Bailey v. Ford Motor Co.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 13, 2024
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02420
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRIAN ROBERT BAILEY, et al., No. 2:24-cv-02420-DC-DMC 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND AND REMANDING THIS 14 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., ACTION TO THE TEHAMA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 15 Defendants. (Doc. No. 10) 16 17 This matter is before the court on the motion to remand this case to the Tehama County 18 Superior Court filed by Plaintiffs Brian Robert Bailey and Kathryn Lynn Philippe. (Doc. No. 10- 19 1.) The pending motion was taken under submission to be decided on the papers pursuant to 20 Local Rule 230(g). (Doc. No. 15.) For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand 21 will be granted. 22 BACKGROUND 23 On July 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this “lemon law” action against Defendant Ford Motor 24 Company (“Ford”) and Does 1 through 10, in Tehama County Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 25 2.) In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege they purchased a 2022 Ford F-250 on June 7, 2022, and as 26 part of that lease, Ford issued a written warranty under which Ford agreed to “maintain the utility 27 or performance of plaintiff’s vehicle” or provide compensation for the vehicle’s nonconformities. 28 (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 10.) Plaintiffs further allege that after they took possession of the vehicle, it had or 1 developed several defects, including defective braking and engine systems. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–12.) 2 According to the complaint, Defendant failed to repair, replace, or make restitution for the 3 vehicle’s defects. (Id. at ¶¶ 14–15.) 4 Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs bring five claims under California’s Song-Beverly 5 Consumer Warranty Act for: (1) violation of California Civil Code § 1793.2(d); (2) violation of 6 California Civil Code § 1793.2(b); (3) violation of California Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3); (4) 7 breach of express written warranty in violation of California Civil Code §§ 1791.2(a), 1794; and 8 (5) breach of implied warranty of merchantability in violation of California Civil Code §§ 1791.1, 9 1794. (Doc. 1-2 at 4–8.). 10 Defendant Ford timely filed its notice of removal on September 5, 2024, asserting that this 11 court has subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 12 §§ 1332, 1441(a), and 1446. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Shortly thereafter, on September 17, 2024, 13 Plaintiffs filed their operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) as a matter of course pursuant to 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B). (Doc. No. 5.) Therein, Plaintiffs assert that same 15 claims and continue to name Defendant Ford and Doe defendants, but they also name Defendant 16 Corning Ford, Inc. (“Corning”) for the first time. (Id.) The only claim Plaintiffs bring against 17 Defendant Corning is their fifth claim of breach of implied warranty of merchantability in 18 violation of California Civil Code §§ 1791.1, 1794. (Id. at ¶¶ 39–43.) 19 On October 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the pending motion to remand this action back to the 20 Tehama County Superior Court, on the grounds that the joinder of Defendant Corning renders the 21 parties non-diverse, and that Defendant Ford has not met its burden in demonstrating that the 22 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 as required for diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. Nos. 10; 10-1 23 at 5, 7.) Defendant Ford filed its opposition to the pending motion on October 17, 2024, and 24 Plaintiffs filed their reply thereto on October 22, 2024. (Doc. Nos. 16, 17.) 25 LEGAL STANDARD 26 A. Removal Jurisdiction 27 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 28 America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove any action from state court to 1 federal court when the federal court has original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 2 Removal to federal court is proper when a case filed in state court poses a federal question or 3 where there is diversity of citizenship among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds 4 $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). 5 The party removing the action has the burden of establishing grounds for federal 6 jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Hamsen v. Grp. Health Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 7 1057 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 8 F.3d 1102, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010)). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the 9 district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 10 Removal statutes are strictly construed against jurisdiction. Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & 11 through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 12 (9th Cir. 1992)). A federal court must remand the case to state court if there is any doubt as to 13 right of removal. Id.; Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 14 2003). 