Bangladesh Bank v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 20, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-00983
StatusUnknown

This text of Bangladesh Bank v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (Bangladesh Bank v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bangladesh Bank v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

USDC SDNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ DOC #: : DATE FILED:_3/20/2020 BANGLADESH BANK, : Plaintiff, : : 19 Civ. 983 (LGS) -against- : : OPINION & ORDER RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING : CORPORATION, et al., : Defendants. :

wanna nnn eK LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge: This action arises out of an alleged international money laundering scheme in which North Korean hackers stole $101 million from Plaintiff Bangladesh Bank’s New York Federal Reserve account and then transferred and dispersed the money to Defendants’ bank accounts and casinos in the Philippines. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated both state law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).! Four Defendants -- Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (“RCBC”), Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels Inc. (““Bloombery”) d/b/a Solaire Resort & Casino, Eastern Hawaii Leisure Company, Ltd. (“Eastern Hawaii”) d/b/a Midas Hotel & Casino, and Eastern Hawaii’s owner Kam Sing Wong -- move to dismiss the Complaint on various grounds.” For the reasons below, the motion to dismiss the civil RICO claim is granted. In the absence of a viable federal claim, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. The motions to dismiss for lack of

' The state law claims, not at issue in these motions, are: conversion, aiding and abetting conversion, fraud against RCBC only, aiding and abetting fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, conspiracy to trespass against chattels, unjust enrichment, and money had and received. * The remaining 16 named Defendants have not appeared, including some who have not been served. Defendants also include 25 John Doe Defendants who have not been named or served.

subject matter jurisdiction and under the forum non conveniens doctrine are denied. I. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the Complaint and accepted as true for the purpose of this motion only. See Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir 2019).

Plaintiff Bangladesh Bank (the “Bank”) is the central bank of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and is headquartered in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Since 1973, the Bank has maintained a U.S. currency account (“New York Fed Account”) at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“Federal Reserve”), with an average $1 billion balance. The Bank uses the account to conduct eighty-five percent of its international transactions. In February 2016, North Korean hackers broke into the Bank’s computing system, issued false funds transfers and removed approximately $101 million from the Bank’s New York Fed Account. Eventually, $81 million dollars reached the Philippines, passing through bank accounts at Defendant RCBC and through casinos operated by Defendants Bloomberry and Eastern Hawaii (together, the “Casino Defendants”). The following narrative describes the path of the

stolen funds. A. North Korean Hacking By January 2015, North Korean hackers identified the Bank as a target. At that time, the hackers had penetrated the computer system at Sony Pictures Entertainment (“Sony”), and decided to use the same tools and methods against the Bank. Specifically, the hackers began sending spear-phishing emails to Bank employees, which enticed employees to click on links that installed malware onto Bank computers. By March 2015, the malware allowed the hackers to access, fraudulently communicate with and surveil the Bank’s computer network, as well as

2 hide their tracks by making their contact appear authentic and authorized. On January 29, 2016, six days before the theft, the hackers accessed the Bank’s SWIFTLIVE system, the platform on which the Bank communicates with other banks, including to transfer funds between banks. The hackers began executing the theft on Thursday, February 4, 2016, after the close of

business in Bangladesh. They chose this date to minimize monitoring in Bangladesh and the Philippines: in Bangladesh, the work week runs from Sunday through Thursday and businesses are closed on Friday and Saturday. In the Philippines, it was a long holiday weekend and businesses were closed from Saturday through Monday. From 8:55 p.m. through 1:00 A.M. Bangladesh time, or 9:55 a.m. through 2:00 P.M. in New York City, the hackers issued 70 fraudulent payment orders from the Bank’s SWIFT platform, to transfer nearly $1 billion out of the New York Fed Account. Four of the payment orders, totaling $81 million, were fully executed. B. Transfer through RCBC Accounts RCBC is one of the largest banks in the Philippines and is headquartered in the Manila

metropolitan area. The hackers’ payment orders directed the stolen funds be routed through RCBC correspondent accounts in the United States and then to RCBC accounts in the Philippines. 1. Correspondent Accounts Because RCBC does not have a New York Fed account, to which funds could be transferred directly, stopovers at local correspondent accounts were necessary. The funds passed through four correspondent accounts on Thursday, February 4, 2016, three of which are located at banks in New York City and the fourth at a bank in Philadelphia.

3 2. Fictitious Accounts On Friday, February 5, 2016, the $81 million moved from the correspondent accounts to four fictitious accounts at RCBC in the Philippines (the “Fictitious Accounts”). John Doe Defendants and Defendant Wong of Eastern Hawaii -- a good friend of RCBC’s then-President

and CEO Lorenzo Tan -- created the Fictitious Accounts expressly to carry out this scheme. RCBC later admitted that the Fictitious Accounts did not belong to real people. The Complaint alleges, however, that RCBC was aware, or should have been aware, that the accounts were fake upon opening: they were all opened on May 15, 2015, with identical $500 deposits, and sat dormant for nine months until the influx of stolen funds on February 5, 2016. Each account holder claimed to earn an identical 1.5 million pesos, equivalent to $28,000 per month, but no employment records verified their jobs. The driver’s licenses of the account holders did not exist in public records. Nor did signatures on the licenses match signatures on account opening documents. Mail to the account addresses was undeliverable. Internal policy required that RCBC employees investigate and explain undeliverable mail in a weekly report to the

District Sales Director. But Defendants Maia Deguito and Angela Torres, senior employees at the RCBC Jupiter branch, responsible for creating the Fictitious Account reports, failed to do so or take any other action. Furthermore, although local banks are aware of the high risk of money laundering at Philippine casinos, Defendants Deguito and Torres and other RCBC employees prepared and executed the Fictitious Account documents at casinos, including at Defendant Eastern Hawaii. Defendant Deguito testified to the Philippine Senate that Defendant CEO Tan, a good friend of Defendant Wong of Eastern Hawaii, knew about the Fictitious Accounts but did nothing.

4 3. The Philrem and Go-Centurytex Accounts Over the following days, the $81 million moved from the Fictitious Accounts into other RCBC accounts, primarily the Philrem Accounts, via the intermediary Go-Centurytex Account. The Philrem Accounts belonged to Defendant Philrem Service Corp. (“Philrem”), a Filipino

corporation co-owned by Defendants Salud Bautista and Michael Bautista. The Go-Centurytex Account belonged to Defendant William So Go, a co-owner of Defendant Centurytex Trading, another Philippine corporation. The latter account was opened on February 5, 2016, the same day the stolen funds arrived at RCBC.

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