Achor, J.
— Appellant was charged and tried before a jury and convicted of second degree murder.
Appellant, in said motion for new trial and in his brief, sets forth 21 causes for a new trial. However, because only Causes numbered 1, 5, 6 and 21 are supported by substantial argument, other asserted causes for new trial are considered waived. Rule 2-17 (e) and (f).
We will therefore consider appellant’s grounds for new trial in the order above presented:
1. Did the court commit reversible error in overruling appellant’s motion for change of venue from the county? It is appellant’s contention that although the statute1 [§9-1305, Burns’ 1956 Repl.] merely grants [132]*132a right to a change of venue, subject to the discretion of the court, that the denial of such change of venue under the circumstances constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and was in violation of Art. 1, §13 of the Indiana Constitution,2 and the 6th Amend, to the Constitution of the United States.3
In support of his contention, appellant cites and relies upon the case of Irvin v. Dowd (1960), 366 U. S. 717, 6 L. Ed. (2d) 751, 81 Sup. Ct. 1639. Appellant also cites, with approval, language contained in the dissenting opinion of State ex rel. Fox v. LaPorte C. C. (1936), 236 Ind. 69, 138 N. E. 2d 875.
We have this observation, regarding the case of Irvin v. Dowd, supra. In that case this court affirmed the decision of the trial court which had denied a change of venue beyond an adjoining county. However, the U. S. Supreme Court, in effect, reversed both decisions, and ordered a new trial. In that case the defendant had confessed to the cold-blooded murder of six women in the Indiana, Kentucky and Illinois tri-state area. These events naturally received extensive and impassioned publicity. Eight of the twelve jurors selected to try the accused, stated that in their opinion he was [133]*133guilty of the particular murder charged, but that, in deciding the case, they would not be guided by their present opinion as to the defendant’s guilt, but would be guided solely by the facts presented at the trial and by the law as stated by the court. Until the case of Irvin v. Dowd, supra, this has always been the test by which to determine the qualification of a juror.4 The trial court, who saw, heard, and believed the statements of these prospective jurors, accepted them as qualified jurors.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in reaching its decision, obviously assumed the role of a trial court and determined for itself the credibility of the prospective jurors, as witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony. We have not conceived this to be a proper function of this court, as a court of review.
In any event, the facts in the Irvin case, as indicated in the U. S. Supreme Court opinion, were altogether different from those existing in the case at bar. In that case the U. S. Supreme Court described the facts as follows:
“ . . . With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of the members admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt....”
In the present case, there was no evidence of an “atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion,” nor did the evidence, taken at the hearing on [134]*134the change of venue, indicate that there was such prejudice or odium, with regard to the appellant or the offense, that an unprejudiced jury could not be selected in the county.
We have no quarrel with the statement quoted by Emmert, J., in the dissenting opinion in State v. LaPorte ex rel. C. C., supra (236 Ind. 69, at pp. 90-91):
“ ‘There can be no justice in a trial by jurors inflamed by passion, warped by prejudice, awed by violence, menaced by the virulence of public opinion or manifestly biased by any influences operating either openly or insiduously to such an extent as to poison the judgment and prevent the freedom of fair action. . . ’ ” [Crocker v. Justices of the Superior Court (1911), 208 Mass. 162, 179, 94 N. E. 369.]
However, the observation contained in the above statement is not applicable to this case. In this case the motion for change of venue contained only general conclusions on the subject of bias and prejudice, and was not supported by affidavits of disinterested residents of the county. At the hearing on the motion for change of venue, certain newspaper items were submitted, which we find to be neither inflamatory nor prejudicial in character. Furthermore, the state, in opposition to the motion for change of venue, introduced numerous witnesses who testified that neither were the newspaper items prejudicial, nor were they aware of any odium, bias or prejudice in the community which would interfere with a fair trial of the case.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for change of venue . from the county and that appellant’s constitutional rights were not violated by such action of the court.
[135]*135We next consider appellant’s second contention, that the jury’s verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence.
The statute under which the appellant was charged, convicted, and sentenced, is Acts 1905, ch. 169, §350, p. 584, as found in §10-3404, Burns’ 1956 Repl., which reads as follows:
“Whoever, purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the second degree, and, on conviction, shall be imprisoned in the state prison during life.”
Thus, it was incumbent here for the state to prove the purposeful and malicious hilling by appellant of his paramour, Culla Horton, as charged in the indictment. Warren v. State (1963), 243 Ind. 508, 188 N. E. 2d 108.
This court has held that the intent and malice necessary to sustain a charge of murder in the second degree may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the transaction. DeBoor v. State (1962), 243 Ind. 87, 182 N. E. 2d 250.