15 A party’s notice of removal must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for 16 removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). “By design, § 1446(a) tracks the general pleading requirement 17 stated in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” and a “statement ‘short and plain’ 18 need not contain evidentiary submissions.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 19 574 U.S. 81, 84, 87 (2014); see also Ramirez-Duenas v. VF Outdoor, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-0161- 20 AWI-SAB, 2017 WL 1437595, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2017) (“The notice of removal may rely 21 on the allegations of the complaint and need not be accompanied by any extrinsic evidence.”). 22 B. Fraudulent Joinder 23 “In determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts may disregard the 24 citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined.” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 25 548 (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914)). There are two 26 ways to show fraudulent joinder: “(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) 27 inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.” 28 Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). In 1 most cases, the determination as to fraudulent joinder turns on whether the plaintiff can “state a 2 reasonable or colorable claim for relief under the applicable substantive law against the party 3 whose presence in the action would destroy the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” 4 Weeping Hollow Ave. Tr. v. Spencer, 831 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 5 However, the party opposing remand bears a “heavy burden” of proving fraudulent 6 joinder. Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1044. “Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear and convincing 7 evidence,” and courts must resolve all disputed questions of fact in favor of the plaintiff. 8 Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts 9 may consider summary judgment-type evidence in making their determination. Morris v. Princess 10 Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, “[r]emand must be granted unless the 11 defendant establishes that plaintiff could not amend her pleadings to cure the purported 12 deficiency.” Reyes v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:20-cv-00833-DAD-SKO, 2020 WL 7224286, at *2 13 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2020) (citing Padilla v. AT&T Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 14 2009)). 15 C. Joinder of a Non-Diverse Defendant After Removal 16 Ordinarily, under Rule 15, a party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course 17 within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). 18 Pursuant to the removal statutes, however, “[i]f after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional 19 defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, 20 or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). 21 While there is some disagreement among district courts in the Ninth Circuit as to whether 22 an amendment of claims that destroys diversity should be analyzed under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) or 23 the more permissive Rule 15(a), a clear majority of courts look to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). See Sabag 24 v. FCA US, LLC, No. 16-cv-6639-CAS, 2016 WL 6581154, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2016) 25 (“Having considered [] conflicting authorities, the Court adopts the approach of the line of cases 26 applying Section 1447(e) to scrutinize the propriety of a diversity-destroying amendment 27 pursuant to Rule 15(a)”); Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, at *3, n.1 (“This court joins the majority of 28 district courts in the Ninth Circuit in choosing to ‘analyze joinder or amendment of claims to add 1 a non-diverse defendant under § 1447(e) as opposed to Rule 15(a)(1)’s amendment as-of-right 2 standard.’”) (quoting Martinez v. FCA US LLC, No. 2:19-cv-08097-SVW, 2020 WL 223608, at 3 *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2020)); Viveros v. Ford Motor Co., No. 21-cv-527-TWR-BGS, 2021 WL 4 5989365, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 28, 2021) (same). This court joins the majority of district courts in 5 the Ninth Circuit and will likewise “scrutinize[] the plaintiff’s purposes for amendment under 6 section 1447(e).” Velasco v. Ford Motor Co., No. 22-cv-366-MMA-DEB, 2022 WL 2287258, at 7 *2 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 2022). 8 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), district courts have discretion to decide whether to allow 9 joinder of a “diversity destroying defendant.” Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 10 (9th Cir. 1998). Courts consider the following factors when determining whether to allow joinder 11 of a non-diverse defendant after removal: 12 whether the new defendants should be joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) as “needed for just adjudication”; (2) whether 13 the statute of limitations would preclude an original action against the new defendants in state court; (3) whether there has been 14 unexplained delay in requesting joinder; (4) whether joinder is intended solely to defeat federal jurisdiction; (5) whether the claims 15 against the new defendant appear valid; and (6) whether denial of joinder will prejudice the plaintiff. 