Bank of America, N.A. v. Mega World Builder Corp., et al.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedNovember 24, 2025
Docket4:24-cv-03021
StatusUnknown

This text of Bank of America, N.A. v. Mega World Builder Corp., et al. (Bank of America, N.A. v. Mega World Builder Corp., et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of America, N.A. v. Mega World Builder Corp., et al., (S.D. Tex. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT November 24, 2025 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk HOUSTON DIVISION

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., § § Plaintiff, § VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-3021 § MEGA WORLD BUILDER CORP., et al., § § Defendants. § §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A. (“Bank of America”). Bank of America’s motion (Dkt. 111) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Bank of America has sued Defendant Mega World Builder Corp. (“Mega World”) for breach of two loan agreements, foreclosure of a security interest under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), conversion, and unjust enrichment. (Dkt. 78 at pp. 17–20). Bank of America has also sued Mahir Nasif (“Nasif”), who is Mega World’s Chief Executive Officer, for breach of related guaranty agreements. (Dkt. 78 at p. 21). The dispute stems from Bank of America’s extension of millions of dollars in loans to Mega World, repayment of which was guaranteed by Nasif. Bank of America signed three loan agreements with Mega World. The first loan was a $4.5 million revolving line of credit secured by a first-priority blanket security interest in all of Mega World’s assets (“the RLOC”). (Dkt. 78-1; Dkt. 78-2). The second loan was a $3 million equipment loan that Mega World purportedly used to purchase two pieces of heavy equipment—specifically, a trencher and a drill (“the equipment loan”). (Dkt. 78-5;

Dkt. 78-6). The third loan agreement was a commercial credit card agreement (“the credit card agreement”). (Dkt. 78-9). Nasif signed personal guaranties of the RLOC and the equipment loan (“the guaranties”). (Dkt. 78-4; Dkt. 78-8). Bank of America filed UCC financing statements with the Florida Department of State perfecting its liens under the RLOC and the equipment loan. (Dkt. 78-3; Dkt. 78-7).

The RLOC, the equipment loan, and the credit card agreement all contain extensive provisions defining what constitutes a default. All three loans stipulate that Mega World has defaulted if it has provided Bank of America with, in the words of the RLOC, “false or misleading information or representations.” (Dkt. 78-1 at p. 12; Dkt. 78-5 at p. 4; Dkt. 78- 9 at p. 7). Moreover, all three loans contain cross-default provisions stipulating that a

default under one loan constitutes a default under the other two. (Dkt. 78-1 at p. 12; Dkt. 78-5 at p. 4; Dkt. 78-9 at p. 7). In its summary judgment briefing, Bank of America contends that Mega World defaulted under all three loan agreements by repeatedly providing Bank of America with false and misleading information regarding, among other things, the existence of other liens on Bank of America’s collateral. (Dkt. 111 at pp. 6–12).

Bank of America further contends that Mega World defaulted under the credit card agreement—and, by operation of the cross-default provisions, the other two loan agreements as well—when it missed a credit card payment because it lacked sufficient funds to cover the remitted payment. (Dkt. 111 at pp. 14–15). Based on the numerous alleged defaults and Mega World’s failure to repay the loans or turn over the collateral, Bank of America seeks summary judgment on its claims. The Court will grant Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment on its claims for breach of the RLOC, the

equipment loan, and the guaranties1 and for foreclosure of a security interest under Article 9 of the UCC.2 (Dkt. 111 at pp. 18–21). II. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS In deciding a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must determine whether the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials

on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). If the movant will carry the burden of proof at trial, as is the case when the movant is either the plaintiff or a defendant asserting an affirmative defense, then the movant must carry its initial burden under Rule 56 by establishing beyond peradventure

1 Bank of America has not brought an action for breach of the credit card agreement because the credit card agreement contains an arbitration clause. (Dkt. 111 at p. 6). 2 The Court will not grant Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment on its claims for unjust enrichment and conversion. Bank of America states in its summary judgment briefing that it only brought its claim for unjust enrichment “as an alternative remedy” in case the Court “rejects [its] claims for breach of contract[.]” (Dkt. 117 at p. 8). The Court is granting Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment on its claims for breach of contract, so there is no need to discuss the claim for unjust enrichment; and the Court will accordingly consider the unjust enrichment claim voluntarily withdrawn. Furthermore, the Court cannot grant summary judgment for Bank of America on its conversion claim on this record. Under Texas conversion law, Bank of America is required to prove the fair market value of the converted property at the time and place of the conversion. United Mobile Networks, L.P. v. Deaton, 939 S.W.2d 146, 147–48 (Tex. 1997). Bank of America has omitted the damages element entirely from its discussion of its conversion claim and has pointed to no evidence in the record showing the fair market value of any property allegedly converted by Mega World or Nasif. (Dkt. 111 at pp. 21–22). all of the essential elements of its claim or defense. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). If the movant meets its initial burden, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings

and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001). “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” DIRECT TV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2006) (citations

omitted). In deciding whether a genuine and material fact issue has been created, the facts and inferences to be drawn from those facts must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Reaves Brokerage Co. v. Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 2003). However, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the non-movant

“only when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Alexander v. Eeds, 392 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The non- movant’s burden is not met by mere reliance on the allegations or denials in the non- movant’s pleadings. See Diamond Offshore Co. v. A & B Builders, Inc., 302 F.3d 531, 545 n.13 (5th Cir. 2002). Likewise, “conclusory allegations” or “unsubstantiated assertions” do

not meet the non-movant’s burden. Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Little v. Liquid Air Corp.
37 F.3d 1069 (Fifth Circuit, 1994)
Littlefield v. Forney Independent School District
268 F.3d 275 (Fifth Circuit, 2001)
Malacara v. Garber
353 F.3d 393 (Fifth Circuit, 2003)
Alexander v. Eeds
392 F.3d 138 (Fifth Circuit, 2004)
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Robson
420 F.3d 532 (Fifth Circuit, 2005)
Marian Fontenot, Etc. v. The Upjohn Company
780 F.2d 1190 (Fifth Circuit, 1986)
United Mobile Networks, L.P. v. Deaton
939 S.W.2d 146 (Texas Supreme Court, 1997)
Michael Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., et
915 F.3d 987 (Fifth Circuit, 2019)
Tow v. Amegy Bank N.A.
498 B.R. 757 (S.D. Texas, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Bank of America, N.A. v. Mega World Builder Corp., et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-america-na-v-mega-world-builder-corp-et-al-txsd-2025.