B. Prunty v. UCBR

CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 4, 2021
Docket1761 C.D. 2019
StatusPublished

This text of B. Prunty v. UCBR (B. Prunty v. UCBR) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
B. Prunty v. UCBR, (Pa. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Beverly Prunty, : Petitioner : : v. : : Unemployment Compensation : Board of Review, : No. 1761 C.D. 2019 Respondent : Argued: February 10, 2021

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 4, 2021

Beverly Prunty (Claimant) petitions this Court for review of the Unemployment Compensation (UC) Board of Review’s (UCBR) November 26, 2019 order affirming the Referee’s decision finding Claimant ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402.1 of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 The issue before the Court is whether the Community College of Philadelphia’s (Employer) summer term constitutes a “regular term” based on the plain language of Section 402.1(1) of the Law.2 Employer employed Claimant as a part-time adjunct faculty member in its English Department (Department) beginning in 1991. Employer begins academic

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, added by Section 5 of the Act of July 6, 1977, P.L. 41, 43 P.S. § 802.1 (relating to benefits based on service for educational institutions). 2 Claimant includes a second issue of whether precedent supports the UCBR’s decision, which is encompassed in the discussion of the first issue. See Claimant Br. at 3. years with a fall semester, after which is a spring semester, followed by two summer sessions. Enrollment in Employer’s courses during the summer sessions is much lower than during the fall and spring semesters and, as a result, Employer offers fewer courses during the summer term. Claimant is a member of a union that has a collective bargaining agreement with Employer providing, among other things, that adjunct, part- time professors or instructors range in seniority from level 1 to level 14, with the highest number having first preference in their departments to bid on work during the summer sessions. Claimant has the highest seniority level in her Department. Further, Employer gives full-time faculty members priority over part-time faculty members, if both are available, to teach summer courses offered in their departments. Claimant taught courses during Employer’s spring 2019 semester, which ended on May 2, 2019. Claimant had a history of returning to her same teaching position each new academic year. On April 24, 2019, Employer issued Claimant a letter stating: “[T]he purpose of this letter is to acknowledge your services during the [s]pring 2019 academic semester . . . . There is a reasonable assurance that you will have the opportunity to perform a similar service during the [f]all 2019 academic semester, dependent upon enrollment, budgetary considerations and performance.” Certified Record (C.R.) Item 9, Notes of Testimony, August 15, 2019 (N.T.) at Ex. E- 1. Employer requires part-time adjunct professors and instructors to submit availability forms. Claimant gave Employer her availability form, wherein she stated she was available to teach any course in her Department during both of the summer 2019 sessions. In various summer terms before 2019, including 2018, Employer had sufficient student enrollment, and few available full-time faculty to teach, thereby giving Claimant the ability to bid on and receive more than one course to teach. However, there was a year, 2012, where Claimant did not teach during either summer session. 2 For the summer 2019 term, either due to lack of student enrollment or full- time faculty available to teach in the summer term, there were an insufficient number of courses within Claimant’s Department to enable her to teach during both summer sessions. Employer offered and Claimant accepted a course in the first summer session, from May 11 through June 21, 2019, at a pay rate of $3,522.75 for said period. In addition to teaching one summer course, Claimant performed non-teaching work for Employer from June 6 through June 20, 2019, at an hourly rate of pay. Claimant applied for UC benefits. Claimant received $1,016.00 in UC benefits from May 11, 2019, through June 8, 2019. On June 13, 2019, the Indiana UC Service Center issued a Notice of Determination (Determination) finding Claimant ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402.1(1) of the Law. The Determination stated that Claimant’s unemployment commenced during the period between successive academic years and that Employer provided a bona fide offer of work for the next academic year.3 The UC Service Center also mailed Claimant a Notice of Non-Fault Overpayment (Notice), stating therein that Claimant was overpaid for five weeks because she was ineligible to receive UC benefits for the 2019 summer break due to Employer’s reasonable assurance of work in the fall. On June 20, 2019, Claimant appealed from the Determination and the Notice, stating that she works for Employer year-round, including the summer term, and that her work hours were decreased in 2019 based on the lone class she taught in the first summer session. A Referee hearing was held on August 15, 2019. On August 19, 2019, the Referee affirmed the UC Service Center’s Determination and Notice.4

3 The Determination stated that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits “beginning waiting week ending 5/4/2019.” C.R. Item 5, Determination at 1. However, because the waiting week ending May 4, 2019, was during the spring semester and not the summer term, Section 402.1(1) of the Law does not apply thereto. 4 The Referee reversed the portion of the Determination finding Claimant ineligible for UC benefits for waiting week ending May 4, 2019. 3 Claimant appealed to the UCBR. The UCBR affirmed the Referee’s decision. Thereafter, Claimant appealed to this Court.5,6 Claimant argues that the reasonable assurance doctrine does not apply herein because Claimant worked for Employer year-round. Specifically, Claimant declares that Section 402.1(1) of the Law only disqualifies her for the weeks at issue if they fall in one of two periods: (1) a break or period between academic years; or (2) a similar period between regular terms. See 43 P.S. § 802.1(1). Claimant contends her unemployment did not occur during a period between academic years, as the summer term is clearly included within Employer’s academic year. Further, Claimant maintains that, in order to determine whether Employer’s summer term constitutes a regular term or a period between regular terms, this Court must examine, as an issue of first impression, the meaning of the word “regular” as it is used in Section 402.1(1) of the Law. Claimant asserts that the plain meaning of “regular” in the context of the statute suggests that “regular terms” are conducted under consistent standards and offer the institution’s normal educational instruction to the general student population. Thus, Claimant argues that whether a school term is considered “regular” must be evaluated individually for each institution of higher learning. Moreover, Claimant proclaims that the plain meaning of Section 402.1(1) of the Law aligns with the remedial nature of the Law as well as the intent behind the Section 402.1 disqualification. Claimant maintains that the General Assembly’s intent in passing Section 402.1 of the Law was “to eliminate the payment of benefits to school employees during summer months and other regularly scheduled vacations, on the

5 “‘Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether the findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence.’ Miller v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev[.], 83 A.3d 484, 486 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).” Talty v.

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Bluebook (online)
B. Prunty v. UCBR, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/b-prunty-v-ucbr-pacommwct-2021.