16 17 Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, at *3 (quoting Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154, at *4 (citation omitted)). No 18 single factor is a precondition for allowing joinder, however, one factor may prove to be decisive. 19 Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154, at *4 (internal citations omitted). 20 ANALYSIS 21 Plaintiffs seeks remand of this action to the Tehama County Superior Court on the 22 grounds that their proper joinder of Defendant Corning in the first amended complaint destroys 23 diversity of citizenship between the parties. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 5.) To determine whether 24 Defendant Corning has been properly joined, the court will address the factors courts consider 25 when determining whether to allow joinder of a non-diverse defendant after removal. For the 26 reasons explained below, the court finds that on balance, consideration of those factors weigh 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 in favor of allowing Plaintiffs to join Corning as a defendant in this matter.1 2 A. Need for Joinder under Rule 19(a) 3 While courts consider the Rule 19(a) standard in deciding whether to permit joinder, it is 4 more restrictive than the standard proscribed by § 1447(e). Eguilos v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., 5 Inc., No. 2:22-cv-00614-KJM-KJN, 2022 WL 2713273, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2022) (citing 6 Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, at *4). Joinder of a party may be necessary under Rule 19(a) when: (1) 7 “in his absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among the parties;” (2) “he has an interest 8 in the action and resolving the action in his absence may as a practical matter impair or impede 9 his ability to protect that interest;” and (3) resolution of the action in their absence “may leave an 10 existing party subject to inconsistent obligations because of that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 19(a)(1)(A)–(B)(ii). In contrast, the standard under § 1447(e) is met when “joinder will prevent 12 separate and redundant actions.” Eguilos, 2022 WL 2713273, at *2 (citing Taylor v. Honeywell 13 Corp., No. 09-4947, 2010 WL 1881459, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010)). 14 Here, Defendant Ford argues that Defendant Corning is not a necessary party under Rule 15 19(a) because complete relief is available against Defendant Ford, and that is why Plaintiffs did 16 not bring a claim against Corning from the outset. (Doc. No. 16 at 9.) However, as Plaintiffs 17 argue in their reply brief, joinder of Defendant Corning is necessary because their claims for 18 relief against Defendants Corning and Ford involve the same vehicle, the same alleged failures to 19 repair the vehicle, and the same alleged warranty obligations. (Doc. No. 17 at 5.) The court 20 agrees. See Viveros, 2021 WL 5989365, at *4 (finding defendant dealership necessary for 21 adjudication where breach of warranty claims against the manufacturer and dealership concerned 22 the same vehicle, defects, and repairs). As a result, failure to join Defendant Corning would result 23 in duplicative actions that concern the same vehicle and “will require many of the same 24 documents and witnesses and will implicate many of the same factual and legal issues.” Avellanet 25

1 Plaintiffs also argued in their motion to remand that Defendant Ford did not meet its burden in 26 demonstrating that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 7.) However, 27 the court need not address whether the amount in controversy is met for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because the joinder of Defendant Corning, a California citizen, destroys diversity of 28 citizenship and divests this court of jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 8.) 1 v. FCA US LLC, No. 19-cv-7621-JFW-KSX, 2019 WL 5448199, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2019); 2 see also Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, at *5 (finding car dealership a necessary party where claim 3 against existing defendant manufacturer involved the same vehicle and alleged failures to repair 4 the vehicle); Malijen v. Ford Motor Co., No. 20-cv-1217-JGB-KKX, 2020 WL 5934298, at *2 5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2020) (finding that failure to join proposed defendant would result in 6 redundant actions because plaintiff’s claims for relief against proposed and existing defendants 7 concerned the same allegedly defective vehicle). Further, “regardless of who Plaintiff[s] could 8 ultimately recover from,” Plaintiffs allege an “independent cause of action” against Defendant 9 Corning that would result in redundancy if Plaintiffs were forced to litigate it apart from their 10 claims against Defendant Ford. See Malijen, 2020 WL 5934298, at *2 (citation omitted). 11 Therefore, consideration of this factor weighs in favor of permitting the joinder of 12 Defendant Corning to this action. 13 B. Timeliness of Joinder 14 Courts consider whether the amendment to add a non-diverse party was completed in a 15 timely manner. Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, at *5; Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 16 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Courts also consider the procedural stage of the case and the length of time 17 between the original complaint and the amended complaint. Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, at *5. 18 However, the court may also deny joinder when the non-diverse defendant’s identity was readily 19 determinable and could have been named in the original complaint. Crippen v. Int’l Paper Co., 20 No. 223-cv-01107-DAD-CKD, 2024 WL 1181367, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2024) (plaintiff’s 21 failure to explain delay in naming non-diverse defendant despite knowing his identity prior to 22 filing the first complaint weighed against joinder). 23 Here, Plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint within three months (67 days) of the 24 filing of their original complaint and less than two weeks (12 days) after service of Defendant 25 Ford’s answer and notice of removal, which falls within the 21-day window provided by Rule 26 15(a) and does not constitute an unreasonable delay. See Eguilos, 2022 WL 2713273, at *3 27 (motion to amend filed three months after initial complaint and one month after removal favors 28 allowing amendment); Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, at *6 (motion to amend filed within three 1 months of original complaint and one month after notice of removal not unreasonable); Lara v. 2 Bandit Indus., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02459-MCE-AC, 2013 WL 1155523, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 3 2013) (motion to amend filed five months after initial complaint and three months after removal 4 is not unreasonable); Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (six-week delay between complaint and 5 attempted amendment not unreasonable). As Plaintiffs noted, neither party has filed dispositive 6 motions or undertaken extensive discovery, which also supports a finding that there was no 7 unreasonable delay. See Lara, 2013 WL 1155523, at *3 (finding no undue delay where parties 8 had not filed dispositive motions nor completed substantial discovery). 9 However, as Defendant Ford points out in its opposition, Plaintiffs were likely aware of 10 the dealership they purchased the vehicle from and the identities of the repair facilities that 11 worked on the vehicle given the nature of this action. (Doc. No. 16 at 10.) Plaintiffs do not 12 provide an explanation for their delay in joining Defendant Corning, the dealership they allegedly 13 purchased the vehicle from, to this action. Plaintiffs’ failure to explain the delay weighs against 14 allowing joinder. See Crippen, 2024 WL 1181367, at *5 (finding plaintiff’s failure to provide 15 reasonable justification for her delay in seeking to join defendant despite knowing of his identity 16 from the outset weighed against allowing joinder); Maldonado v. City of Oakland, 01-cv-01970- 17 MEJ, 2002 WL 826801, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2002) (denying motion to amend where 18 plaintiffs failed to explain their delay in joining parties whose identities they knew of eight 19 months prior to the inception of the case). 20 The court finds that the minimal delay in filing the first amended complaint weighs in 21 favor of permitting joinder, but Plaintiffs’ failure to explain the reason for this delay in naming 22 Defendant Corning weighs against permitting joinder. Therefore, consideration of this factor is 23 neutral. 24 C. Whether Joinder is Intended to Solely Defeat Jurisdiction 25 A plaintiff’s motive in seeking to join a non-diverse party after removal is a pertinent 26 consideration in a district court’s decision to permit or deny joinder. Viveros, 2021 WL 5989365, 27 at *6. However, the court is not required to automatically impute an improper motive to plaintiffs 28 seeking to join defendants that would destroy diversity because § 1447(e) gives courts greater 1 discretion in dealing with this type of scenario. IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Campania Mexicana 2 de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Trotman v. United 3 Parcel Serv., No. 96-cv-1168-VRW, 1996 WL 428333, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 1996) (“The 4 legislative history to § 1447(e) also suggests that it was intended to undermine the doctrine 5 employed by some courts that amendments which destroyed diversity were to be viewed with 6 suspicion.”)). Indeed, courts have allowed joinder in the post-removal context when the plaintiff’s 7 claim is facially valid, even when the circumstances otherwise suggest a motive to destroy 8 diversity jurisdiction. See Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, at *7 (allowing joinder despite substantial 9 similarities between initial complaint and proposed amended complaint where plaintiff alleged a 10 facially valid claim against proposed defendant); Lara, 2013 WL 1155523, at *4 (allowing 11 joinder and declining to find improper motive even though plaintiff sought to add a non-diverse 12 defendant after removal). 13 The fourth factor of plaintiff’s motive and the fifth factor of the facial validity of the 14 plaintiff’s claim against the non-diverse defendant are “intertwined” in the § 1447(e) analysis. 