Azzarmi v. Doe Officers 1-10

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 13, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-05726
StatusUnknown

This text of Azzarmi v. Doe Officers 1-10 (Azzarmi v. Doe Officers 1-10) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Azzarmi v. Doe Officers 1-10, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK AASIR AZZARMI, Plaintiff, 22-CV-5726 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND DOE OFFICERS 1-10, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that ten unidentified federal officers violated his rights.1 By order dated October 25, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Because Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated by federal officers, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint as an action brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (“[Bivens] is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under [§ 1983].”). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, who resides in Inglewood, California, brings this complaint alleging that Defendants, whom Plaintiff identifies as “Federal officers,” violated his rights “beginning around the end of July 2019 through present.” (ECF No. 2 at 5-6.) Plaintiff alleges that these unidentified officers “acted in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,” and that “at least one of the Defendants referred to Plaintiff and/or called Plaintiff a ‘Muslim terrorist’ when depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional rights in July 2019.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff brings this complaint seeking “monetary damages, punitive damages, emotional damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, equitable relief, etc.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also seeks to have this Court issue an order pursuant to Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997), to assist Plaintiff in identifying Defendants. (Id.)

DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but it lacks the facts necessary for the Court to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Although Plaintiff identifies Defendants as federal officers, he does not identify the federal agency that employs them. Further, it is not clear what these Defendants allegedly did or failed to do that harmed Plaintiff, or where the events giving rise to his claims occurred. Because such facts are not included, Plaintiff’s claim that his constitutional right were violated must be regarded as conclusory, and the Court is unable to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Because Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court declines, at this time, to issue a Valentin order to assist Plaintiff in identifying Defendants. In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, however, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his

complaint. LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege facts to state a valid claim against Defendants, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to amend his complaint to detail where the events giving rise to his claim occurred; to identify, if Plaintiff is able, the federal agency that employs the officers; and what each Defendant did or failed to do

that violated his rights. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his claims.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Azzarmi v. Doe Officers 1-10, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/azzarmi-v-doe-officers-1-10-nysd-2023.