OPINION
ANDELL, Justice.'
The appellant, Carrie M. Baker, appeals a judgment in her favor. In her sole point of error, Baker argues the court clearly erred by overruling her challenge to the racially motivated use of a jury strike. We affirm.
Background
During jury selection, Lexington Place exercised a peremptory challenge to remove venire member number three, a black woman, from the panel. Baker objected that the challenge was impermissibly motivated by race under Batson v. Kentucky.1
The court conducted a brief hearing on Baker’s challenge, which went as follows:2
MR. GOLUB: Judge, we need to do a Batson challenge to the exclusion of Juror No. 8. I don’t believe there was any justification for excluding her from the panel. I think this was based on the fact that she is a black woman, and I don’t know there’s any nondiseriminato-ry reason for her exclusion from the panel.
THE COURT: Your response?
MR. HANDY: Your Honor, we based — we didn’t consider color. We based it on the fact that she’s a postal worker and a union worker, and postal workers are known to be militant and more pro-employee then pro-employer, and that’s what was the basis for striking that juror.
MR. GOLUB: There is another postal worker on the panel, No. 17, and he was not struck by the defendants.
MR. HANDY: Well, that’s the lesser of evils.
MR. GOLUB: Number 17 is an employee of the U.S. Post Office, and that juror was not struck.
MR. HANDY: You want me to—
THE COURT: That’s his response to your statement.
[755]*755MR. HANDY: I understand that, but that doesn’t change the fact that — I’m trying to think why we kept him. We had a big question mark on him and ended up keeping him because it was either that or somebody else. But I absolutely didn’t want a postal worker on the jury.
MR. GOLUB: There is a racially neutral reason, but the fact is that the black person on the jury didn’t say anything to give any indication about her opinions or feelings at all except to state that loyalty is an important aspect of an employee. It is up to the defendant, once a factor that there is a prima facie case of discrimination made known to the Court, to come up with a showing that this was not discrimination, and all they’re saying is that we’re targeting postal workers where there’s another postal worker that they did select, who is white. So what we have here is a selection process about which postal worker to strike that appears to be made on a postal worker’s race, a venireman’s race.
MR. HANDY: That is a racially mixed group. We didn’t go through and cut all of the blacks. We cut this lady because she was a postal worker and for union reasons. We may have not been consistent as we got later in the numbers, but I don’t think you could compare one with the other. There wasn’t another reason. I’ll state so under oath.
THE COURT: There are others on the jury?
MR. HANDY: Other blacks on the jury? There are two blacks on the jury, yes, sir.
THE COURT: Is that right?
MR. GOLUB: That is correct.
THE COURT: I hadn’t noticed because I don’t notice those kinds of things. Okay. Anything else?
MR. GOLUB: Judge, we — is the motion— is the Court going to make a ruling on the motion?
THE COURT: Sure. Denied. What else?
Baker contends the court erred by allowing Lexington Place to strike juror number three though Lexington Place did not offer a race-neutral explanation for its challenge.
Batson/Edmonson Challenges
In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court declared that racially motivated use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases violates due process of law and requires reversal. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court extended the reach of Batson to civil trials. 500 U.S. 614, 618-28, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2081-87, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991).
Resolution of a Batson/Edmonson challenge is a three-step process: (1) the opponent of the peremptory challenge must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination; (2) the party who exercised the strike must come forward with a race-neutral explanation; and (3) if the striking party does so, the party challenging the strike must prove purposeful racial discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71, 131 L.Ed.2d 834; Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1865-66, 114 L.Ed.2d 395; Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex.1997).
1. Prima Facie Case
Because Lexington Place offered an explanation for striking veniremember three without first objecting that Baker did not state a prima facie case, it waived that objection. Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445.
2. Race-Neutral Explanation
In evaluating whether the explanation offered is race-neutral, we must determine whether the peremptory challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law, assuming the reasons for the peremptory challenge are true. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S .Ct. at 1866; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445. A neutral explanation means the challenge was based on something other than the veniremember’s race. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866-67; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will [756]*756be deemed race-neutral for purposes of the analysis at step two. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866-67; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445. Thus, the inquiry does not terminate at step two even if the party opposing the peremptory challenge offers a “silly or superstitious” explanation, so long as that explanation is race-neutral. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445. The persuasiveness of the justification for the challenge is not relevant until the third step. Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445.
