Irvin v. Dowd

359 U.S. 394, 79 S. Ct. 825, 3 L. Ed. 2d 900, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1086

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: May 4, 1959
• Docket: 63
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner brought this habeas corpus proceeding in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under 28 U. S. C. § 2241,¹ claiming that his conviction, for murder in the Circuit Court'of Gibson County, Indiana, was obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the writ, 153 F. Supp. 531, under the provision of 28 U. S. C. § 2254 that habeas corpus “shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the state . . . 2 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 251 F. 2d 548. We granted certiorari, 356 U: S. 948.³

The constitutional claim arises in this way. Six murders were committed in the vicinity of Evansville, Indiana, two in December 1954, and four in March 1955. The crimes, extensively covered by' news media in the locality, aroused great excitement and indignation throughout Vanderburgh County, where Evansville is located, and'adjoining Gibson County, a rural county of approximately 30,000 inhabitants. The petitioner was arrested on April 8, 1955. Shortly thereafter, the Prosecutor of .Vanderburgh County and Evansville • police officials issued press releases, which were intensively-publicized, stating that the petitioner had confessed to the six murders. The Vanderburgh County Grand Jury soon indicted the petitioner for the murder which resulted in his conviction. This was the murder of Whitney Wesley Kerr allegedly committed in Vanderburgh County on December 23, 1954. Counsel appointed to defend petitioner immediately sought a change of venue from Van-derburgh County, which was granted, but to adjoining Gibson County. Alleging that the widespread and inflammatory publicity had also highly prejudiced the inhabitants of Gibson County against the petitioner, counsel, on October 29, 1955, sought another change of venue, from Gibson County to a county sufficiently removed from the Evansville locality that a fair trial would not be prejudiced. The motion was denied, apparently because the pertinent Indiana statute allows only a single change of. venue.⁴

The voir dire examinations of prospective jurors began in Gibson County on November 14, 1955. The aver-ments as to the prejudice by which the trial was allegedly environed find corroboration in the fact that from the first day of the voir dire considerable difficulty was experienced in selecting jurors who did not have fixed opinions that the petitioner was guilty. The petitioner’s counsel therefore renewed his motion for a change of venue, which motion was denied. He renewed the motion a second time, on December .7, 1955, reciting in his moving papers: “in the voir dire examination of 355 jurors called in this case to qualify as jurors 233 have expressed and formed their opinion as stated in said voir dire, that the. defendant is guilty . . . Again the motion was denied. Alternatively, on each of eight days over the four weeks required to select a jury, counsel sought a continuance of the trial on the ground that a fair trial at that time was not possible in the prevailing atmosphere of hostility toward the petitioner. All of the motions for a continuance were denied. The State Prosecutor, in a radio broadcast during the second week of the voir dire examination, stated that “the unusual coverage given to the case by the newspapers and radio” caused “trouble in getting a jury of people who are not [sic] unbiased and unprejudiced in the case.”

■ The petitioner’s counsel exhausted all 20 of his peremptory challenges] and when 12 jurors were ultimately accepted by the court also unsuccessfully challenged all of them for alleged bias and prejudice against the petitioner, complaining particularly that four of the jurors,, in their voir dire examinations, stated that they had an opinion that.petitioner was guilty of the murder charged.⁵

Also, at the trial, the State’s Prosecuting Attorney took the stand as part of his presentation of the State’s case, and over petitioner’s objection was allowed to testify that the petitioner, five days after his arrest, on April 13,1955, had orally confessed the murder of Kerr to him. The Prosecuting Attorney was also permitted in summation, again over petitioner’s objection, to vouch his own testimony by commenting to the jury, “I testified myself what was told me.”

The opinions of the Indiana Supreme Court and the District Court held the constitutional claim to be without merit. Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 392-394, 139 N. E. 2d 898, 902; Irvin v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531, 535-539. On the other hand, Chief Judge Duffy of the Court of Appeals, concurring in the affirmance of the dismissal by the District Court, reached a contrary conclusion: “Irvin was not accorded due process of law in the trial which resulted in his conviction and death sentence. In my judgment, he. did not receive a fair trial because some of the jury had preconceived opinions as to defendant’s guilt, and also because of the conduct of the prosecuting attorney.” 251 F. 2d 548, 554.