15 McGrath v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 298 F.R.D. 601, 608 (S.D. Cal. 2014). The “strength of the 16 claims against the proposed new [d]efendants bears directly on whether joinder is sought solely to 17 divest” the court of diversity jurisdiction. Id. 18 Here, Defendant Ford suggests the filing of the first amended complaint shortly after it 19 removed this action to federal court coupled with Plaintiffs’ failure to identify any damages for 20 their claim against Defendant Corning suggests the only purpose of the amendment is to destroy 21 diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 16 at 11–12.) Plaintiffs argue in reply that Defendant Ford has 22 not carried the “heavy burden of persuasion” in (1) demonstrating that Defendant Corning has 23 been fraudulently joined; (2) that Plaintiffs insufficiently plead the implied warranty of 24 merchantability claim against Defendant Corning; and (3) that Plaintiffs could not amend their 25 complaint to correct any deficiency. (Doc. No. 17 at 9–10.) 26 Based on the timing of Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint and the similarity between the 27 two complaints, it appears that Plaintiffs were motivated, at least in part, by a desire to destroy 28 diversity. See Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154, at *5 (noting that some courts infer improper motive 1 where the proposed amended complaint is substantially similar to the original complaint). 2 However, the court “does not construe Plaintiffs’ preference for state court any more negatively 3 than Defendants’ preference for federal court.” Lara, 2013 WL 1155523, at *4 (citing Taylor, 4 2010 WL 1881459, at *3). Despite the similarities between the original complaint and first 5 amended complaint, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ joinder of Defendant Corning is not for the 6 sole purpose of destroying diversity, especially because in considering the fifth factor below, the 7 court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claim against Corning is “facially legitimate.” See McGrath, 298 8 F.R.D. at 608; Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154, at *5 (finding plaintiff’s motive in amending complaint 9 not solely for the purpose of destroying diversity where the claim against new defendant was 10 facially legitimate). 11 Therefore, consideration of this factor weighs slightly in favor of permitting the joinder of 12 Corning to this action. 13 D. Validity of Plaintiff’s Claim against Non-Diverse Defendant 14 “The existence of a facially legitimate claim against the putative defendant weighs in 15 favor of permitting joinder under § 1447(e).” Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154, at *6 (quoting Taylor, 16 2010 WL 1881459, at *3). The court only needs to decide if the claim seems to be valid and not 17 whether the claim could “be defeated by a motion to dismiss” or whether “[p]laintiff can prevail 18 on the merits.” Freeman v. Cardinal Health Pharm. Servs., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-01994-JAM-KJN, 19 2015 WL 2006183, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting the notion that the standard under § 1447(e) is 20 the same as the standard under a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment). A claim 21 does not have to be alleged with particularity or plausibility, rather, it only needs to “seem” valid 22 to meet the standard set forth by § 1447(e). Dordoni v. FCA US LLC, No. 20-cv-1475-JGB-SHK, 23 2020 WL 6082132, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2020). 24 In determining whether Plaintiffs’ claim appears valid, the “question is whether California 25 law obviously forecloses plaintiffs’ claim.” Millican v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-cv-05348-WHA, 26 2019 WL 7020214, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2019) (joinder of defendant was proper even though 27 plaintiffs’ claims may not have survived a motion to dismiss or prevailed on the merits). Notably, 28 Defendant Ford does not assert that car dealerships are not subject to implied warranty 1 obligations. Indeed, dealerships have been sued and found liable for breach of warranty under the 2 Song-Beverly Act. See Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154, at *6 (citing Jones v. Credit Auto Ctr., Inc., 3 237 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 4 (2015) (holding that dealership breached implied warranty of 4 merchantability when latent defect was discovered within three months of sale of vehicle); 5 Reveles v. Toyota by the Bay, 57 Cal. App. 4th 1139, 1158 (1997) (plaintiff allowed to recover 6 against defendant dealership under the Song-Beverly Act)). 