This court has also held that:
“Concerning the absence of evidence of motive in the case, this Court has stated the rule as follows: “ ‘ “With motives, in any speculative or psychological sense, neither the law, nor the tribunal which administers the law, has any proper concern. The outward acts of men are all that they profess, or are called upon to regulate or to punish. . . . And that motives may be inferred from conduct, as well as conduct from motives, is a familiar principle in the law of presumptive evidence.” ’ [Hinshaw v. State (1877), 147 Ind. 334, 364, 47 N. E. 157.]
[136]*136[135]*135“Also, it has been held that motive may be inferred from the commission of the criminal act. [136]*136Evans v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 55, 64, 155 N. E. 203, 206; Morgan
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Achor, J.
— Appellant was charged and tried before a jury and convicted of second degree murder.
Appellant, in said motion for new trial and in his brief, sets forth 21 causes for a new trial. However, because only Causes numbered 1, 5, 6 and 21 are supported by substantial argument, other asserted causes for new trial are considered waived. Rule 2-17 (e) and (f).
We will therefore consider appellant’s grounds for new trial in the order above presented:
1. Did the court commit reversible error in overruling appellant’s motion for change of venue from the county? It is appellant’s contention that although the statute1 [§9-1305, Burns’ 1956 Repl.] merely grants [132]*132a right to a change of venue, subject to the discretion of the court, that the denial of such change of venue under the circumstances constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and was in violation of Art. 1, §13 of the Indiana Constitution,2 and the 6th Amend, to the Constitution of the United States.3
In support of his contention, appellant cites and relies upon the case of Irvin v. Dowd (1960), 366 U. S. 717, 6 L. Ed. (2d) 751, 81 Sup. Ct. 1639. Appellant also cites, with approval, language contained in the dissenting opinion of State ex rel. Fox v. LaPorte C. C. (1936), 236 Ind. 69, 138 N. E. 2d 875.
We have this observation, regarding the case of Irvin v. Dowd, supra. In that case this court affirmed the decision of the trial court which had denied a change of venue beyond an adjoining county. However, the U. S. Supreme Court, in effect, reversed both decisions, and ordered a new trial. In that case the defendant had confessed to the cold-blooded murder of six women in the Indiana, Kentucky and Illinois tri-state area. These events naturally received extensive and impassioned publicity. Eight of the twelve jurors selected to try the accused, stated that in their opinion he was [133]*133guilty of the particular murder charged, but that, in deciding the case, they would not be guided by their present opinion as to the defendant’s guilt, but would be guided solely by the facts presented at the trial and by the law as stated by the court. Until the case of Irvin v. Dowd, supra, this has always been the test by which to determine the qualification of a juror.4 The trial court, who saw, heard, and believed the statements of these prospective jurors, accepted them as qualified jurors.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in reaching its decision, obviously assumed the role of a trial court and determined for itself the credibility of the prospective jurors, as witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony. We have not conceived this to be a proper function of this court, as a court of review.
In any event, the facts in the Irvin case, as indicated in the U. S. Supreme Court opinion, were altogether different from those existing in the case at bar. In that case the U. S. Supreme Court described the facts as follows:
“ . . . With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of the members admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt....”
In the present case, there was no evidence of an “atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion,” nor did the evidence, taken at the hearing on [134]*134the change of venue, indicate that there was such prejudice or odium, with regard to the appellant or the offense, that an unprejudiced jury could not be selected in the county.
We have no quarrel with the statement quoted by Emmert, J., in the dissenting opinion in State v. LaPorte ex rel. C. C., supra (236 Ind. 69, at pp. 90-91):
“ ‘There can be no justice in a trial by jurors inflamed by passion, warped by prejudice, awed by violence, menaced by the virulence of public opinion or manifestly biased by any influences operating either openly or insiduously to such an extent as to poison the judgment and prevent the freedom of fair action. . . ’ ” [Crocker v. Justices of the Superior Court (1911), 208 Mass. 162, 179, 94 N. E. 369.]
However, the observation contained in the above statement is not applicable to this case. In this case the motion for change of venue contained only general conclusions on the subject of bias and prejudice, and was not supported by affidavits of disinterested residents of the county. At the hearing on the motion for change of venue, certain newspaper items were submitted, which we find to be neither inflamatory nor prejudicial in character. Furthermore, the state, in opposition to the motion for change of venue, introduced numerous witnesses who testified that neither were the newspaper items prejudicial, nor were they aware of any odium, bias or prejudice in the community which would interfere with a fair trial of the case.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for change of venue . from the county and that appellant’s constitutional rights were not violated by such action of the court.
[135]*135We next consider appellant’s second contention, that the jury’s verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence.
The statute under which the appellant was charged, convicted, and sentenced, is Acts 1905, ch. 169, §350, p. 584, as found in §10-3404, Burns’ 1956 Repl., which reads as follows:
“Whoever, purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the second degree, and, on conviction, shall be imprisoned in the state prison during life.”