The Gibson County jury returned its verdict on December 20, 1955, and assessed the death penalty. Indiana law allows 30 days from the date of the verdict within which to file a motion for a new trial in the trial court: Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann., 1956 Replacement Vol., § 9-1903. The petitioner’s counsel, on January 19, 1956, the 30th day, filed such a motion specifying- 415 grounds of error constituting the- alleged denial of constitutional rights. However, the petitioner had escaped from custody the night before, January 18, 1956, and on January 23, 1956, the trial court overruled the motion, noting that the petitioner had been an escapee when the motion was filed'and was still at large. The petitioner was captured in California about three weeks later and, on February 17, 1956, was confined in the Indiana State Prison.

Under Indiana law the denial of the new trial was not appealable, but was reviewable by the Indiana Supreme Court only if assigned as error in the event of an appeal from the judgment of conviction., The State Supreme Court has held:

“The statute [providing for appeal] does not authorize an appeal from every ruling which a court may make against a defendant in a criminal action, but only authorizes an appeal ‘from any judgment . . . against him,’ and provides for review, upon such appeal, of decisions and rulings of the court made in the progress of the case. This court' has construed the statute as authorizing an appeal only from a final judgment in a criminal action. The action of a trial court in overruling a motion for a new trial may be reviewed upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction rendered against a defendant, but the overruling of a motion' for a new trial must be assigned as error. In such case the appeal is from the judgment of conviction and not from the ruling upon the motion for a new trial. The.overruling of a motion for a new trial does not constitute a judgment and an appeal does not lie from the court’s action in overruling such motion.” Selke v. State, 211 Ind. 232. 234. 6 N. E. 2d 570. 571.

The judgment of conviction imposing the death sentence was entered January 9,1956. The petitioner was entitled to appeal, as a matter of rights from that judgment, pro - vided, in compliance with % State Supreme Court rule,⁶ the appeal- was perfected by filing with the Clerk of. the Supreme Court a transcript of the trial record and an assignment of errors within 90 days of the judgment. The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, extend the time on proper motion made within the 90-day period. The questions before the Supreme Court are those raised by the appellant in his assignment of errors.

On March 22, 1956, the petitioner applied for an extension of time within which to file the trial transcript and his assignment of errors.. This was after he was returned to the custody of the State and well within 90 days from January 9, 1956, the date of the judgment of conviction. We were advised on oral argument that the State objected to this motion “because he [petitioner] had escaped,” and a hearing was held on the objection by the State Supreme Court. Petitioner’s motion was granted and the time was extended to Juné 1, 1956. The assignment of errors, timely filed with the trial transcript of some 5,000 pages, assigned only one . ground of error— that , “the [trial] Court erred in overruling appellant’s motion for new trial.” The -petitioner’s brief of over 700 pages opened by advising the State Supreme Court that “Under this single assignment of error, the appellant has combined all errors alleged to have been committed prior to the filing of the motion for a new trial.” In short, the form of the assignment was a shorthand way of specifying the 415 grounds stated in the motion for new trial as constituting the claimed denial of constitutional rights. Indeed the only arguments made in the lengthy brief related to the constitutional claim. The State’s brief devoted some 70 pages to answering these contentions, and in 7 additional pages argued that in any event the Circuit Court had not erred in denying the motion for a new trial because the petitioner was an escapee at the time it was filed and decided.

The case before the Indiana Supreme Court was thus an appeal perfected in full compliance with Indiana procedure; therefore, the court was required under Indiana law to pass on the merits of the petitioner’s assignment of error. That the assignment of error was sufficient to present the constitutional claim is evident from the court’s acceptance of it as the basis for considering the 415 grounds of alleged error constituting that claim. However, under the single assignment of error, the judgment of conviction could be affirmed by the State Supreme Court if, for any reason finding support in the record, the motion for a new trial was properly overruled. The State argued that the overruling should be upheld on either of two grounds: one, because the petitioner was an escapee at the time the motion was made and decided, and, two, because the trial itself was fair and without error. Petitioner’s appeal clearly raised both of these issues and the Indiana Supreme Court discussed both in its opinion.