Lexington Place’s attorney explained: “We based [the challenge] on the fact that she’s a union worker and a postal worker, and postal workers are known to be militant and more pro-employee than pro-employer, and that’s what was the basis for striking that juror.” Baker’s attorney agreed that this explanation was racially neutral. This explanation was not based on the juror’s race, but rather on her occupation and the views and attitudes attached to that occupation.
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OPINION
ANDELL, Justice.'
The appellant, Carrie M. Baker, appeals a judgment in her favor. In her sole point of error, Baker argues the court clearly erred by overruling her challenge to the racially motivated use of a jury strike. We affirm.
Background
During jury selection, Lexington Place exercised a peremptory challenge to remove venire member number three, a black woman, from the panel. Baker objected that the challenge was impermissibly motivated by race under Batson v. Kentucky.1
The court conducted a brief hearing on Baker’s challenge, which went as follows:2
MR. GOLUB: Judge, we need to do a Batson challenge to the exclusion of Juror No. 8. I don’t believe there was any justification for excluding her from the panel. I think this was based on the fact that she is a black woman, and I don’t know there’s any nondiseriminato-ry reason for her exclusion from the panel.
THE COURT: Your response?
MR. HANDY: Your Honor, we based — we didn’t consider color. We based it on the fact that she’s a postal worker and a union worker, and postal workers are known to be militant and more pro-employee then pro-employer, and that’s what was the basis for striking that juror.
MR. GOLUB: There is another postal worker on the panel, No. 17, and he was not struck by the defendants.
MR. HANDY: Well, that’s the lesser of evils.
MR. GOLUB: Number 17 is an employee of the U.S. Post Office, and that juror was not struck.
MR. HANDY: You want me to—
THE COURT: That’s his response to your statement.
[755]*755MR. HANDY: I understand that, but that doesn’t change the fact that — I’m trying to think why we kept him. We had a big question mark on him and ended up keeping him because it was either that or somebody else. But I absolutely didn’t want a postal worker on the jury.
MR. GOLUB: There is a racially neutral reason, but the fact is that the black person on the jury didn’t say anything to give any indication about her opinions or feelings at all except to state that loyalty is an important aspect of an employee. It is up to the defendant, once a factor that there is a prima facie case of discrimination made known to the Court, to come up with a showing that this was not discrimination, and all they’re saying is that we’re targeting postal workers where there’s another postal worker that they did select, who is white. So what we have here is a selection process about which postal worker to strike that appears to be made on a postal worker’s race, a venireman’s race.
MR. HANDY: That is a racially mixed group. We didn’t go through and cut all of the blacks. We cut this lady because she was a postal worker and for union reasons. We may have not been consistent as we got later in the numbers, but I don’t think you could compare one with the other. There wasn’t another reason. I’ll state so under oath.
THE COURT: There are others on the jury?
MR. HANDY: Other blacks on the jury? There are two blacks on the jury, yes, sir.
THE COURT: Is that right?
MR. GOLUB: That is correct.
THE COURT: I hadn’t noticed because I don’t notice those kinds of things. Okay. Anything else?
MR. GOLUB: Judge, we — is the motion— is the Court going to make a ruling on the motion?
THE COURT: Sure. Denied. What else?
Baker contends the court erred by allowing Lexington Place to strike juror number three though Lexington Place did not offer a race-neutral explanation for its challenge.
Batson/Edmonson Challenges
In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court declared that racially motivated use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases violates due process of law and requires reversal. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court extended the reach of Batson to civil trials. 500 U.S. 614, 618-28, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2081-87, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991).
Resolution of a Batson/Edmonson challenge is a three-step process: (1) the opponent of the peremptory challenge must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination; (2) the party who exercised the strike must come forward with a race-neutral explanation; and (3) if the striking party does so, the party challenging the strike must prove purposeful racial discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71, 131 L.Ed.2d 834; Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1865-66, 114 L.Ed.2d 395; Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex.1997).
