Austro v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.

New York Court of Appeals

Austro v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.

487 N.E.2d 267, 66 N.Y.2d 674, 496 N.Y.S.2d 410, 1985 N.Y. LEXIS 17232

CourtNew York Court of Appeals

DecidedOctober 10, 1985

StatusPublished

Cited by38 cases

This text of 487 N.E.2d 267 (Austro v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Austro v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 487 N.E.2d 267, 66 N.Y.2d 674, 496 N.Y.S.2d 410, 1985 N.Y. LEXIS 17232 (N.Y. 1985).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, with costs, and judgment granted to Niagara Mohawk Power Co. (NiMo) on its third-party complaint against third-party defendants Weber Construction Co., Inc., and Kenneth Begin.

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, following trial, of NiMo’s third-party complaint insofar as it demanded indemnification from Weber for liability arising out of NiMo’s gross negligence. The demand was based on an agreement by Weber to indemnify NiMo for any liability caused by the latter’s negligence resulting, in whole or in part, in bodily injury arising out of work performed by Weber under a construction contract. The Appellate Division relied on this court’s pronouncements, in Gross v Sweet (49 NY2d 102) and Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v City of New York (58 NY2d 377), that exculpatory agreements will not be read to exempt a willful or grossly negligent party from liability to an injured person. The Appellate Division, however, failed to distinguish between the exculpatory clauses involved in those cases, which typically deprive a contracting party of the right to recover for damages suffered as the result of the exonerated party’s tortious act, and indemnity contracts that simply shift the source of compensation without restricting the injured party’s ability to recover. Indemnification agreements are unenforceable as violative of public policy only to the extent that they purport to indemnify a party for damages flowing from the intentional causation of injury (Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v Goldfarb, 53 NY2d 392, 400). Because there is no allegation of intentional harm in this case, NiMo should have been granted [677]*677judgment against Weber and Begin for the full amount of its liability to plaintiff Austro. In view of our holding, we need not decide whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding of gross negligence against NiMo.

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Meyer, Simons, Kaye, Alexander and Titone concur; Judge Jasen taking no part.

Order reversed, with costs, and judgment granted to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation in accordance with the memorandum herein.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, with costs, and judgment granted to Niagara Mohawk Power Co. (NiMo) on its third-party complaint against third-party defendants Weber Construction Co., Inc., and Kenneth Begin.

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, following trial, of NiMo’s third-party complaint insofar as it demanded indemnification from Weber for liability arising out of NiMo’s gross negligence. The demand was based on an agreement by Weber to indemnify NiMo for any liability caused by the latter’s negligence resulting, in whole or in part, in bodily injury arising out of work performed by Weber under a construction contract. The Appellate Division relied on this court’s pronouncements, in Gross v Sweet (49 NY2d 102) and Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v City of New York (58 NY2d 377), that exculpatory agreements will not be read to exempt a willful or grossly negligent party from liability to an injured person. The Appellate Division, however, failed to distinguish between the exculpatory clauses involved in those cases, which typically deprive a contracting party of the right to recover for damages suffered as the result of the exonerated party’s tortious act, and indemnity contracts that simply shift the source of compensation without restricting the injured party’s ability to recover. Indemnification agreements are unenforceable as violative of public policy only to the extent that they purport to indemnify a party for damages flowing from the intentional causation of injury (Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v Goldfarb, 53 NY2d 392, 400). Because there is no allegation of intentional harm in this case, NiMo should have been granted [677]*677judgment against Weber and Begin for the full amount of its liability to plaintiff Austro. In view of our holding, we need not decide whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding of gross negligence against NiMo.

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Meyer, Simons, Kaye, Alexander and Titone concur; Judge Jasen taking no part.

Order reversed, with costs, and judgment granted to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation in accordance with the memorandum herein.

St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company A/s/o the Durst Organization, Inc., and Four Times Square Association, L.L.C. v. Universal Builders Supply, Tishman Construction Corporation of New York, Universal Builders Supply, Inc., Third-Party-Plaintiff v. Tig Insurance Company, Aiu Insurance Company, and Royal Insurance Company of America, Third-Party-Defendants-Appellees

409 F.3d 73 (Third Circuit, 2004)

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487 N.E.2d 267, 66 N.Y.2d 674, 496 N.Y.S.2d 410, 1985 N.Y. LEXIS 17232, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/austro-v-niagara-mohawk-power-corp-ny-1985.

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