303 P.2d 86]
; Pacific Western Oil Co.
v.
Bern Oil Co.,
13 Cal.2d 60 [87 P.2d 1045].) The nature of the case “may be determined from the relief sought as well as from the nature of the facts stated.”
(Dills
v.
Delira Corp.,
145 Cal.App.2d 124, 128 [302 P.2d 397].) If the gist of the action is for equitable relief, pleading a cause of action at law does not entitle a party to a jury trial as a matter of right where the facts found on the equitable issues will dispose of such cause of action.
(Dills
v.
Delira Corp., supra.)
“ ‘ [W]here the case as made by the pleadings involves the application of the doctrines of equity and the granting of relief, which can be obtained in a court of equity, and not elsewhere, the parties are not entitled to a jury trial.' ”
(Holt
v.
Parmer,
106 Cal.App.2d 329, 332 [235 P.2d 43], quoted with approval in
Tibbitts
v.
Fife,
162 Cal.App.2d 568, 573 [328 P.2d 212].) Examination of plaintiff’s complaint discloses that the gist of its action is equitable in nature. It contains fifteen causes of action. In the first and second causes of action the allegations indicate that the Ryans are constructive trustees of money and property which belong to plaintiff and that plaintiff is entitled to an accounting. Both of these causes of action are clearly equitable in nature and seek relief that only a court of equity can provide. The third through the eleventh causes of action seek to impress a trust on specified property. Obviously the relief sought in these causes of action is exclusively equitable. The twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth causes of action were dismissed by plaintiff. The fifteenth cause of action which on its face seeks to recover damages for fraud and also exemplary damages need not be analyzed and classified for the court did not make any award against defendants on this cause of action. Therefore, the defendants were not prejudiced in any event. The trial court properly denied defendants’ request for a jury trial.
Ripling
v.
Superior Court,
112 Cal.App.2d 399 [247 P.2d 117], relied on by defendants, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
Ripling
involved a situation where the alleged trustee admitted the funds were held for the use of plaintiff. The court there stated: “Our own ease is not for the declaration of a trust, existence of which the defendant admits, but presents the simple question whether trust money is still held by the trustee.’’ Further, in that case legal remedies, i.e., money damages were sought and were entirely adequate; in the instant case the remedies sought are only cognizable in equity. (See
supra.)
Defendants contend there is no evidence to support a number of the findings that cover specific transactions. In examining the evidence touching the findings we must, of
course, bear in mind that it was for the trial court to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and determine the inferences that should be drawn from the evidence. We must therefore view the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the successful party in the trial court.
(Estate of Teel,
25 Cal.2d 520, 526 [154 P.2d 384].) When the evidence is so examined we find it sufficient to sustain each of the challenged findings. Since the discussion of these factual matters is of no particular interest to the profession generally, we shall place it in a footnote.
The basic difficulty with defendants’ argument on the insufficiency of the evidence to support the numerous findings that he has challenged on that ground is that he would have this court reevaluate the credibility of the witnesses, reweigh the evidence and draw inferences contrary to those drawn by the trial court. Under firmly established principles we are not at liberty to do this.
(People
v.
Gould,
111 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [243 P.2d 809];
Anchor Casualty Co.
v.
Surety Bond S. & L. Assn.,
204 Cal.App.2d 175, 180 [22 Cal.Rptr. 278].)
Defendant argues that many of the transactions herein involved were not within the scope and course of Ryan’s employment with plaintiff bank and therefore the bank cannot recover.
The answer to this contention is twofold: (1) implicit in the findings the court made as to these various transactions is the determination that each of these matters was within the general area of defendant’s duties and responsibilities with the bank; and (2) this is an action based upon the breach of defendant’s fiduciary duty to the bank and once the court has found on substantial evidence that this duty has been violated by the defendant in a particular transaction, it is no longer important to determine whether the particular act falls within the scope and course of defendant’s employment.
Defendant attacks another group of findings of fact and a number of conclusions of law on this basis: “The failure of the trial court to recognize that the relationship between defendant and his employer, plaintiff bank, as to the monies wrongfully received by defendant, is that of debtor and creditor completely voids” such findings and conclusions.
Defendant’s major premise is that the “monies wrongfully received” by him created merely a debtor-creditor relation between him and plaintiff. We have demonstrated
ante
that defendant is completely in error in espousing this thesis. By reason of his position and in view of the confidential and fiduciary relation that defendant occupied with and to the bank and the duty thus imposed upon him, and his violation of such duty in the many transactions herein, the monies and property received by him from these deals in equity and in good conscience belonged to the bank and he therefore held the same as a constructive trustee for the bank. Defendant makes no other attack upon these findings and conclusions. They therefore stand without any successful challenge.
Defendant attacks Finding XI 9 relating to monies received by defendant from Carol Heers claiming that the “clean hands” maxim precludes plaintiff bank’s recovery with respect to this transaction. Defendant cites no authority to show the applicability of this doctrine to the case at bar. Further, defendant in no way shows that the bank’s act of extending credit to the Long Beach bank in connection with loans to Heers Brothers is illegal, in violation of any statute or case law, or against any public policy. Except for the broad statement that making out-of-state loans was against the policy of plaintiff bank, there is not even a claim that plaintiff bank was guilty of any wrongful act. It must be recalled that it was the act of defendant Ryan in diverting business away from plaintiff bank to the Long Beach bank that made this transaction possible. The trial court did not have to
sua sponte
delve deeper into this transaction when the only questionable act apparent herein was the diversion of business by Ryan in violation of his fiduciary relationship. Defendant's argument, therefore, is without merit.
There is also no merit in defendant’s argument that the court erred in allowing interest from the time the monies were received by defendant to the date of the judgment.
The law is clear that if a constructive trust is to be imposed on money and other property, the beneficiary thereof is entitled to recover not alone the money and property so acquired but also interest on such money at the legal rate from the time of its receipt and the rents, income and profits on such property together with interest thereon at the legal rate from the time of receipt. Any other principle of law would reward the wrong doer by permitting him to
obtain the benefit and use of the property and money which he had wrongfully obtained without accounting for the rents therefrom or interest thereon.
In
Fleishhacker, supra,
the applicable principle with respect to recovery of interest in a case such as this is correctly stated: “The court did not err in allowing interest on the various sums received by Fleishhacker. The amounts received by him as salary and dividends belonged, in equity, to the Bank. Upon these funds the Bank is entitled to interest. It is likewise entitled to interest on the proceeds received by Fleishhacker from the sale of the stock. See Cal. Civ. Code, § 2237; Restatement, Trusts, § 208, Comment f. To deny interest on these sums would be to permit Fleishhacker to profit from the use of moneys belonging to the Bank.” (See also
Jud Whitehead Heater Co.
v.
Obler,
111 Cal.App.2d 861, 871-872 [245 P.2d 608]; 1 Rest., Restitution (perm. ed.) § 156, p. 618; Civ. Code, § 2237.)
Relying on
Tevis
v.
Beigel,
174 Cal.App.2d 90 [344 P.2d 360] defendant suggests that his conduct in the transactions here involved should be considered as merely “constructively fraudulent” and therefore the allowance of interest should have been treated as a discretionary matter under section 3288, Civil Code. We do not view defendant’s acts so lightly as suggested. In any event the trial court was justified in awarding interest on the basis that it did.
The judgment is affirmed.
Ashburn, J., and Herndon, J., concurred.
Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 13, 1962.