1. Prima Facie Case
Because Lexington Place offered an explanation for striking veniremember three without first objecting that Baker did not state a prima facie case, it waived that objection. Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445.
2. Race-Neutral Explanation
In evaluating whether the explanation offered is race-neutral, we must determine whether the peremptory challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law, assuming the reasons for the peremptory challenge are true. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S .Ct. at 1866; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445. A neutral explanation means the challenge was based on something other than the veniremember’s race. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866-67; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will [756]*756be deemed race-neutral for purposes of the analysis at step two. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866-67; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445. Thus, the inquiry does not terminate at step two even if the party opposing the peremptory challenge offers a “silly or superstitious” explanation, so long as that explanation is race-neutral. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445. The persuasiveness of the justification for the challenge is not relevant until the third step. Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445.
Lexington Place’s attorney explained: “We based [the challenge] on the fact that she’s a union worker and a postal worker, and postal workers are known to be militant and more pro-employee than pro-employer, and that’s what was the basis for striking that juror.” Baker’s attorney agreed that this explanation was racially neutral. This explanation was not based on the juror’s race, but rather on her occupation and the views and attitudes attached to that occupation. Striking a juror because of his employment with the United States Postal Service constitutes a facially race-neutral explanation and does not violate Batson. Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 205 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).
3. Purposeful Racial Discrimination
At the third stage of the Bat-son/Edmonson analysis, the trial court may determine if the party challenging the strike has proven purposeful discrimination, and the trial court may believe or not believe the explanation offered by the party who exercised the peremptory challenge. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364, 367, 111 S .Ct. at 1866-67, 1870; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446. The issue of whether the race-neutral explanation should be believed is purely a question for the trial court. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364, 367, 111 S.Ct. at 1866-67, 1870; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446. It is at this stage that implausible justifications for striking potential jurors “may (and probably will) be found [by the trial court] to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” Purkett 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771; Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446.
Baker claims the court erred in accepting Lexington Place’s explanation because (1) nothing in the record supports characterizing Baker as a militant, anti-employer, union member and (2) a white male postal worker (veniremember number 17) was not struck from the jury.
During voir dire, the full extent of the excluded veniremember’s statements was that pride, loyalty, and good attendance make for a good employee. Neither these responses, nor the juror information cards show the excluded juror to be a militant, anti-employer, union member. In fact, when veniremember number three was asked questions she tended to reveal pro-employer views and not an anti-employer stance. These responses arguably support a finding that Lexington Place’s proffered explanation was merely a pretext.
However, Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 868 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), lays out certain factors which can be used to overcome a finding of pretext. These factors include:
1. No evidence of a pattern of strikes used to challenge black veniremembers; and
2. Blacks remaining on the venire.
Keeton, 749 S.W.2d at 868.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that a pattern of strikes was used to challenge veniremembers on the basis of race. In fact, two blacks were seated on the jury. The selected jury’s racial mix undercuts Baker’s claim that there was purposeful discrimination.
Baker further contends that leaving a white postal worker on the jury when a black veniremember was struck for being a postal worker raises an inference of discrimination.
Lexington Place explained that it did not want any postal employees on the jury, but that it had competing concerns later in the panel selection when veniremember number 17 was questioned, and Lexington Place chose not to strike him because he was “the lesser of two evils.” The record supports that assertion. Juror number 17’s voir dire responses were very favorable to the defense. He replied that he had been the foreman on a jury that had reached a verdict [757]*757for a defendant in a civil ease, and he had been exposed to propaganda regarding lawsuit abuse and mental anguish suits.
The standard of review is “abuse of discretion.” Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision “is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding principles.” Id. Considering that (1) there were two black persons left on the venire, (2) Lexington Place provided a facially race-neutral explanations for not striking veniremember number 17, and (3) juror number 17’s responses favored Lexington Place’s assertion that he was “the lesser of two evils,” we cannot hold there was an abuse of discretion.
We overrule the sole point of error and affirm the judgment.
O’CONNOR, J., dissents.