We think that the District Court and Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the State Supreme Court decision rested on the ground that the petitioner was an escapee when his motion for a new trial was made and decided. On the contrary, the opinion to us is more reasonably to be read as resting the judgment on the holding that the petitioner’s constitutional claim is without merit.' As we have shown, under the state procedure, the State Supreme Court could have rested its. decision solely on the federal constitutional claim.⁷ This, we think, is what the Indiana high court did. The opinion discusses both issues. ■ The discussion of the escape issue concludes with the statement, “No error could have , been committed' in. overruling the rhotion for a new trial under the circumstances.” 236 Ind., at 392, 139 N. E. 2d, at 902. But the opinion proceeds: “Our decision on the point under examination makes it unnecessary for us to consider the other contentions of the appellant; however, because of the finality of the sentence in the case we have reviewed the evidence to satisfy ourselves that there is no miscarriage of justice in the case.” 236 Ind., at 392-393, 139 N. E. 2d, at 902. The-conclusion reached after discussion of the merits is: “It does not appear from the record and argument had, that the appellant was denied due process of law under C Fourteenth Amendment . . . 236 Ind., at 394hiid9 N. E. 2d, at 902. The court’s statement that its conclusion on .the escape point made it “unnecessary” to consider the constitutional claim was not a holding that the judgment was rested on that ground. Rather the court proceeded to determine the merits “because of the finality of the sentence” and “to satisfy ourselves that there is no miscarriage of justice.” In this way, in our view, the State Supreme Court discharged the obligation which rests upon “the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, . . . to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or' secured by the Constitution of the United States . . . .” Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 637. We thus believe that the opinion is to be read as rested upon the State Supreme Court’s considered conclusion that the conviction resulting in the death sentence, was not obtained in disregard of the protections secured to the petitioner by the Constitution of the United States.

In this posture, 28 U. S. C. § 2254 does not bar the petitioner’s resort to federal habeas corpus. The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies in federal habeas corpus was judicially fashioned after the Congress, by the Act of February 5, 1867, greatly expanded the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts to embrace “all cases where any person may be restrained of his . . . liberty in violation of the constitution, or of .any treaty or law of the United States .• . . .” 14_Stat. 385. Although the statute has been re-enacted with minor changes at various times the sweep of the jurisdiction granted by this broad phrasing has remained unchanged.⁸ .

Since there inhered in this expanded grant of power, beside the added burden on the federal courts, the potentiality of conflict between federal and state courts, this Court, starting with the decision in Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, developed the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies, a “rule . . . that the . . . Courts of the United States, while they have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for" the purpose of inquiring into the cause of restraint of liberty of any person in custody under, the authority of a State in violation of the Constitution, . . . yet, except in cases of peculiar urgency, ought not to exercise that jurisdiction by a discharge of the person in advance of a final determination of his case in the courts of the State, . . .” Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 104-105. The principles are now reasonably clear. “Ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained under a state court judgment of conviction for crime will be entertained by a federal court only after all state remedies available, including all appellate remédies in the state courts and in this Court by appeal or writ of cer-tiorari, have been exhausted.” Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 116-117. The principles of the doctrine have been embodied in 28 U. S. C. § 2254 which was enacted by Congress to codify the existing habeas corpus practice. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 210-214; Young v. Ragen, 337 U. S. 235, 238, note 1; Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 447-450. As is stated in the Reviser’s Note: “This new section is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court.”⁹

The petitioner in this case plainly invoked “all state remedies available” and obtained “a final determination” of his constitutional claim from the Indiana Supreme Court.’ Certainly Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, relied upon by the Court of Appeals, does not bear-on his situation. In that case the two petitioners in Daniels v. Allen had 60 days in which to make and serve a statement of the case on appeal from a conviction in the state trial court. Counsel failed to serve this statement until 61 days had expired, and the trial judge struck the appeal as out of time. The pertinent North Carolina rule provided that the time limitation was “mandatory,” and precluded an appeal to the State Supreme Court.. The State Supreme Court dismissed petitioners’ attempted appeal on the ground that no appeal had been filed. This Court held that under the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies habeas corpus ought not be granted since petitioners had sought too late'to invoke North Carolina’s “adequate and easily-complied-with method of appeal.” 344- U. S., at. 485. In contrast, the petitioner’s appeal from his judgment of conviction to the Indiana Supreme Court raising the constitutional claim was timely and was accepted by that court as fully complying with all pertinent procedural requirements. Furthermore, the State Supreme Court did reach and. decide petitioner’s federal constitutional claim.

