Baltazar v. Goldfarb Properties

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 22, 2023
Docket7:22-cv-07363
StatusUnknown

This text of Baltazar v. Goldfarb Properties (Baltazar v. Goldfarb Properties) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baltazar v. Goldfarb Properties, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MYNOR FEDERICO NUNEZ BALTAZAR, Plaintiff, -against- GOLDFARB PROPERTIES, INC.; PELICAN 22-CV-7363 (LTS) MANAGEMENT, INC.; ROCKAWAY ONE COMPANY, LLC; CHRISTOPHER MILLER; ORDER TO AMEND LINDSAY HEINEMAN (HECK); MICHAEL KOENIG; HAL WEINER; SOPHIA BIRAGLIA; BETTINA EQUITIES COMPANY, LLC; BETTINA EQUITIES MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and “the Fair Housing Act of 1978” (“FHA”), alleging that “Defendants have deliberately disregarded known or serious known risks of harm to Plaintiff, and their actions and failures to act cause harm or serious risks of harm to Plaintiff, including unnecessary isolation and segregation, physical, medical, and psychological harm.” (ECF No. 2 at 1.) By order dated August 30, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Mynor Federico Nunez Baltazar, who resides at 20-50 Seagirt Blvd. Apt. # 3E, Far Rockaway, New York, brings this action alleging that he is “a qualified individual with disabilities,” and that Defendants are violating his rights. (ECF No. 2 at 4.) He alleges that his medical providers, together with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Public Housing Authority (PHA), made and approved an accommodation request to Plaintiff’s landlord and issued a move voucher to Plaintiff, requesting that Plaintiff be moved to Manhattan or the Bronx, on an emergency basis to alleviate serious conditions of isolation and segregation, which were exacerbating Plaintiff’s medical condition. (Id.) He claims that

Defendants have refused to move him, and his “Section 8 Move Voucher” expired. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff made a second accommodation request “due to isolation causing a significant breakdown in Plaintiff’s mental health. Which included suicidal ideation and attempted suicide on or about November, 2021. When a neighbor called Firefighters and Wavecrest Gardens Security to put out a fire in Plaintiff’s apartment; saving Plaintiff from suicidal death.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he received a telephone call on August 19, 2022, advising him that his second request for accommodation had been approved, and that a new Section 8 Move Voucher would be issued. (Id.) Plaintiff brings this action seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages in the amount of $500,000.00.

DISCUSSION A. The Fair Housing Act The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing.” Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979). Specifically, it prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, . . . national origin,” or disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f). Section 3604 makes it unlawful to “discriminate in the . . . rental [of], or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any . . . renter because of” the individual’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A). It also prohibits discrimination against “any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such a dwelling, because of a [disability].” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Under the FHA, disability discrimination further includes a refusal to make “reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal

opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). “To demonstrate a disability under the FHA, a plaintiff must show: (1) ‘a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities’; (2) ‘a record of having such an impairment’; or (3) that he or she is ‘regarded as having such an impairment.’” See Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty, Inc., 788 F.3d 31, 40 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

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Baltazar v. Goldfarb Properties, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baltazar-v-goldfarb-properties-nysd-2023.