Thus, it was incumbent here for the state to prove the purposeful and malicious hilling by appellant of his paramour, Culla Horton, as charged in the indictment. Warren v. State (1963), 243 Ind. 508, 188 N. E. 2d 108.
This court has held that the intent and malice necessary to sustain a charge of murder in the second degree may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the transaction. DeBoor v. State (1962), 243 Ind. 87, 182 N. E. 2d 250.
This court has also held that:
“Concerning the absence of evidence of motive in the case, this Court has stated the rule as follows: “ ‘ “With motives, in any speculative or psychological sense, neither the law, nor the tribunal which administers the law, has any proper concern. The outward acts of men are all that they profess, or are called upon to regulate or to punish. . . . And that motives may be inferred from conduct, as well as conduct from motives, is a familiar principle in the law of presumptive evidence.” ’ [Hinshaw v. State (1877), 147 Ind. 334, 364, 47 N. E. 157.]
[136]*136[135]*135“Also, it has been held that motive may be inferred from the commission of the criminal act. [136]*136Evans v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 55, 64, 155 N. E. 203, 206; Morgan v. State (1921), 190 Ind. 411, 417, 130 N. E. 528, 530.” Byrd v. State (1962), 243 Ind. 452, 185 N. E. 2d 422, 425.
Furthermore, this court has held that under like circumstances, whether or not purpose and malice have been proven, are questions of fact for the jury. Wahl v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 521, 98 N. E. 2d 671.
On appeal, only the evidence most favorable to the state will be considered, as well as all reasonable and logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Tait v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 35, 188 N. E. 2d 537.
The evidence most favorable to the state against appellant LeRoy Baker, including the necessity to determine whether or not appellant had a diseased or insane mind at the time the deceased was killed, is as follows:
Appellant and the deceased had been involved in extramarital romance for several months. On the night of November 9, 1961, at about 11:00 o’clock, both the appellant and decedent were in the Pub Tavern in Aurora. They were both sober when they left. Later, on the same night, a witness, who had lost his billfold in the vicinity, passed appellant’s car, which was parked in a wide place off the road on a “lover’s lane,” on three different occasions. On the first or second occasion, he saw a woman’s legs over the seat on the driver’s side of the car. She was wearing black slacks or pedal pushers, and had on white shoes or sox. On the third occasion, seeing his billfold at about the same location, he stopped to pick it up and casually spoke to appellant Baker, who “didn’t appear to be drunk.” [137]*137This was about 12:30 a.m. The next day the victim’s body, so attired, was found at the bottom of the embankment by the road where appellant’s car had been parked the night before. The following day appellant was arrested and taken to Dearborn County Jail, where, on interrogation, he admitted that he had killed the decedent and left her where her body had been found. According to the coroner, she had suffered death by strangulation.
At the conclusion of appellant’s evidence, evidence was presented on appellant’s plea of not guilty by reason of temporary insanity and plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease. This testimony was to the effect that appellant was sane, both at the time of the criminal act and at the time of trial. Thus, the state, contrary to appellant’s contention, did submit substantial evidence of probative value upon appellant’s special plea of temporary insanity and diseased mind and thus sustained its burden of proof upon this issue. See: Flowers v. State (1947), 236 Ind. 151, 139 N. E. 2d 185; Warren v. State (1963), 243 Ind. 508, 188 N. E. 2d 108, supra.
As a third major contention, appellant asserts that the verdict is contrary to law because of deficiencies in the evidence. Only when the evidence is with-out conflict and leads to but one reasonable conclusion, and the verdict of the jury reaches a contrary conclusion, will the verdict be disturbed as being contrary to law. White v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 199, 191 N. E. 2d 486; Warren v. State, supra; Bowens v. State (1953), 231 Ind. 559, 109 N. E. 2d 91. Such are not the facts in this case.
As cause No. 21 of his motion for new trial, appellant contends that the trial judge erred in sustaining [138]*138the state’s objection to the following question asked of Dr. Fong, the recognized medical expert:
“Q. Do you know of your own knowledge, and if you don’t know please feel free to say, that in the eyes of the law that it is possible for a person to reach a point of intoxication where he is unable to control his impulses and determine right from wrong and that at such point that is considered a mental disease?” [Óur emphasis.]
The above question is one involving a proposition of law. It does not establish evidentiary facts or tend to prove an ultimate fact in issue. The ultimate fact of whether or not LeRoy Baker was laboring under such legal disability as would constitute a complete defense to the crime charged was one to be decided by the jury, pursuant to instructions on the subject by the court, not this medical expert.
The question was, in terms of subject-matter, an improper one to ask. In any event, (1) Dr. Fong is not recognized as an expert on the law; (2) appellant made no offer to prove as to the excluded evidence,5 and (3) by its Instruction No. 15, the trial court substantially stated the correct law in Indiana on this matter.
Judgment affirmed.
Landis, C. J., and Myers, J., concur. Arterburn, J., concurs, with opinion. Jackson, J., concurs in result.