We therefore hold that the case is governed by the principle that the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies embodied in 28 U. S. C. § ^254 does not bar resort to federal habeas corpus if the petitioner has obtained a decision on his coñstitutional claims from the highest court of the State, even though, as here, that court could have based its decision on another ground. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672. In this view, we do not reach the question whether federal, habeas corpus would have been available to the petitioner had the Indiana Supreme Court rested its decision on the escape ground.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court. The Court of Appeals may decide the merits of petitioner’s constitutional claim, or remand to the District Court for further consideration of that claim, as the Court of Appeals may determine.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Stewart concurs in the judgment and the opinion of the Court, with the understanding that the Court does not here depart from the principles announced in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443.

1 Section 2241 provides in pertinent part:.

“(a) Writs of¹ habeas corpus may be granted by the . . . district courts . . . within their respective jurisdictions.

“(c) The writ of habeas corpus jshall not be extended to a prisoner unless ...

“(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws^ or treaties of the United States ....

2 The full text of § 2254 is as follows: ’

“An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the. applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights' of the .prisoner.

“An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.”

3 The case was here previously on Irvin’s petition seeking direct review on certiorari to the Indiana Supreme Court from that court’s decision in Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 139 N. E. 2d 898. Certiorari was denied “without prejudice to filing for federal habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies.” 353 U. S. 948. The Indiana Assistant Attorney General, on the oral argument here, advised that there was not then, nor is there now, any state procedure available for the petitioner to obtain a determination of his constitutional claim.

4 Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann., 1956 Replacement Vol., § 9-1305, provides:

“When affidavits for a change of venue are founded upon excitement or prejudice in the county against the defendant, the court, in all cases not punishable by death, may, in its discretion, and in all cases punishable by death, shall grant a change of yenue to the most convenient county. The clerk must thereupon immediately make a transcript of the proceedings and orders of court, and, having sealed up the same with the original papers, shall deliver them to the sheriff, who must, without delay, deposit them in the clerk’s office of the proper county, and make his return accordingly: Provided, however, That only one [1] change of venue from the judge, and only one [1] change from the county shall be granted.”

5 The trial judge qualified the jurors in question under the authority of Burns’ Ind. St-at. Ann., 1956 Replacement Vol., §9-1504, which provides:

“The following shall be good causes for challenge to any person called as a juror in any criminal trial:

“Second. That he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. But if' a person called as a juror states that he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the court or the parties shall thereupon proceed to examine such juror on oath as to the ground of such opinion; and if it appears to have been founded upon reading newspaper statements, communications, comments or reports, or upon rumors or hearsay, and not upon conversation with witnesses of the transaction, or reading reports of their testimony, or hearing them testify, and the juror states on oath that he feels able, notwithstanding such opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and evidence, the court, if satisfied that he is impartial and will render such verdict, may, in its discretion, admit him as competent to serve in such case.”

6 Rule 2-2 of the Supreme Court of Indiana, Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann., 1946 Replacement Vol. 2; pt. I, p. 8, provides:

“Time for appeal or review. — In all appeals and reviews the assignment of errors and transcript of the record must be filed in the office of the .clerk of the Supremé Court within 90 days, from the date of the judgment or .the ruling on the motion for a new trial, unless the statute under which the appeal or review is taken fixes a shorter time, in which latter event the statute shall control. If within the time for filing the assignment of errors and transcript, as above provided, it is made to appear to the court to which an appeal or review is sought, notice having been given to the adverse parties, that notwithstanding due diligence on the part of ’ the parties seeking' an appeal or review, it has been-and will be impossible to procure a bill of exceptions or transcript to permit the filing of the transcript within the time allowed, the court to which the appeal or review is sought may, in its discretion, grant a reasonable extension of time within which to file such transcript and assignment of errors. When the appellant is under legal' disability at the time the judgment is rendered, he may file the transcript and assignment of errors within 90 days after the removal of the disability.”

The statutory provision for appeal is Burns’ Ind. Stat. Anni, 1956 Replacement Vol., §9-2301, which provider"

“Appeal by defendant — Decisions and orders reviewed. — An appeal to the Supreme Court . . . may be taken by the defendant as a matter of right, from any judgment in a criminal action against him, in the manner and in the cases prescribed herein; and, upon the appeal, any decision of the court or intermediate order made in the progress of the case may be reviewed.” ' • • •

7 This conclusion was also expressed on the oral argument in this Court by the State’s Assistant Attorney General.

8 The substance of the original Act of 1867 is now found in 28 U. S. C. § 2241, see note 1, supra.

9 For the legislative history, see H. R. Rep. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. A172; H. R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. A180; S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th .Cong.,