7 Plaintiffs allege in their first amended complaint that Defendant Corning violated the 8 Song-Beverly Act by failing to comply with their obligations under the implied warranty of 9 merchantability that accompanied the sale of the vehicle. (Doc. No. 5 at ¶¶ 40–43.) Defendant 10 Ford argues Corning is not necessary to resolving this action and Plaintiffs make no attempt to 11 state facts or include any details to support their contention that Defendant Corning had 12 knowledge of defects at the time of the sale. (Doc. No. 16 at 12.) However, as Plaintiffs 13 emphasize in their reply brief, Defendant Ford makes no showing that any insufficiency with 14 Plaintiffs’ pleading could not be remedied by amendment and any doubts regarding the validity of 15 Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendant Corning should be resolved in favor of remand. (Doc. No. 17 16 at 8–9). The court agrees any such purported deficiencies appear to be curable by amendment. See 17 Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, at *9 (noting that though plaintiff’s complaint could be dismissed 18 under Rule 12(b)(6), the deficiencies could be “cured by amendment”). 19 For these reasons, Defendant Ford has not shown that Plaintiffs do not have a facially 20 valid claim against Defendant Corning. Thus, consideration of this factor weights in favor of 21 permitting joinder of Defendant Corning to this action. 22 E. Whether the Statute of Limitations Would Preclude a New Action in State Court 23 “When a claim is timely filed in state court and then removed, a finding that the statute of 24 limitations would preclude the filing of a new, separate action against a party whose joinder has 25 been denied in the federal proceeding, may warrant remand.” Dordoni, 2020 WL 6082132, at *4 26 (citation omitted). The statute of limitations for breach of warranty claims under the Song- 27 Beverly Act is four years. Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154, at *5 (citing Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 174 28 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1306 (2009) (“[T]he statute of limitations for an action for breach of warranty 1 under the Song-Beverly Act is four years pursuant to section 2725 of the Uniform Commercial 2 Code.”)). 3 Here, Plaintiffs concede that a new action against Defendant Corning in state court would 4 not be time-barred. (Doc. No. 17 at 6.) Indeed, because Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle on June 7, 5 2022, at a minimum, they have until June 2026 to bring an action against Defendant Corning. 6 (Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 6.). Accordingly, consideration of this factor weighs against permitting the 7 joinder of Defendant Corning to this action. 8 F. Prejudice to Plaintiff 9 Lastly, courts consider any prejudice to the plaintiff. If a proposed defendant is “crucial” 10 to the action and complete relief cannot be afforded without the defendant, a plaintiff will be 11 prejudiced by their absence. Eguilos, 2022 WL 2713273, at *5 (citing Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, 12 at *10). Further, it is in the economic benefit of the parties and judicial system to allow plaintiffs 13 to pursue claims against parties sought to be joined in an action when the claims arise out of the 14 same factual circumstances. Reyes, 2020 WL 7224286, at *10. 15 Defendant Ford argues that Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by denial of joinder because 16 Plaintiffs can bring a separate action against Defendant Corning in state superior court and can 17 obtain complete relief from Defendant Ford in this action. (Doc. No. 16 at 13.) While that may be 18 true, the court agrees with Plaintiffs that it is in the economic benefit to all parties and the judicial 19 system to avoid such redundant litigation in state and federal court. (Doc. No. 17 at 9); see Reyes, 20 2020 WL 7224286, at *10 (finding that this factor of prejudice to the plaintiff weighed in favor of 21 permitting joinder where plaintiff’s claims against both defendants “arose out of the same 22 transaction or occurrence” and if denied, plaintiff would have to proceed with a separate action in 23 state court); Lara, 2013 WL 1155523, at *5 (explaining that denying joinder would prejudice 24 plaintiff who would have to proceed with a separate action in state court or choose to not pursue a 25 potentially viable claim). 26 Therefore, consideration of this factor weighs in favor of permitting the joinder of 27 Defendant Corning to this action. 28 ///// 1 | G. Balancing of the Factors 2 In sum, the court finds that four out of the six factors under § 1447(e) weigh in favor of 3 | remand, while one factor weighs against remand and one factor is neutral. After balancing these 4 | factors and considering the strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, this court concludes 5 | that Plaintiffs’ joinder of Defendant Corning was proper and will therefore permit joinder of 6 | Defendant Corning to this action. Consequently, there is no longer complete diversity of 7 | citizenship because Plaintiffs and Defendant Corning are citizens of California. (Doc. No. 5 at 8 | 45.) Accordingly, the court no longer has jurisdiction over this action and must grant Plaintiffs’ 9 | motion to remand. 10 CONCLUSION 11 For the reasons explained above: 12 1. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand this action to the Tehama County Superior Court 13 (Doc. No. 10) is granted; 14 2. This action is remanded to the Tehama County Superior Court, pursuant to 28 15 U.S.C. § 1447(c), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and 16 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. 17 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. □ 20 | Dated: _November 12, 2024 _ RUC Dena Coggins 21 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13